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Abstract 
 
Hazardous materials can be generally deemed as any material which, because of its 
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics, may cause, 
or pose a substantial or potential hazard to human health or the environment. In the 
context of ―sustainable development‖, most ‗materials‘ could be deemed to be 
‗hazardous‘ at some stage of their lifecycle, i.e. from extraction to final disposal.  
 
This PhD study develops a decision support system for engineers and policy makers to 
help limit environmental burden, by reducing the environmental risk and the associated 
carbon footprint, from the perspective of ‗hazardous‘ materials in product design, 
through the application of ‗game theory‘ and ‗grey theory‘ etc, as well as various 
computational approaches, by helping the designer identify novel solutions or 
mitigation strategies.  
 
The thesis starts by introducing the problem situation of the study and identify the 
research objectives, as well as previous studies have been reviewed in order to set this 
study in context.  
 
Since it is evident that consumers drive the open market, and their preference may be 
influenced by the carbon footprint label of products, the decision support system 
proposes an improved carbon labelling scheme to demonstrate the significance of a 
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product‘s carbon footprint in a more visual way. The prototype of the scheme is derived 
from the concept of ‗tolerability of risk‘, providing a framework by which judgments 
can be made as to whether society will accept the risk from hazardous materials.  
 
Application of game theory for decision support is a novel approach in this study, which 
aids decision-making by selecting appropriate strategies for both organisations and 
policy makers to reduce environmental impact. In this context, a game between 
manufacturers and government in the field of clean production is generated with various 
game scenarios to reflect the variation trend of strategic actions, and then developed to 
discuss the reduction of the inherent risk posed by ‗hazardous‘ materials and carbon 
emissions on the supply chain network.  
 
The ‗hierarchy of waste‘ suggests that the most preferable state for sustainability is 
prevention or the elimination of waste. Although this is not wholly practicable in real 
terms, the framework gives the importance to waste minimisation and prevention, 
especially promotes the cleaner production. In addition to strategy selection for 
mitigating environmental impact, the decision support system also develops an 
evaluation methodology for application by engineers to aid decision-making on 
materials selection, thus to improve the materials performances, promote cleaner 
production and provide better and sustainable products for public consumption.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Within the United Kingdom, approximately 272 million tonnes of waste from 
households, commerce and industry is generated annually (DEFRA, 2007). In most 
cases, waste materials treatment appears to be relatively straight forward and in many 
cases results in disposal to landfill. Fig.1.1 shows the current situation of waste 
materials disposal to landfill in European countries, where United Kingdom (UK) lags 
some way behind and maintains the higher landfill rate (DEFRA, 2007). However, this 
is relatively simplistic since most, but not all materials can be considered harmful or 
‗hazardous‘ to the environment to a greater or larger extent. That is to say most 
materials sent to landfill have an environmental impact.  
 
Fig.1.1. Municipal waste materials sent to landfill (adopted from: DEFRA, 2007) 
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The definition of hazardous materials, as given by Lee (2005) is  ―anything which, 
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious 
characteristics may cause, or significantly contribute to, an increase in mortality; or 
cause an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness: or pose a 
substantial present or potential hazard to human health and the environment when 
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed‖. 
Examples are the leaching properties of common polymers in the food supply chain, or 
formaldehyde, a common substance used in some furnishings, which is deemed to be 
carcinogenic. Thus, given this broad definition, the implication is that there are very few 
manufactured materials that would not be considered hazardous to some degree if badly 
managed or disposed of inappropriately. It follows that there is a need to consider the 
environmental risk to society associated with everyday consumer products. The 
environmental risk which is caused by the ‗hazardous‘ materials can be deemed as a 
measure of probability that damage to life, health, property, and/or the environment will 
occur as a result of a given hazard (Lee, 2005). Therefore, the risk to the environment 
resulting from ‗hazardous‘ materials as defined here, and the attendant health 
implications, need to be carefully assessed in the context of the product life-cycle. 
Furthermore, it is now widely acknowledged that our assessment of risk is often highly 
subjective, and that society tolerates a given level of risk on the basis of the perceived 
benefits and/or associated hazards (McGuire and Neighbour, 2010).  
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With natural resources being exploited at an increasing rate, as well as the threat of 
―climate change‖, the concept of Sustainable Development has been given more and 
more attention. Sustainable Development is now broadly recognized as “the principles 
of the current process of economic and technological development to ensure that the use 
of environmental resources to satisfy present demands is managed in a way that they 
are not left so damaged or impoverished they cannot be used by future generations” 
(WCED, 1987). In this context, all materials can be seen as ‗hazardous‘ in certain 
situations or at the various stages of the product lifecycle (Giudice, Rosa and Risitano 
2006), i.e. design, production, transportation, use, and final disposal. In particular, 
hazardous materials perhaps convert into the hazardous waste at the post consuming 
stage. In addition to the immediate risk posed by ‗hazardous‘ materials, it is also 
important in the socio-political context to attach importance to the ‗carbon footprint1‘, 
which may be an increasingly used indicator of environmental sustainability. Fossil 
fuels such as petrol, diesel etc. have been widely consumed during production and 
transportation, resulted in methane or other greenhouse gas generation. Due to most of 
the waste materials, i.e. organic materials, ultimate ending up in landfill, landfill gas, if 
uncontrolled, is considered as one of the main sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Thus, not only reducing, reusing and recycling waste materials, but also providing 
better, safer and sustainable products for public consumption, should be significant 
indicators in the goal of achieving sustainable development.  
                                                 
1
 which is interpreted as the total amount of carbon dioxide emitted, or its equivalent in terms of 
other greenhouse gases emissions (Carbon Trust, 2006) 
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1.2 The problem situation 
With regard to the ‗sustainable development‘, how to achieve sustainability becomes a 
worldwide concern. Thus, the ‗Triple Bottom Line‘ has been put forward to measure the 
impact of an organisation‘s activities (Henriques and Richardson, 2004). Table 1.1 
shows that the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) has reflected a company‘s value in terms of 
three dimensions, including not only its financial performance, i.e. profitability, but also 
the environmental and social resources (Savitz and Weber, 2006). Thus, a sustainable 
business should not only focus on the economic prosperity, but also pay much more 
attention to the environmental and social perspectives, ultimately to benefit all the 
stakeholders who will be affected by these three dimensions.  
 
Table 1.1 Triple bottom line (Reproduced from Savitz and Weber, 2006) 
Economic 
 performance 
 Environmental 
performance 
Social  
performance 
Proﬁtability 
Air quality 
(CO2 emissions) 
Human rights 
Return on investment Water quality Community impacts 
Tax payment 
Waste production and 
 energy consumption 
Product responsibility 
 
13 
 
However, it is thought that manufacturers, depending upon their business strategy, will 
tend to focus primarily on their owned economical profit and thus would be reluctant to 
bear the additional economic cost for technological innovation to implement ‗cleaner 
production‘. It is often assumed that manufacturers neglect their higher moral 
responsibility to provide ‗environmentally sound‘ products having due regard to the 
Triple Bottom Line. For instance, product design typically still does not consider the 
full lifecycle, especially giving little deliberation in the post-consuming stage (Deutz, 
Neighbour and McGuire, 2010). To provide ‗better‘ and ‗safer‘ products for the public 
as well as achieve the long term commercial sustainability, it is the duty of government 
to regulate the production process to ensure ‗safe‘ products not only in use to reduce 
their inherent risk, but also to mitigate the environmental impact. The question is 
whether the governmental regulation is sufficient and whether manufacturers would be 
willing to bear the additional cost for green technological innovation. 
 
In addition to environmental education sponsored by government, consumers‘ 
preference may be also influenced by the introduction of ‗carbon labelling‘ scheme, 
which has the potential to stimulate reductions in carbon emissions (Vanclay et al., 
2011). However, the current systems of carbon labelling do not communicate a 
meaningful message to the consumer, if the label simply presents the emissions value 
on the product package (Upham, Dendler and Bleda, 2011). According to the responses 
from a survey of carbon labelling, it is clear that the public find it quite difficult to 
imagine a given quantity of CO2 emission and its potential environmental impact 
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(Gadema and Oglethorpe, 2011). Thus, the carbon label still needs improvement in the 
clarity of current carbon labelling schemes, so as to encourage consumers to select low 
carbon products, as well as increase the potential for public carbon footprint reduction.  
 
Meanwhile, Society should also focus on achieving waste materials sustainability, by 
transforming from ―Cradle to Grave‖ into ―Cradle to Cradle‖, to create a closed-loop 
system for waste free, thus to improve the product quality being environmentally 
friendly (Lovins, 2008). The concept of ―Cradle to Cradle‖ is firstly put forward by 
Walter R. Stahel in the 1970‘s, and developed sub-sequentially by Dr. William 
McDonough and Dr. Michael Brauggart. Their collaborative publication ―Cradle to 
Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things‖ in 2002, which firstly demonstrates how 
to achieve the model. This approach divides all materials into to two categories: 
‗technical‘ or ‗biological‘ nutrients (see Fig.1.2). Technical nutrients are those materials 
which are non-toxic, non-harmful, and consequently have less environmental risk or 
negative impact on the natural environment. These kinds of materials can be reused 
directly in continuous cycles without losing their integrity or quality, or recycled parts 
of their quality and functionality, for example the cola bottle. Biological nutrients are 
organic materials, which can be decomposed into the soil as fertilization to provide food 
for microorganisms without affecting the natural environment. Both nutrients are in 
order to prevent waste materials, reduce consumption of raw materials, energy 
consumption, and environmental risk (McDonough and Brauggart, 2002). In this 
context, environmental consideration has played an important role in materials selection, 
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which is an increasing requirement in product design to provide better, safer and 
sustainable products for public consumption.  
 
Fig.1.2. A ―Cradle to Cradle‖ model (adopted from McDonough and Brauggart, 2002) 
 
In summary, as society is facing major environmental challenges, is it possible to 
achieve sustainability by using less natural resources, optimizing recycling and reusing 
waste materials (DEFRA, 2008)? This PhD project focuses mainly on the design of an 
environmental management system for hazardous waste materials in order to reduce 
environmental risk and the associated impact, as well as to battle against ‗climate 
change‘.  
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1.3 Aims and objectives 
The main aim of this PhD study is to develop a ―decision support system‖ for 
application by engineering designers to minimize environmental risk and thus to 
minimize the associated carbon footprint, through the application of ‗game theory‘, 
‗grey theory‘ and various computational approach, to help the designer identify novel 
solutions, mitigation strategies.  
 
Specifically, the objectives for the PhD study are presented below: 
 
Identify an appropriate indicator to better understand the environmental impacts of 
products, which is easily communicated and consistent with the concept of 
sustainability (TBL).  
 
Using Systems Theory, evaluate the ‗problem situation‘ and develop a conceptual 
model for hazardous waste materials to understand the principal drivers, actors, etc. and 
influences upon the ultimate environmental impact.  
 
Using game theory, simulate the possible actions of government and manufacturers in 
the context of a ‗game‘, in order to achieve more environmentally friendly products.  
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Using game theory, with a novel underlying mathematical model, identify the most 
appropriate strategy in the context of ―green supply chain management‖, for 
manufacturers of commercial products optimising the three dimensions of sustainability 
(TBL).  
 
Using grey theory, develop a design tool, to facilitate materials selection, adapt product 
design to promote cleaner production, provide sustainable products for public 
consumption and achieve long term commercial success.  
 
By combination of the approaches outlined above, provide new understanding and 
novel solutions with regard to societal change, by the provision of a new design for a 
risk management decision support system for hazardous waste materials which could 
suggest mitigation strategies.  
 
1.4 Research approach 
This study involves various computational approaches to limit environmental burden 
and to reduce the risk and the carbon footprint, and can be divided into following stages 
(See Fig.1.3). The technical path starts from the statement of the set research aim, and 
the first process is a literature review, which are covered by Chapter 2, in order to 
understand the status of previous studies and set this research in context. 
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Based upon the literature review, the problem situations can be described more clearly 
and more specifically. The functional framework of the proposed system is designed in 
terms of the ‗analysis of problems‘. Sequentially, the proposed decision support system 
for hazardous materials is developed by means of modular design, according to the 
system framework (See Fig.1.4).  
 
 
Fig.1.3. Process of the research 
 
The proposed decision support system is mainly divided into three modules:  
application of tolerability of risk, materials selection and carbon label improvement. 
The latter two modules can be connected closely by the application of tolerability of risk, 
through which the carbon emissions intensity ratio is introduced to set up the 
appropriate carbon criteria, as well as cleaner production can be promoted by reducing 
Research aim 
Literature review 
Analysis of problems 
Modular design 
Tool development 
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environmental risk and carbon footprint. With such environmental and economic factors 
being considered by materials selection, products can be improved further to be more 
‗environmentally friendly‘, thus minimizing the risk as well as reducing the 
environmental impact. Moreover, followed by the introduction of a new carbon 
labelling scheme for products, consumer‘s preferences on products purchasing 
behaviour may be affected. In this case, organisations have to reconsider their strategies 
for production and Government should be also involved in this situation to regulate the 
environmental unfriendly actions by manufacturers. Due to their different behaviours, 
various interests and conflicts may be generated. Thus, the application of the game 
theory integrated with dynamic optimization technique can provide insight to solve 
these interactions. There are at least three important boundaries according to the game 
situation, Government︱Manufacturer, Manufacturer︱Manufacturer, and Manufacturer
︱Consumer. This study mainly focuses on the first two dynamic boundaries. 
 
At the last stage, the decision support tool corresponding to the functional modules will 
be developed by means of computer programming. For example, the integrated 
evaluation approach is embodied into a computational tool based on a spreadsheet 
application (Microsoft Excel 2007) to aid decision making.  
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1.5 Thesis layout 
The introduction section starts to provide a brief background of this research topic and 
then discusses the problem situation, whilst the research aim, objectives and approach 
are put forward.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of previous studies which are related to the research, e.g. 
hazardous materials or waste, environmental risk, carbon footprint, game theory 
applications and decision support systems. The current research status will be 
summarized to provide insight on this research and set it in context.  
 
Chapter 3 identifies a new indicator ‗Carbon Emissions Intensity Ratio (CEIR)‘ by 
normalizing carbon emissions data on a common scale, to improve the current carbon 
labelling scheme. A diagram with colour-coding is developed to represent the degrees 
of carbon emissions intensity ratio, to encourage consumers to select low carbon 
products, and thus increase the potential for reduction in carbon emissions.  
 
Game theory is a novel approach in this study, which is proposed to aid 
decision-making on strategy selection for promoting ‗cleaner production‘, reducing the 
environmental risk and carbon emissions caused by ‗hazardous‘ materials in the whole 
supply chain. Chapter 4 provides the basis of game theory, which will be used for 
further game theoretical analysis and simulation in Chapter 5 and 6. The ―Prisoners‘ 
21 
 
dilemma‖, which is the prototype for many game situations, is introduced as an example 
to illustrate how game theory is used to predict the strategic action.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the possible game scenarios in the context of ‗cleaner production‘, 
generated by a ―Two-person Non-cooperative‖ game model, which examines various 
strategic options selected by government and manufacturers, to promote cleaner 
production whilst maximizing the economic and environmental profits. In addition, the 
software package ‗Gambit‘ is selected for the analysis to demonstrate the game problem 
situation more visually.  
 
Chapter 6 develops the game scenario of ‗cleaner production‘ further, by applying it to 
supply chain networks, and analyzes the strategies selected by manufacturers of the 
‗hazardous‘ materials in the context of ‗green supply chain management‘, to reduce the 
environmental risk and the associated carbon emissions.  
 
In addition to the optimal strategy selected by manufacturers in the supply chain for the 
risk and carbon footprint reduction, Chapter 7 employs the dynamic optimisation 
technique to minimize the total economic cost, followed by maximizing the reduction 
extent of inherent risk and the associated carbon footprint.  
 
In order to provide better, sustainable products for public consumption, as well as 
promote cleaner production by reducing the ‗hazardous‘ materials consumption and 
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carbon footprint that products contain, environmental consideration should become 
more important in product design and especially in the field of materials selection. In 
this context, Chapter 8 introduces a convenient approach to materials selection for 
application by engineers to aid decision-making taking environmental evaluation into 
account. 
 
Chapter 9 gives conclusions derived from each preceding chapter, and discusses the 
research limitations, laying a foundation for further work. Future studies are proposed 
based upon the concluding remarks and limitations.  
 
Finally, a user manual is provided in the Appendix A, which demonstrates how to use 
the functional modules of the developed decision support tool. Moreover, all the related 
conference and journal publications are listed in the Appendix B and C.  
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Fig.1.4. Framework of the proposed decision support system 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Hazardous materials and hazardous waste 
2.1.1 Definition 
According to UK regulations, hazardous materials or substances are defined as ―any 
substance or group of substances which are toxic, persistent, and liable to 
bio-accumulate‖ (DEFRA, 2009). Thus these materials are a potential threat to the 
environment. Moreover, hazardous substances have the potential to pollute the 
environment, and accumulate in animals or human well-beings in the long term 
(Environment Agency, 2009).  
 
In the United States, the definition of hazardous materials is differentiated in each 
Department. For instance, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) defines that 
hazardous material as ― a substance or material capable of posing an unreasonable risk 
to public safety or the environment when being transported or moved in commerce, and 
designated as hazardous under the Federal hazardous materials transportation law 
―(49 CFR 100-180).  
 
American Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) states hazardous 
materials to be the hazardous chemical specifically, which identified any hazardous 
substance to be a "health hazard" or "physical hazard", including ―chemicals which are 
carcinogens, toxic agents, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers; agents which act on the 
hematopoietic system; agents which damage the lungs, skin, eyes, or mucous 
membranes; chemicals which are combustible, explosive, flammable, oxidizers, 
pyrophorics, unstable-reactive or water-reactive‖; and ―chemicals which in the course 
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of normal handling, use, or storage may produce or release dusts, gases, fumes, 
vapours, mists or smoke which may have any of the previously mentioned 
characteristics‖ (29 CFR 1910.1200). 
 
It is evident that there are different definitions for hazardous materials as above, in 
terms of the regulations from different countries and organisations. However, hazardous 
materials can be generally deemed as ―anything which, because of its quantity, 
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause, or 
significantly contribute to, an increase in mortality; or cause an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness: or pose a substantial present or 
potential hazard to human health and the environment when improperly treated, stored, 
transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed‖(Lee, 2005; De Lisi, 2006). 
Moreover, this definition will be used throughout this study.  
 
Hazardous waste is distinguished from hazardous materials in this study. With regard to 
the definition of hazardous waste, it is defined in the United Kingdom as to be certain 
kinds of waste which possess hazardous properties that may cause environmental risk or 
be harmful to human health (DEFRA, 2005). In the United States, Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) describes ―hazardous waste” to be “a solid 
waste, or combination of solid wastes, due to its quantity, concentration, physical, 
chemical or infectious characteristics, which may cause, or significantly contribute to 
an increase in mortality (death) or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating 
reversible illness; or pose a substantial (present or potential) hazard to human health 
or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or 
otherwise managed ‖ (Liu and Lipták, 1997; Garrett, 2004). In addition, United Nations 
Environment Programme has elaborated the definition of hazardous waste as ―wastes 
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which, by reason of their chemical activity or toxic, explosive, corrosive, or other 
characteristics, cause danger or likely will cause danger to health or the environment, 
whether alone or when coming into contact with other waste‖ (Lagrega et al., 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is no exact definition for ‗hazardous 
waste materials‘ since any waste with properties of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, 
toxicity etc., can be mixed during the process of production, deposit, transportation, 
treatment, as well as ultimate disposal, can cause impairment of the environment 
(Tchobanoglous, 2000). According to the Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2005, there are fifteen typical hazardous waste materials resulted from the 
daily consuming activities which are listed below (DEFRA, 2005b): Acides; Alkaline 
solutions; Batteries; Oil fly ash; Industrial solvents; Oily sludges; Pesticides; 
Pharmaceutical compounds; Photographic chemicals; Waste oils; Wood preservatives; 
TVs; Computer monitors; Paint; Fluorescent tubes. Clearly, this is a rather simplistic 
viewpoint.  
 
2.1.2 Comparative analysis between hazardous materials and waste 
Primarily, the comparative analysis between hazardous materials and hazardous waste 
starts from their similarities. The characteristics of hazardous materials or hazardous 
waste are more or less the same. Moreover, any hazardous materials or hazardous waste 
may have at least one of these four characteristics (Blackman, 2001; Enger and Smith, 
2004). Due to these harmful properties, it is significant to control the inherent risk at the 
initial stage (design phase), as the potential harm can be immediate (short term) or 
delayed (long term).  
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1. Ignitability 
2. Corrosivity 
3. Reactivity 
4. Toxicity 
 
The apparent difference between hazardous materials and hazardous waste has legal and 
regulatory implications (Enger and Smith, 2004). At its simplest, waste is considered as 
any material that has no value. If a material has any value, be it treated or not, it can be 
still considered as a ‗commodity‘. Discarded products, e.g. computers, can be 
considered to be a commodity, due to the value of metals contained. Thus, hazardous 
waste management is involved of many uncertainties.  
 
2.1.3 Hazardous waste management 
Relevant laws and regulations are designed to ensure the implementation of hazardous 
waste management at an early stage. The European Commission has issued a Directive 
on the correct management and regulation of hazardous waste (HWD, Council Directive 
91/689/EC), and such waste is defined on the basis of a list, the European Waste 
Catalogue (EWC 1994, Commission Decision 94/3/EC), drawn up under that Directive. 
Council Decision 94/904/EC then identified which of the wastes on EWC 1994 are 
deemed to be hazardous, based on the properties set out in the HWD. There are 14 
hazardous properties set out by the HWD with the details reflected in Table 2.1 
(Environment Agency, 2009; DEFRA, 2009), but it should be noted that this is very a 
partial view in comparison to the earlier definitions of hazardous materials.   
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Table 2.1 Typical hazardous properties  
(Adopted from: Hazardous Waste Directive Annex III) 
H1 
―Explosive‖: substances and preparations which may explode under 
the effect of flame or which are more sensitive to shocks or friction than 
dinitrobenzene. 
H2 
―Oxidising‖: substances and preparations which exhibit highly 
exothermic reactions when in contact with other substances, particularly 
flammable substances. 
H3A 
―Highly Flammable‖: liquid substances and preparations having a 
flashpoint of below 21°C (including extremely flammable liquids), or 
substances and preparations which may become hot and finally catch 
fire in contact with air at ambient temperature without any application of 
energy, or solid substances and preparations which may readily catch 
fire after brief contact with a source of ignition and which continue to 
burn or to be consumed after removal of the source of ignition, or 
gaseous substances and preparations which are flammable in air at 
normal pressure, or substances and preparations which, in contact with 
water or damp air, evolve highly flammable gases in dangerous 
quantities. 
H3B 
―Flammable‖: liquid substances and preparations having a 
flashpoint equal to or greater than 21°C and less than or equal to 55°C. 
H4 
―Irritant‖: non-corrosive substances and preparations which, 
through immediate, prolonged or repeated contact with the skin or 
mucous membrane, can cause inflammation. 
H5 
―Harmful‖: substances and preparations which, if they are inhaled 
or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may involve limited health 
risks. 
H6 
―Toxic‖: substances and preparations (including very toxic 
substances and preparations) which, if they are inhaled or ingested or if 
they penetrate the skin, may involve serious, acute or chronic health 
risks and even death. 
H7 
―Carcinogenic‖: substances and preparations which, if they are 
inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may induce cancer or 
increase its incidence. 
H8 ―Corrosive‖: substances and preparations which may destroy living 
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tissue on contact. 
H9 
―Infectious‖:  substances containing viable micro-organisms or 
their toxins which are known or reliably believed to cause disease in 
man or other living organisms. 
H10 
―Toxic for reproduction‖: substances and preparations which, if 
they are inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may produce or 
increase the incidence of non-heritable adverse effects in the progeny 
and/or of male or female reproductive functions or capacity. 
H11 
―Mutagenic‖: substances and preparations which, if they are 
inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may induce hereditary 
genetic defects or increase their incidence. 
H12 
Substances and preparations which release toxic or very toxic gases 
in contact with water, air or an acid. 
H13 
Substances and preparations capable by any means, after disposal, 
of yielding another substance, e.g. landfill leachate, which possesses any 
of the characteristics listed above. 
H14 
―Ecotoxic‖: substances and preparations which present or may 
present immediate or delayed risks for one or more sectors of the 
environment. 
 
With several years of consultation and development among the EU countries, the EWC 
1994 has been updated, resulting in a revised European Waste Catalogue (EWC 2002, 
Commission Decision 2000/532/EC). There are two highlighted aspects of the revised 
catalogue in contrast with the EWC 1994: a catalogue of all wastes, classified in terms 
of generic industry, process or waste type; a distinction between non-hazardous and 
hazardous by identifying hazardous waste entries with an asterisk (Environment 
Agency, 2009). Fig.2.1 presents a flowchart about how to determine whether a waste is 
hazardous or non-hazardous.  
 
Similarly, Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC has integrated HWD 91/689/EEC 
and Directive 94/31/EC, to simplify European Union legislation on waste management. 
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The obligations of hazardous waste management such as keeping, monitoring and 
controlling, has been provided from the ―Cradle to Grave‖, i.e., from the waste producer 
to the final disposal or recovery. Moreover, more attention has been paid in the 
Directive to preventing risks for the environment and human health, when different 
categories of hazardous wastes are mixed together, or with non hazardous wastes. In 
addition, the permit exemptions that allow the related infrastructure or installations 
dealing with hazardous wastes are more restrictive than dealing with other wastes 
(European Commissions Environment, 2010). 
 
On 16 July 2005, the Hazardous Waste Directive was implemented in the UK by the 
Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2005 and the List of Waste 
(England) Regulations. The new regulations have come into force replacing the Special 
Waste Regulations, which was transposed from the European Hazardous Waste 
Directive (91/689/EEC) (DEFRA, 2007). The Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005 No 894) is comprised of thirteen chapters, from which 
general introduction of hazardous waste, distinguishing between hazardous and 
non-hazardous waste, mixing hazardous waste, movement of hazardous waste, 
hazardous waste premises and records etc., has been discussed respectively (HMSO, 
2005). The regulations are designed in order to simplify the documentation associated 
with the collection and disposal of hazardous waste, as well as implement in accordance 
with EU legislation. Moreover, the ultimate objective is to improve hazardous waste 
management, protect human health and reduce environmental risk as a whole (PHS 
Group, 2005). Following a long term public consultation, there are some amendments to 
the Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2005, and the latest regulations 
have been validated since 6 April 2009, as Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2009 (S.I. 2009 No 507) which is more detailed and comprehensive to 
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clarify certain provisions of the 2005 Regulations. Another prominent change reflects 
the exemption from hazardous waste producer registration, on which the qualifying 
limitation of hazardous waste output per year is adjusted to 500 Kg instead of 200 Kg 
(DEFRA, 2010; Environment Agency, 2010).  
 
On the basis of Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC and Hazardous Waste 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2009 (S.I. 2009 No 507), the Strategy for Hazardous 
Waste Management in England has been formulated and implemented since 18 March 
2010. This strategy determined the revised waste hierarchy with respect to hazardous 
waste, as well as intended to facilitate the provision of infrastructure for the hazardous 
waste management. The ultimate aim of the strategy is to manage hazardous waste in 
more economically and environmentally ways, through the combined effort of members 
of the public, local authorities, trade associations, businesses, non-governmental 
organisations and consumer groups etc (DEFRA, 2010). Specifically, the strategy 
mainly consists of four parts: a set of six principles for the environmentally sound 
management of hazardous waste; a series of outline decision trees to help waste 
producers and managers determine the best management solution for the hazardous 
waste, as well as help move hazardous waste management up the waste hierarchy via 
cost-benefit analysis in infrastructure; a timeline of action on issues related to the 
introduction and implementation of the strategy; a list of relevant guidance to the 
treatment of hazardous waste and proposed further guidance by DEFRA or 
Environment Agency (DEFRA, 2010).  
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Fig.2.1. Flowchart of distinction between hazardous and non-hazardous 
(adopted from: Environment Agency, 2005) 
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In addition to above regulations set for hazardous waste management, whilst taking 
public health and safety, the overall environmental impact into account, hazardous 
waste streams should be departed from the waste hierarchy, where it is justified by life 
cycle assessment on the overall environmental impacts from the generation to the final 
disposal (DEFRA, 2007). Fig.2.2 shows the waste hierarchy for hazardous waste 
management, incorporated with waste prevention at the top and disposal at the bottom. 
From the standpoint of ―hierarchy of waste management‖, the most preferable state 
encompassing sustainable development is to prevent or eliminate the waste. Waste 
prevention includes relevant measures or techniques that reduce the adverse impact of 
hazardous waste on the environment and human health, as well as reduce not only the 
quantity of hazardous waste produced, but also the content of harmful substances in raw 
materials and products before converting to hazardous waste (National Research 
Council, 1995; Allen and Rosselot; 2004; DEFRA, 2010).   
 
 
 
Fig.2.2. Hierarchy of waste management (adapted from: DEFRA, 2007) 
 
 
Waste Prevention (Reduction) 
Reuse 
Recycle or Compost 
Energy Recovery 
Disposal 
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The hierarchy has also incorporated with the ―3R concept‖, which provides a 
framework for hazardous waste management in terms of the possible environmental 
consequence. ―3R concept‖ focuses on waste reduction, reuse and recycling, which 
aims at reducing the waste disposal in the landfill, consequently the landfill gas and 
leachate emitted to the environment, thus reducing the total environmental impact and 
saving the energy and natural resources (Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2008). Fig.2.3 shows that 
the waste hierarchy has been divided into three stages in real terms: resource 
management; recovery by means of various techniques, i.e. recycling from different 
waste materials, heat recovery from the pyrolysis or incineration; final disposal, 
respectively. Waste prevention as mentioned above, should be involved within the 
resource management not only to reduce the waste amounts but also the potential 
toxicity. However, this is not wholly practical in real terms. Options of reusing or 
recycling, e.g. waste exchange, should be employed and promoted during the waste 
management. By analogy, when such opportunities as reusing and recycling have been 
all exhausted, the waste treatments like incineration or other thermal methods need to be 
developed before disposal in landfill (Soesilo and Wilson, 1995; DEFRA, 2007 and 
2010). Furthermore, each stage in the hierarchy may generate residues, which need to be 
carefully managed.  
 
Although the waste hierarchy provides a general principle for waste management 
(Williams, 2005), there are some limitations which impede its practical implementation. 
First of all, the hierarchy itself does not consider the overall impacts within a given 
waste management system, as it focuses more on waste materials elimination but gives 
less attention to the economic and energy aspects. For instance, some underdeveloped 
or developing countries would prefer landfill as the primary disposal approach instead 
of other thermal treatment process with respect to the economic consideration. 
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Secondly, how to treat the residues from the reusing, recycling or the energy recovery 
processes (e.g. the fly ash generated from the incinerators) can be another issue of the 
waste hierarchy. In addition, for those hazardous waste materials which present a risk to 
the public health and the environment throughout their life cycle, the hierarchy may 
involve difficulties and uncertainties on how to select the appropriate options for the 
waste treatment and disposal (White, Franke and Hindle, 1995; Williams, 2005). Thus, 
it is suggested taking a more holistic way to manage waste contained hazardous 
substances in this study, e.g. using the product lifecycle management to mitigate the 
environmental risk and impact.  
 
 
Fig.2.3. The detailed framework of the waste hierarchy (adopted from Williams, 2005) 
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2.1.4 Product life cycle management 
Product lifecycle management (PLM) is an effective tool which provides an approach to 
control the product process in a specific business or manufacturing area, from product 
design, development to marketing, final disposal in the post-consuming stage 
(Saaksvuori and Immonen, 2005). With natural resources being exploited at an 
increasing rate, as well as the threat of ―climate change‖, the product life cycle 
management has also to take the environmental impact into account, for instance to use 
lifecycle assessment to investigate such indicators as environmental risk, carbon 
emissions etc. This aims at reducing the total environmental impact throughout the 
product lifecycle, ―from sunrise to sunset‖ (Stark, 2005). Therefore, product lifecycle 
management can be combined with the waste management and risk management to 
handle hazardous materials or hazardous waste materials effectively, especially to 
reduce environmental risk and negative impact during various stages of the product 
lifecycle, i.e. design, production, transportation, use and decommissioning. However, 
the literature is weak in this area and demonstrates the need for this study. For instance, 
many manufacturers still primarily focus on the profit as the bottom line for business 
(Henriques, 2004), while not taking the full lifecycle of products into account, and even 
do not regard waste management as a key business area. In addition, studies have shown 
that smaller organizations have paid less attention to ―waste prevention‖ or ―cleaner 
production‖ (European Environment Agency, 2003). From the perspective of the 
‗Hierarchy of Waste‘ (See Section 2.1.3), the preferable strategy for encompassing 
sustainable development is to prevent or eliminate waste (DEFRA, 2007). Waste 
prevention or ‗cleaner production‘, which is defined as ―the continuous application of 
an integrated, preventive strategy to processes, products and services to increase 
efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the environment‖ (UNEP, 2006), and has 
been demonstrated as the best model for pollution prevention within the product life 
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cycle management, the best way to promote economic benefits and the most effective 
way to implement sustainable development (China NDRC, 2008). The following 
sections review how to select the appropriate materials to promote cleaner production at 
first, and then review two indicators which significantly affect the sustainability of a 
product‘s life cycle, environmental risk and carbon footprint respectively.  
 
2.1.5 Environment oriented materials selection 
Materials selection can be done in different ways, but the principles are quite similar. 
Generally, selection of materials for products is principally driven by function and 
structural demands, requiring considerations of mechanical, physical and chemical 
properties (Ashby, 2005). In addition, cost and availability are equally important 
considerations. With the threat of ―climate change‖, the term ―environmental conscious 
design‖ has gradually emerged in manufacturing, in particular focusing on ―design for 
environment‖ in the context of sustainable development (Kalpakjian and Schmid, 2006). 
The main objective of this approach is to mitigate the adverse impact on the 
environment and human health by decreasing the amount or toxicity of raw materials 
used in a product; redesigning products in order to increase their lifecycle, reusability 
and reparability; reforming the quality of products; reducing the amount and toxicity of 
waste generated, etc (Tchobanoglous, 2002; Allen and Rosselot; 2004; Williams, 2005). 
Therefore, environmental consideration is an increasing requirement in materials 
selection. Holloway (1998) has extended the Ashby flow diagram of materials selection 
by taking environmental factors into account for mechanical design, in which air and 
water pollution are calculated and plotted on the Ashby‘s energy content chart to help 
engineers or designers better understand the optimal environmental design criteria. 
Ermolaeva, Castro and Kandachar (2004) have used life cycle assessment (LCA) to aid 
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materials selection in an automotive structure, based upon structural optimization. Three 
important indicators have been considered, as ‗Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALY)‘, 
‗Potentially Disappeared Fraction (PDF)‘, ‗Mega Joule‘ (MJ), which are used for the 
environmental impact assessment, corresponding to areas of ‗Human Health‘, 
‗Ecosystem Quality‘ and ‗Resources‘ accordingly. According to the LCA, it is 
suggested that low-density phenolic foam can be used as a core material for an 
automotive structure. In a similar study, Bovea and Vidal (2004) have applied LCA 
methodology to selecting materials with low environmental impact during the process 
of wood-based furniture design. Further, Giudice, Rosa and Risitano (2005) have 
applied a product life-cycle design approach to the selection of materials, not only to 
meet the product requirements of functionalities and performances, but also to minimize 
the environmental impact from ‗Cradle to Grave‘. The brake disc is cited as a case 
example, and shows how this approach can be integrated with conventional design 
methods.  
 
In addition, products are increasingly being developed that are less damaging to the 
environment, gradually moving towards the concept of ‗sustainability‘. Thus, Ljungberg 
(2007) has suggested that more renewable and easy recyclable materials be selected for 
sustainable product design, aimed at environmental impact reduction, usually referred to 
as ‗design for environment‘. Further, Zhou, Yin and Hu (2009) have built a 
multi-objective optimisation model of materials selection for sustainable products, in 
which life cycle assessment is integrated with artificial neural networks.  
 
While these previous studies are very useful in informing our approach, most of them 
have used the life cycle assessment (LCA) approach to materials selection in terms of 
environmental consideration, which is still a complex process involving a large amount 
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of available data to determine the specific scenarios, thus limiting its wider application 
(Yang, 2007; Zhou, Yin and Hu, 2009). There is thus a need for an approach that is 
simple to use. In addition, most existing studies present methods for selecting between 
widely different materials (Bovea and Vidal, 2004; Ermolaeva, Castro and Kandachar, 
2004; Giudice, Rosa and Risitano, 2005). However, while choosing between materials 
with substantially different properties is a relatively straightforward task, selection 
between similar materials, or different varieties of the same material, would require 
highly precise data.  
 
2.2 Environmental risk 
2.2.1 Definition 
Risk is defined as ―a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a 
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence‖ (DETR, 
1995). This is a two dimensional definition which describes the risk as integrating the 
undesirable outcome with the probability of that outcome. Based upon the two 
dimensional definition of risk, Kaplan and Garrick (1981) have considered risk as a 
triple dimension, representing Ri= {Si, Pi, Ci}. In terms of this equation, Si is indicated 
as scenario i, Pi the probability of scenario i, and Ci the consequence of scenario i. In 
this definition, the scenario describes the conditions which are set for some event to 
happen (e.g. environmental contamination such as explosion, flood etc); the probability 
represents the likelihood; whilst the consequence indicates the impact of a 
corresponding scenario. Compared with the two dimensional definition of risk, the triple 
one is much more specific, since different consequences may result from the 
predetermined scenarios. Thus, it is much more practical and applicable for further risk 
assessment and analysis.  
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In brief, environmental risk can be defined as ―a measure of potential threats to the 
environment and the total loss of value that human health resulting from the presence of 
environmental hazards, as well as combines the probability which events will cause 
degradation of the environment and the severity of the degradation‖ (Cothern, 1996; 
Pritchard, 2000). Moreover, the environmental hazards within the definition can be seen 
as a source of risk (Wilson, 1991). From the viewpoint of system thinking, 
environmental risk can be determined by the following key factors, and each factor 
interacts sequentially from the source to the final consequences (see Fig.2.4).  
 
1. The source of the risk (e.g. hazardous materials or hazardous waste);  
 
2. The potentially affected objects or the targets (e.g. various media such as human 
being, plants, animals, air, water, soil etc);  
 
3. the potential environmental impact ( e.g. the water, waste pollution, greenhouse gas 
emission);  
 
4. the possible consequences and impact ( e.g. the impacted extent and area including 
fatalities, injuries, property damage etc).  
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Fig.2.4. Definition of environmental risk in a systematic view 
 
In this study, the risk to the environment resulting from the complete supply chain 
involving ‗hazardous‘ materials, and the attendant health implications, needs to be 
carefully assessed in the context of the product life-cycle. Fig.2.5 shows that the public 
may be at environmental risk throughout the product‘s full lifecycle of hazardous 
materials, from extraction to final disposal. Certainly, this is scarcely considered in the 
literature. It follows that there is a need to consider the risk to society associated with 
everyday consumer products. 
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Fig.2.5. Environmental risk throughout product‘s full lifecycle 
 
2.2.2 Environmental risk management 
Environmental risk management can be interpreted as an integrated decision making 
process, which is a multi-phase analysis comprised of risk identification, environmental 
risk assessment,  further regulatory or non-regulatory alternatives, implementation of 
management strategy and monitoring (Gough, 1996; Morris and Therivel, 2009). 
Fig.2.6 presents a basic framework for an integrated approach to environmental risk 
assessment and management, where the level of effort put into assessing each risk is 
related to its priority (to compare with other risks e.g. economic or financial risk ) and 
its complexity (in order to understand the possible impacts or consequences) (DETR, 
1995). 
 
In the field of hazardous waste management, environmental risk assessment is an 
essential tool to provide significant information for decision makers, such as the 
frequency of environmental hazards, the possible damaging consequences in a 
predetermined scenario and how best to manage various kinds of risk. Moreover, 
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environmental risk assessment demands better understanding of a risk source, e.g. the 
hazardous waste materials, and the characteristics of an environmental receptor that may 
be at risk from this hazard and the pathway through which the receptor maybe affected, 
which can be seen from Fig.2.5. Such management measures, based upon the risk 
assessment, could reduce the inherent risk to public health caused by hazardous 
materials/waste from production to final disposal. This is also available to select 
appropriate facilities for hazardous waste treatment or disposal, remediate the 
contaminated sites, minimize waste generation, and develop new products etc (Lagrega, 
Buckingham and Evans, 2001).  
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Fig.2.6. Framework of environmental assessment and management  
(adopted from: DETR, 1995) 
 
2.2.3 Tolerability of risk 
In order to reinforce sustainability in the case of hazardous waste materials, the 
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be by means of different risk assessment methodologies. This is especially implemented 
in hazardous waste site, consequently whether to take relevant measures to reduce and 
control risk. Therefore, it is necessary to set out a certain criterion to determine 
acceptable levels of risk (Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt, 2008). The principle of 
―tolerability of risk‖ provides a framework by which judgments can be made as to 
whether society would accept the risk (HSE, 1988; Cowan 2005; Kumamoto 2007).  
 
Importantly, this framework provides a benchmark for a tolerable risk, which cannot be 
deemed as broadly acceptable without implementing any risk control measures, see 
Fig.2.7. Tolerable risk is the gap between what is absolutely safe and absolutely unsafe, 
i.e. intolerable (Clay and Bassett 1999; Fuller and Vassie 2004). Between the intolerable 
region and the broadly acceptable region, it is a requirement to demonstrate the risk is 
‗as low as reasonably practicable‘ (ALARP), i.e. risk mitigation is in place. The 
ALARP principle was formulated by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (Smith, 
2001; Manuele, 2003). Within the ALARP region, whether to reduce the level of risk 
further or accept the existing level of risk can be judged on the grounds of the risk levels 
and the costs associated with controlling the risk (Fuller and Vassie, 2004). The risk 
which is deemed as acceptable to society, should be lower than or at least below the 
upper boundary of ALARP region. This threshold is relevant to the ―Basic Safety 
Level‖ (BSL), where the risk is most acceptable with the adverse consequence Society 
is prepared to accept. Thus, this level of risk is broadly acceptable and relates to ―Basic 
Safety Objective‖ (BSO) (HSE, 1988). Compared with Fig.2.7, ―frequency‖ and ―harm‖ 
are comprised of a two dimensional area to set up the boundary between tolerable and 
broadly acceptable, which is better to present the variation of ―tolerability of risk‖ (See 
Fig.2.8).  
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This principle is well established in some heavy industries, such as nuclear, chemical, 
etc. HSE has also proposed notional boundaries for each region (see Fig 2.9). A risk of 
death of 1 in 10
4
 per annum to any member of the public is the maximum that should be 
tolerated from any large industrial plant in any industry. Moreover, HSE specifies that 
the maximum risk to workers in any industry should be tolerated is 1 in 10
3
 per year. 
With the ALARP principle being implemented, the risk from most plant is in fact lower 
than the proposed boundary. The level of broadly acceptable risk is suggested as 1 in 
10
6 
per annum (HSE, 1988).  
 
 
Fig.2.7. Tolerability of risk (Adapted from: HSE, 1988) 
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Fig.2.8. Another view of tolerability of risk 
 
 
Fig.2.9. Tolerable and actual levels of risk to workers and the public  
(adapted from: HSE, 1988) 
 
 
1 in 10
3
 suggested 
maximum tolerable risk to 
workers  
 
1 in 10
4
 suggested 
maximum tolerable risk to 
any member of the public  
1 in 10
6
 suggested broadly 
acceptable risk 
Unacceptable and Intolerable 
risk 
Tolerable Risk 
Risk Reduction Acceptable 
Risk 
Scale of Consequences (“harm”) 
L
ik
elih
o
o
d
 (“
F
req
u
en
cy
”
) 
48 
 
In the last few decades, a potential environmental risk has been identified as ―Climate 
Change‖. This is generally acknowledged to be a global problem and thus to impede 
sustainable development (Markandya and Halsnaes, 2002; Hansjurgens and Antes, 
2008). Previous studies have found out that greenhouse gas emission is a huge 
contribution to climate change (Solomon, Plattner, Knutti and Friedlingstein, 2008; 
Nerlich and Koteyko, 2009). For example, when waste materials are disposed in landfill, 
landfill gas, if uncontrolled, is considered as one of the main sources of greenhouse gas 
emissions, especially in producing large amounts of methane, which is about 21 times 
more potent than CO2 (DEFRA, 2007). As there is no specific standard for carbon 
emissions in EU countries at present, it is unknown whether the risk ―climate change‖ 
exceeds the upper limit of tolerability. However, it is proposed that the framework of 
―tolerability of risk‖ could be used to set up the criteria for carbon emissions reduction, 
which is presented in the Chapter 6. For instance, any CO2 emissions may have an 
equivalent incremental risk analogous to the ‗Tolerability of Risk‘, e.g. the 
tolerable/intolerable boundary of 10
-6 
deaths per year for the general public can be 
equated to a level of CO2 emissions from a product‘s lifecycle. Thus, a risk based 
analogy is then used to divide various regions or bands representing increasing levels of 
carbon emissions.  
 
2.3 Carbon footprint 
‗Carbon footprint‘ is regarded as a new concept which has been widely adopted as ―the 
total set of greenhouse gas emissions caused directly and indirectly by a person, 
organization, event or product‖ (Carbon Trust, 2009). As a response to the 
climate-change crisis, pressure is increasing societal responsibility to reduce and 
manage the carbon footprint. The carbon footprint calculation provides a tool to help 
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conventional business gradually transform itself into a green business, especially 
reflecting in the following dimensions: environmental impacts of the supply chain, 
investment decisions in terms of the carbon profits, and strategies for product 
innovation to reduce the carbon emissions (Carbon Trust, 2006). 
 
2.3.1 Carbon footprint measurement 
The cornerstone of carbon labelling is the assessment of product carbon emissions 
following the principles of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA). A number of standards and 
protocols have been, and are still being, developed for this purpose. The ISO, the 
International Organization for Standardization, for example, has devised carbon 
emissions measurement standards. These include ISO 14067, still in progress, which 
will elaborate the requirements for the quantification and communication of the product 
carbon emissions (Gaussin et al., 2011 In Press; Dias and Arroja, 2012). Additionally, 
the British Standards Institution (BSI) published the Publicly Available Specification 
(PAS) 2050 in 2008. The latter attempts to standardize methods for assessing the life 
cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for various goods and services, as well as 
specify the detailed requirements of the assessment (BSI, 2008; Sinden, 2009; Iribarren, 
Hospido, Moreira and Feijoo, 2010). In addition, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative 
was developed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as guidance to help organisations report their 
GHG emissions, (WRI/WBCSD, 2004; WRI/WBCSD, 2011).  
 
Studies reported in the literature indicate that carbon emissions have been measured for 
a wide range of products using life cycle assessment methods. Iribarren, Hospido, 
Moreira and Feijoo (2010) used the ‗Cradle to Grave‘ approach, by taking the full 
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lifecycle of the product into account, to assess the carbon footprint of canned mussels 
from harvesting to ultimate disposal. This showed that 4.35 kilogram CO2e (Carbon 
dioxide equivalent) were emitted per triple pack of round cans. Moreover, the primary 
packaging and mussel shell management were found to contribute the most to the 
carbon footprint taken over the whole lifecycle. Similar studies by Pathak et al. (2010) 
and Muthu, Li, Hu and Mok (2011), used life cycle analysis to measure the carbon 
footprint of food and shopping bags, respectively. The former study, relating to food 
production, examined 24 Indian food products, and showed that, for animal food and 
rice planting, methane was the main contribution to carbon emission, providing an 
opportunity for greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction by encouraging changes in current 
food consumption habits. With regard to the latter study on shopping bags, the IPCC 
2007 method was applied to the carbon footprint calculation during the full lifecycle. 
This study compared the carbon footprint resulting from different disposal options for 
shopping bags, and confirming that reusing or recycling was preferable to landfill 
disposal. Similarly, in the case of beverages (juice, beer and water), Pasqualino, 
Meneses and Castells (2011) suggested that recycling was the optimal choice for 
disposing of packaging materials, depending upon the environmental impact (carbon 
footprint and energy consumption), whilst incineration and landfill were the near 
optimal choice. In addition, using life cycle assessment for carbon footprint calculation 
of milk production, Flysjö et al. (2011) found out some important factors which affect 
the carbon footprint, such as dry matter intake (DMI), emission factor (EF) for methane 
from enteric fermentation, amount of nitrogen applied and EF for direct nitrous oxide 
emissions from soils. If any of these parameters was altered, the total carbon footprint 
was changed correspondingly, by up to 15%.  
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2.3.2 Carbon labelling 
The carbon emissions embodied in a product are usually presented to consumers in the 
form of a carbon label on product packaging. Carbon labels usually present emissions 
information either as in numerical form (e.g., tonnes of CO2 emitted per product unit) 
or with claims of emissions reduction (Upham, Dendler and Bleda, 2011). Whilst the 
amount of literature is considerable on carbon footprint measurement, which can be 
viewed as the basis of carbon labeling communication, there is very little literature on 
carbon labelling itself (Upham, Dendler and Bleda, 2011). Edwards-Jones et al. (2009) 
investigated the vulnerability of exporting nations to the development of a carbon label. 
The carbon footprints of three vegetables, such as lettuce, broccoli and green beans 
supplied externally to the UK market were studied. This has highlighted export 
vulnerability in the areas of transport, the national economy and the supply chain 
network. Moreover, the geographically distant countries were identified most 
vulnerable, as their exports were substituted by the local UK products. Vanclay et al. 
(2011) examined the customers‘ response to carbon labelled products by recording the 
sales for a three month period. Thirty seven products were labelled with green, yellow 
and black footprints to represent their corresponding carbon emissions level, as below 
average, near average and above average, respectively. It was noted that customers‘ 
purchasing behaviour changed only slightly, with reduction of 6% in the case of the 
black labelled products, and an increase of 4% in green labelled products. Furthermore, 
Upham, Dendler and Bleda (2011) discussed the public perceptions of carbon labelling 
of grocery products, and found that the emission value, without further explanation, 
cannot significantly influence product selection. A similar study can be found by 
Gadema and Oglethorpe (2011), who surveyed the purchasing habits and perceptions 
related to various carbon labelled food products. Although the surveyed consumers 
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displayed a high preference motivation (72%) for carbon labelled products, a high 
proportion (89%) were confused by carbon labels resulting from different interpretation 
or comprehension. While previous studies are very useful in informing our approach, 
none of them focuses on how to improve the carbon label itself to be more readily 
understood by consumers. Even though a previous study has proposed using the 
normalization approach for processing the data from life cycle assessment (Upham, 
Dendler and Bleda, 2011), it is still a conceptual idea, and how to normalize the carbon 
footprint value and establish an appropriate frame of reference have not been addressed 
anywhere. It is hoped an improvement in the clarity of current carbon labelling schemes 
is essential, and thus encourage consumers to select low carbon products, and so 
increase the potential for reduction in carbon emissions.  
 
2.4 Game theory 
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) published their book ―The Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior‖, game theory has been widely used as a mathematical 
and logistical approach applied in various research fields, such as economics, 
marketing, supply chain etc. Game theory models can be used to test against real human 
behaviours, and the solutions are usually arrived at by considering the interaction 
between the ‗players‘ (or ‗agents‘ in the context of the supply change) who are 
involved, which can be seen as a form of ―interactive decision theory‖ (Aumann, 2003; 
Pak and Brieva, 2010). In general, the role of game theory in academic research is to 
help ‗players‘ decide their own strategies by predicting the actions of other players 
based on the expectation of the maximized payoff (Madani, 2010).  
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With natural resources being exploited at an increasing rate, the conflict over resource 
extraction and allocation, pollution control and management etc becomes more and 
more fierce. Thus, game theory has become an essential tool for the analysis of 
environmental problems (Hanley and Folmer, 1999). In the following sections, game 
theory application to environmental policy, supply chains and green supply chains, 
waste management are reviewed, respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Application of game theory to environmental policy 
In the field of environmental policy, game theory is used to analyse how such policies 
affect the decision-making of different ‗players‘ and provides a useful insight to 
increase the stability of policies aimed at improving environmental management and 
regulation (Albiac, Sánchez-Soriano and Dinar, 2007). Endres and Finus (1998) have 
established a bargaining game of incomplete information to investigate how the policy 
affects pollution control, in order to reinforce the stability of international 
environmental agreements. Three policy frameworks such as ‗emission reduction 
quotas‘, ‗effluent taxes‘ and ‗tradable emission‘ have been investigated to derive the 
socially optimal emission levels and Nash equilibrium emissions. Similarly, Feenstra 
(1998) has built a dynamic game model to analyse the environmental policy set by 
national government that balance environmental standards with domestic firm 
competitiveness in the context of international trade and transboundary pollution. The 
Governmental role seems not only to arouse the vitality of domestic firms, but also 
improve environmental quality. Thus, the relevant policy instruments should balance 
the two aims, in which ‗emission taxes‘ and ‗emission standards‘ are compared in this 
game model. Only if the taxes and standards are equivalent, environmental policy can 
be set at a laxer level. With regard to the resource management policy, Munro (2007) 
has investigated the problem of the management of shared fishery resources by means 
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of game theoretical analysis, which can be reflected in the strategic interaction of 
resources shared between different States. In this case, game theory could derive the 
necessary conditions for stability of a new regime. However, game theory applications 
for policy making or analysis in cleaner production have been rarely reported in the 
literature. A typical study can be found by Dong et al. (2010), who have built a game 
theoretical framework to analyze the conflicts between local government and a polluting 
firm, whist promoting cleaner technologies in the Chinese electroplating industry. Such 
policy variables as ‗psychological costs‘, ‗environmental benefit evaluation‘, ‗reward 
local government for its implementation‘ have been discussed in the game model. Most 
of these previous studies present game theoretical analysis in an abstract way, based 
upon mathematical models or frameworks, in the form of equations containing many 
parameters. The messages derived from such complex analyses can be poorly 
understood by policymakers. 
 
2.4.2 Application of game theory to supply chains 
In the supply chain field, game theory is usually used as a tool to deal with supply chain 
management problems with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives, in order 
to help decision makers enhance the cooperative efficiency of the partners involved in 
the supply chain or in the design and construction of new supply chains (Cachon and 
Serguei, 2004). Game theory application in supply chain coordination can be divided 
into two areas of application: the cooperative game and the non-cooperative game. For 
the cooperative game, Li, Huang, Zhu and Chau (2002) developed three game models to 
determine the optimal cooperative advertising program between a retailer and a 
manufacturer in order to achieve the full coordination of the supply chain, where 
influencing factors such as ‗brand name investment‘, ‗local advertising‘ and ‗sharing 
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policy‘ were discussed. Further, Yue, Austin, Wang and Huang (2006) analyzed profit 
sharing between a retailer and manufacturer making the assumption that the 
manufacturer provides price deduction to the customers, and suggested that the profits 
could be increased for both parties when they coordinated as a partnership relationship 
in cooperative advertising. Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) used cooperative bargaining 
models to investigate the economic profit allocation between different supply chain 
partners, and then discussed the profit stability based upon their potential coalition. 
However, for the non-cooperative game, Wang, Guo and Efstathiou (2004) discussed a 
decision model between one supplier and n retailers in echelon inventory games and 
local inventory games. Later Esmaeili, Aryanezhad and Zeephongsekul (2009) built 
both cooperative and non-cooperative game models between the sellers and buyers 
across the supply chain. Hennet and Arda (2008) studied the efficiency of different 
types of contracts subscribed by the participants of the supply chain. Leng and Zhu 
(2009) developed a side-payment contract scheme for the supply chain coordination and 
for reducing the impact of forward buying on supply chain performance. However, 
these studies mainly focus on the economic stability or the supply chain efficiency. 
None of them has applied game theory approach to discussing environmental issues.  
 
2.4.3 Application of game theory to green supply chains 
Game theory applications for ‗green‘ supply chain management have been rarely 
reported in the literature. Zhu and Dou (2007) have created a game between government 
and enterprises in the green supply chains and such factors as cost and benefit, 
governmental subsidies and penalties have been investigated. The game result suggests 
that government should reinforce the environmental regulations by means of increasing 
relevant subsidies and penalties to impel enterprises to implement environmental 
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management. Chen and Sheu (2009) have applied game theory to the design of 
environmental regulation pricing strategies. With the governmental regulation standards 
being raised, manufacturers will gradually extend their product responsibility followed 
by increasing the product recyclability. Further, Sheu (2011) has used the asymmetrical 
bargaining game model to seek to negotiate solutions between manufacturers and the 
‗reverse logistics‘ suppliers under the governmental financial intervention, from which 
the bargaining power of green supply chain members will be greatly affected. A similar 
study can be found by Barari et al. (2012), who have provided a dynamic evolutionary 
game model to discuss the potential strategic coordination between producer and retailer 
by maximizing economic profits while implanting green practices, thus to achieve a 
‗win-win‘ situation between environmental and commercial benefits on the supply 
chain. These past studies are very useful in informing our approach, however they do 
not consider the issues raised in the introduction, namely, by identifying which 
producers offer a sustainable economic performance with a level of environmental risk 
or carbon footprint which society is prepared to accept.  
 
2.4.4 Application of game theory to waste management 
At present, studies of Game theory application to waste management are rarely reported 
in the literature. Cheng, Chan and Huang (2003) have put forward multi-criteria 
decision analysis (MCDA) integrated with inexact mixed integer linear programming 
(IMILP) to select the appropriate landfill site to minimize the total cost of waste 
management. Moreover, co-operative game theory is used as a sub-module of MCDA to 
evaluate the landfill site alternatives. Davila, Chang and Diwakaruni (2005) have used a 
two-tiered grey integer programming based on the game theoretic analysis to evaluate 
the optimal pricing strategies for tipping fees available to certain regional landfills. The 
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game model is derived from a ―Two Person Zero-Sum‖ game, and the corresponding 
payoffs matrix is constructed by the grey integer programming algorithm. Thus, 
different strategy ―win or lose‖ can be compared by the payoffs matrix while taking the 
relevant constraint conditions into account, e.g. economic cost, design capacity etc. For 
example, Fig.2.10 shows that payoffs (nodes) resulted from a step reduction in tipping 
fees at Edinburgh and Browning-Ferries Industries (BFI) landfills (En for Edinburgh, Bm 
for BFI).  
 
 
Fig.2.10. Strategic actions selected by the payoffs matrix and constraint conditions  
(adopted From: Davila et al., 2005) 
 
Grimes-Casey, Seager, Theis and Powers (2007) have integrated game theory with the 
lifecycle cycle assessment (LCA) of bottle packaging to discuss the preferable choice 
between refillable and disposable bottles. The refillable bottles can be reused only if the 
consumers maintain high return rates and the consumers who keep the refillable bottles 
may raise the reusing cost. Therefore, the optimal strategy is expected to be cooperated 
between the bottlers and consumers. Jørgensen (2010) has created a dynamic game 
scenario for waste management. This game prototype is derived from a ―N-Person 
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Cooperative‖ game, where there are three players involved. Each player has a stock of 
waste, and would dump a certain amount to another player at any instant of time. 
Assume that the overall waste constant throughout the game scenario, the region‘s stock 
of waste can be reduced only by dumping on others. The analysis shows that an 
inter-temporal core-theoretic cooperation can be sustained in a finite time horizon.  
 
2.5 Decision support systems 
Since the 1970s, research into decision support systems (DSS) has occurred in a range 
of fields, e.g. finance (banking, insurance). A DSS can be defined as an integrated 
approach, in the shape of computer-based information system, which promotes practical 
problem solving at the beginning of the process, and then supports decision-making 
activities during the implementation stages (Stuth and Lyons, 1993; Power, 2002). With 
DSS technology development in recent years, it has been widely used in the sustainable 
development study for decision-making, such as land and water management; food 
production and distribution; poverty alleviation; public health services; environmental 
management; pollution control; urban planning and management; economic planning; 
recovery from natural disasters etc (Mikolajuk and Yeh, 2000). The development of 
decision support systems for hazardous materials/waste has gone through several 
important stages, such as conceptual prototype; model design oriented application and 
computer based system respectively. Present studies mainly focus on the decision 
support systems application to hazardous materials/waste management at the stage of 
transportation or final disposal. However, none of them has discussed the stage of waste 
reduction or prevention.  
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2.5.1 Decision support system for hazardous materials transportation 
In the past 20 years, decision support system has gradually evolved from a conceptual 
model to a computer based system. Bowen, Weeks, Batra and Hill (1989) have 
established a framework of decision support system to evaluate nuclear waste 
trans-shipment in order to determine a low risk and cost route. The framework is a 
two-tier system, which is comprised of the model database and the user interface. 
Moreover, the model database contains a routing model, transportation model and 
decision-tree model separately. Each model is one mathematical programming problem, 
see Fig.2.11.  
 
Further, Beroggi and Wallace (1994) provided a prototype DSS for operational control 
of hazardous material shipments by means of hypermedia technology. The main 
function of this DSS was to help operator at a control centre monitor transportation 
process of hazardous materials in real time, especially in helping vehicles assess the 
route condition risk and select the most cost-effective routes. Zografos, Vasilakis and 
Giannouli (2000) put forward a decision support framework by choosing appropriate 
operations management for hazardous materials emergency response, especially for 
large scale industrial accidents in Western Attica, Greece. There were several prominent 
features of the methodological framework to establish better communication for 
hazardous emergency response operations, such as providing the capability to identify 
different roles and responsibilities, developing procedures for the integrated functions, 
as well as establishing the continuous interaction between developers and users through 
a series of acceptable models. 
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Fig.2.11. Structure of the proposed decision support system  
(adapted from: Bowen et al., 1989) 
 
On the basis of the above methodological framework, Zorgrafos, Androutsopoulos and 
Vasilakis (2002) developed a real-time DSS for roadway logistics and incident response, 
aimed at minimize the response times to any incidents. Several important functionalities 
were provided by this DSS, such as districting, response unit dispatching, routing of 
response units and on scene management. Similar work was undertaken by Hamouda 
(2004) to support emergency response planning in which a DSS was proposed to 
integrate the hazardous materials transport risk analysis with the emergency response 
and allow the assessment of implications with regard to the regional locations of 
hazardous materials teams. Bubbico, Di-Cave and Mazzarotta (2004) introduced the 
application of geographic information system (GIS) for decision support of hazardous 
materials in terms of risk analysis for road and rail transport, and considered factors that 
affected the risk analysis, i.e. population, accident rate and weather conditions along the 
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transport route. By means of the database of GIS, risk curves can be derived for 
different transport scenarios and the possible consequences resulted from changes of 
transportation routes or modalities can be investigated rapidly, so as to achieve 
comprehensive risk management for hazardous materials transportation. Gheorghe et al. 
(2005) designed a DSS in a software platform, through the application of ‗hot spot 
approach‘, using intelligent maps and GIS for hazardous materials rail transportation 
risk analysis. The determination of the annual societal risk resulted from the specific 
sudden accident scenario was provided, and moreover the potential causes of an 
accident was revealed while taking the spatial parameters into account. Similar works 
can also be found concerning DSS design for hazardous materials transportation, 
through which risk analysis is the most paramount element (Madala, 2000; Qiao, 2006). 
In addition, Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2008) integrated routine and emergency 
decisions together, and designed a DSS based on GIS to determine the non-dominated 
hazardous materials distribution routes whilst minimizing the economic cost and risk, 
and so were able to allocate the emergency service units to achieve timely response 
once accidents had happened, and predetermine the shortest evacuation path from the 
impacted area to the designated safety area (See Fig.2.12). Further, Zhao, Liu and Li 
(2012) designed an environmental risk information management system for China 
Railway Ministry. This system aimed at reducing the serious consequence resulting 
from sudden environmental pollution accidents during hazardous materials rail 
transportation, by means of computational simulation techniques for different accident 
scenarios, e.g. poisonous gas diffusion. Moreover, this system was incorporated 
transportation management of hazardous materials and consequent environmental risk 
into the design approach, using techniques of Management Information System (MIS) 
and geographical information system (GIS) for system development.   
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Fig.2.12. Architecture of the decision support system  
(Adopted from: Zografos et al., 2008) 
 
2.5.2 Decision support system for waste management 
Decision support system could be beneficial for the decision makers in the field of 
waste materials management to find out optimal or near optimal decisions (Finlay, 
1989).  
 
Paige, Stone, Lane and Hakonson (1996) designed a prototype based upon 
multi-objective decision theory to help engineers or designers select an appropriate 
trench cap for waste disposal. They used the hydrologic evaluation of landfill 
performance (HELP) model integrating with chemicals, runoff and erosion from 
agricultural management systems (CREAMS) to simulate the trench cap water balance 
and erosion, separately. Further, Boyle and Baetz (1998) developed a conceptual 
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prototype to select the appropriate management options for various wastes from one or 
more industrial plants. In particular, the potentials for reusing and recycling waste 
materials, as well as pre-treatment and co-treatment before final disposal were 
determined. The novel idea in this conceptual design was that the options were more 
efficient to recycle the useful waste materials and recover the waste energy, by using 
‗trains‘ (sequential approach) for waste materials sorting and treatment (see Fig.2.13).  
 
With the development of information technology, there are a number of decision 
support systems designed for municipal waste management to determine the optimal 
plan for waste collection, treatment, disposal capacity and sites allocation etc, by means 
of computer based techniques, some of which have been implemented by case studies, 
to demonstrate their availability. Chang and Wang (1997) developed an environmental 
decision support system for regional municipal waste management in Taiwan, based on 
a software package ‘SAS@‘. Haastrup et al., (1998) built a decision support system for 
regional waste management in Sicily, to identify the areas which are suitable for waste 
treatment and optimize the selection of disposal location. The related studies can be 
found by Fiorucci, Miniciardi, Robba and Sacile (2003), Simonetto and Borenstein 
(2007), in which the former mainly focused on the determination of optimal quantities 
and characteristics of waste materials sent to the different disposal facilities, e.g. 
landfill, recycling centre etc, based upon a constrained non-linear optimisation problem, 
with cost minimization including recycling, transportation and maintenance cost. The 
later one concentrated on the solid waste collection process, by building an operational 
planning system called ―Solid Waste Collection Decision Support System‖ (SCOLDSS) 
to implement in Porto Alegre, Brazil. This system was consist of several functional 
modules, such as allocation of collection vehicles, transportation route selection, 
predetermination of daily amount of waste sent to the sorting units.  
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Fig.2.13. Conceptual prototype of decision support system for industrial waste 
(adopted from: Boyle and Batez, 1998) 
 
In the context of sustainable development, life cycle assessment has been widely 
integrated with optimisation methods such as ‗cost-benefit‘ analysis, multi-criteria 
decision analysis etc., for decision-making in the field of municipal or hazardous waste 
disposal management. Costi, Minciardi, Robba and Rovatti, (2004) proposed an 
environmentally sustainable decision support system for urban waste management, 
which was based on a constrained non-linear optimisation problem by taking the 
economic costs, technical and environmental factors into account, to determine the 
allocation of waste materials by sending to the different disposal facilities, i.e. recycling 
centre, incineration plant, sanitary landfill. A similar study was found by Oropeza 
(2006) in his Ph.D dissertation ―SUWAMAS, a decision support model for sustainable 
waste management systems‖. SUWAMAS represented ‗Sustainable Waste Management 
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System‘, developed by an integer non-linear mathematical programming, which was 
comprised of four functional modules to achieve waste sustainability, being not only 
economically affordable, environmentally effective, socially acceptable but also 
logistically optimised (see Fig. 2.14). Five waste disposal operations were considered in 
this proposed system, as mechanical, biological, mechanical-biological recycling, 
incineration and landfill, respectively. The results were also to determine the optimal 
flow distribution of primary and secondary waste, thus to decide the number and 
location of the corresponding waste disposal facilities. In addition, the shortest paths 
between waste generation sites and the treatment facilities were provided by the system.  
 
Further, Boer, Boer and Jager (2007) designed a decision support tool for sustainability 
assessment of waste management systems, in which four different scenarios were 
considered, i.e. temporary storage, collection and transportation, treatment and disposal. 
This system also incorporated the economic, environmental and social sustainability 
into integrated evaluation criteria. However, it should be noticed that the assessment 
results were displayed separately, instead of converting the outcomes into a normalized 
unit. Minciardi, Paolucci, Robba and Sacile (2008) used the non-linear multi-objective 
approach to develop a decision support system for sustainable waste management, 
whilst minimizing economic costs, un-recycled waste, and quantities of waste sent to 
the landfill and environmental impact caused by the incineration.  
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Fig.2.14. Assessment criteria of sustainable waste management system  
(adopted from: Oropeza, 2006) 
 
2.6 Summary 
This Chapter has reviewed the previous studies on hazardous materials/waste 
management, environmental risk, carbon footprint, game theory application, and 
decision support system, which are very useful in informing this research to develop a 
novel environmental risk management system for hazardous waste materials.  
 
In order to manage the waste materials more efficiently, it is proposed that product 
lifecycle management combined with the waste management, and risk management to 
reduce their inherent risk and environmental impact throughout the product lifecycle, 
i.e. design, production, transportation, use and final disposal. Moreover, ‗cleaner 
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production‘ has been demonstrated as the best model for pollution prevention within 
product life cycle management. In this context, materials selection plays an important 
role to promote cleaner production, whilst providing better and safer products for the 
public. However, most of these previous studies have concentrated on selection between 
different materials. Selecting from a range of materials of a similar type and 
composition still has not been discussed.  
 
Environmental risk and carbon footprint are two significant indicators in the product 
lifecycle management. Previous studies have mainly focused on risk management on 
human health resulted from the hazardous materials/waste including the stages of 
production, transportation and disposal. However, there is no connection between risk 
and carbon footprint (which has been deemed as a potential environmental risk, see 
Section 2.2.3). Although HSE has put forward the framework of ―tolerability of risk‖, 
by which judgments can be made as to whether society would accept the risk or not, 
there is no specific criteria for carbon emissions in EU countries. Thus, how to set up 
the appropriate criteria for carbon footprint reduction is suggested and discussed in this 
study (See Chapter 3 and 6). Whilst studies reported in the literature indicate that carbon 
footprint have been measured for a wide range of products by using life cycle 
assessment, which can be viewed as the basis of carbon labelling communication, there 
is very little literature on carbon labelling itself. This study proposes an improved 
carbon labelling scheme to appreciate the significance of a product‘s carbon footprint in 
a more visual way, as presented in Chapter 3.  
 
With regard to the game theory, it has been widely employed in economic, market and 
environment research to aid decision-making by considering the interaction between the 
‗players‘. Although studies have reported in the literature that game theory has been 
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used for environmental policy making, the application to analysis in the context of 
‗cleaner production‘ have been rarely reported. Most of these previous studies present 
game theoretical analysis in an abstract way which can be poorly understood by 
policymakers. This study will employ a software package to intuitively demonstrate the 
possible game actions between government and manufacturer in the context of cleaner 
production, presented in Chapter 5. Moreover, none of the previous studies have applied 
game theory to discussing a level of environmental risk or carbon footprint reduction in 
the context of ‗green supply chain management‘. Therefore, using game theory could 
provide a novel insight to provide optimal strategies for decision-making in this study, 
thus to reduce the environmental impact, which are described in Chapter 6 and 7.  
 
Past studies on decision support system for hazardous materials or waste have mainly 
focused on the transportation and disposal stage, including the application of shortest 
transportation paths determination, waste option selection, waste facilities allocation etc. 
However, none of them has involved the stage of waste reduction or prevention and 
none has used game theoretical analysis to aid decision support for hazardous waste 
materials management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Chapter 3: Carbon Emissions Intensity Ratio
2
 
3.1 Introduction 
With the issue of global climate change assuming a higher profile in the socio-political 
context, greater attention is being paid to the greenhouse gas emissions produced by 
goods and services, directly and indirectly during their lifecycle (Wiedmann and Minx, 
2007; Iribarren, Hospido, Moreira and Feijoo, 2010). Business management, in the UK 
and elsewhere, has been encouraged, and in some instances required, to measure and 
report carbon emissions to incentivise and monitor emissions reductions (e.g., DEFRA, 
2009). For manufactured goods environmental interventions, such as emissions 
reductions, need to be implemented mainly through product design and innovation 
(Deutz, Neighbour and McGuire, 2010; Song and Lee, 2010). Moreover, with the 
concept of ‗green‘ consumerism emerging gradually into the market, consumer 
preference may be also influenced by information provided through carbon labelling of 
products (Vanclay et al., 2011). The UK government launched the carbon labelling 
program in 2007, and now more than 1100 products have been carbon labelled (Tesco, 
2011). A Recent investigation shows that some UK customers can be persuaded to buy 
a product with low carbon emissions, given the relevant information, 59% of people 
surveyed had selected at least one carbon-labelled product during the previous three 
years (Tan, 2009; Tesco, 2011).  
 
The carbon emissions embodied in a product are usually presented to consumers in the 
form of a carbon label on product packaging. Emissions information is typically 
presented either in numerical form (e.g., tonnes of CO2 emitted per product unit) or with 
                                                 
2 This chapter has been published by the Journal ―Environmental Research Letters‖. See details in: 
Zhao, R., Deutz, P., Neighbour, G., McGuire, M., 2012. Carbon Footprint Intensity: an Indicator for 
Improved Carbon Labelling Scheme. Environmental Research Letters 7, 01414.  
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claims of emissions reduction (Upham, Dendler and Bleda, 2011). A typical carbon 
reduction label has been developed by the Carbon Trust. The label presents the life 
cycle carbon emissions of the product per functional unit (i.e., packet, or serving), 
which the Carbon Trust define as the carbon footprint 
(www.carbontrustcertification.com; accessed 31/10/2011).  
 
Fig.3.1 shows an example of a typical carbon label developed by the Carbon Trust, in 
which ‗100 g‘ indicates the carbon footprint throughout the product‘s lifecycle, in terms 
of the mass of ‗CO2‘ carbon dioxide emitted, or its equivalent of other greenhouse 
gases, and ‗per serving‘ helps the consumer to relate a typical quantity of food to its 
carbon footprint (Carbon Trust, 2010).  
 
 
Fig.3.1. Carbon reduction label in UK (Adopted from: Carbon Trust) 
 
The carbon label is seen as an effective means of communication to raise consumers‘ 
awareness of climate change, and thus to help change their lifestyles and purchasing 
behaviours (Carbon Trust, 2008; Tan, 2009). However, based upon the responses from 
focus groups and surveys of responses to carbon labelling, it is clear that the public find 
it quite difficult to imagine a given quantity of CO2 emission and its potential 
environmental impact (Upham, Dendler and Bleda, 2011; Gadema and Oglethorpe, 
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2011 in press). In this context, the current system of carbon labelling does not 
communicate a sufficiently meaningful message to the consumer, especially if the label 
simply presents the emissions value on the product package. 
 
Thus, the carbon label still needs further improvement, in order to establish an 
appropriate frame of reference that helps consumers better understand the concept of a 
carbon footprint (Carbon Trust, 2008). This Chapter proposes a dimensionless system of 
carbon emissions labelling, which, by facilitating comparison between products, would 
increase the ability of green consumers to implement their concerns in the market place. 
The carbon emissions data are normalized to a common scale of Carbon Emissions 
Intensity (CEI), and a new indicator Carbon Emissions Intensity Ratio (CEIR) is 
generated based the ratio of CEI to the annual national greenhouse gas emission per 
gross domestic product. The value of the dimensionless Carbon Emissions Intensity 
Ratio (CEIR) of a product can be evaluated on a simple scale with five ranges of values 
from ‗extremely low‘ to ‗extremely high‘. The performance of a given product can be 
presented on its packaging by a simple diagram with colour gradation. It is hoped that 
this study could lead to an improvement in the clarity of current carbon labelling 
schemes and thus encourage consumers to select low carbon products, as well as 
increasing the potential for reduction in carbon emissions. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Carbon emissions derived from the LCA is generally determined by functional unit. 
That is the carbon emissions relate to a specific scenario, e.g. per pack, per serving, per 
pint etc (Carbon Trust, 2010). The starting point of the proposed methodology is to 
normalize the carbon emissions into a common scale. Here, it is considered using an 
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indicator defined as ‗Carbon Emissions Intensity‘ (CEI), which can be understood as 
carbon emissions per unit of economic output (DEFRA, 2009). This indicator can be 
calculated as follows:  
 
                      
)( jR
CE
CEI
i
i                                 (3-1) 
where CEi  is the carbon emissions of the ith product (kilogram per functional unit), 
which is derived from a LCA; ( )iR j  is the retail price of the ith product at the the jth 
year, using British pounds per functional unit. 
 
However, the CEI is highly dependent upon the retail price, fluctuations of which would 
disguise temporal variations in carbon emissions levels (DEFRA, 2009). Thus, in 
successive years the product‘s retail price would need to be adjusted to allow for 
inflation. This is not a trivial matter, but the UK government, for example, provides 
guidance on the derivation of official measures of inflation, as well as tracking the 
calculated values (Office of National Statistics: www.ons.gov.uk/ accessed 8/1/2012).  
 
The second stage is to devise a baseline to build a dimensionless indicator and frame of 
reference. The baseline is the national carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic 
product (GDP), defined as National Carbon Emissions Intensity (NCEI) (Fan et al., 
2007; Wang, Wang and Wang, 2011 In press). This is expressed as follows: 
                       
 
)(
)(
)(
jGDP
jGHG
jNCEI                           (3-2) 
 
where )( jNCEI is the National Carbon Emissions Intensity for the country of 
production in a designated year (j); )( jGHG is the national greenhouse gas emissions 
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(direct emissions) at the jth year and )( jGDP  is the national gross domestic product at 
the jth year. The NCEI is based on estimated emissions for a given year, rather than life 
cycle emissions for a product. This is appropriate as an emissions intensity baseline is 
established in time, to facilitate comparison of product emissions intensity over time, as 
well as between products at a given time.   
 
From Equations (3-1) and (3-2), a dimensionless indicator can be set based upon the 
ratio of CEI and NCEI, which now can be defined as the ‗Carbon Emissions Intensity 
Ratio‘ (CEIR) and expressed as follows: 
              
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)( jGHG
jGDP
jR
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CE
jNCEI
CEI
CEIR
i
i
i
i
i              (3-3) 
 
By definition, the value for NCEI for the designated baseline year would remain 
constant for the calculation of CEIR for successive years. Thus any change in CEIR 
over time would be accounted for primarily by changes in carbon emissions per product 
unit for the given product. It is assumed in this proposed methodology that CEIRs are 
normally distributed with mean value   and standard deviation  . This assumption 
may be compromised if, for example, products for which data are available are 
preferentially from higher emissions categories. However, this potential problem would 
decrease over time, as labelling became more widely adopted. Based on this 
assumption, it is proposed to divide the carbon emissions intensity ratio into five ranges, 
designated as extremely low, low, medium, high and extremely high, respectively (See 
Fig.3.2).  
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Fig.3.2. Ranges of carbon emissions intensity ratio in terms of the normal distribution 
 
Both  and  are calculated based on Equation (3-3), in order to determine the 
regional boundaries. Thus, the mean of carbon emissions intensity ratio   can be 
expressed as follows: 
                       
n
CEIR
n
i
i
 1                                (3-4) 
 
where n indicates the sample number of the measured products.  
 
  is the standard deviation of carbon emissions intensity ratio, which reflects how 
much variation is from the mean, and can be measured by the following equation.  
                     


n
i
iCEIR
n 1
2)(
1
                         (3-5) 
75 
 
For example, if a certain product‘s CEIR approaches the mean, within the standard 
deviation range / 2 , it is suggested that the measured product could be labelled as 
‗medium‘.  
 
In order to help customers perceive this dimensionless indicator intuitively, a coloured 
diagram is developed to present the ratio in a visual way, and thus to improve the 
effectiveness of carbon labelling scheme. The prototype of the diagram is derived from 
the concept of ‗tolerability of risk‘, providing a benchmark by which judgments can be 
made as to whether society should accept the risk, as intolerable, tolerable or acceptable 
(HSE, 1988). Moreover, HSE has proposed notional boundaries for each region in terms 
of the risk of death or serious injury to a member of the public (See Fig.3.3). For 
instance, a risk of 1 in 10
4
 per annum to any member of the public is the maximum that 
should be tolerated from any large industrial plant in any industry. The level of broadly 
acceptable risk is suggested as 1 in 10
6
 per annum (HSE, 1988).  
 
 
Fig.3.3. Framework of ‗tolerability of risk‘ (adapted from: HSE, 1988) 
 
 
Intolerable region 
Tolerable region 
Acceptable region 
1 in 10
4
 per annum 
1 in 10
6
 per annum 
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In this study, it is suggested dividing the inverted triangle into five ranges of carbon 
emissions intensity ratios. The ranges are highlighted using a background colour that 
gradually changes from red to green, as the CEIR decreases from extremely high to 
extremely low (See Fig.3.4). 
 
 
Fig.3.4. Level of carbon emissions intensity ratio 
 
3.3 Case examples 
In this section, two case examples are presented to demonstrate the application of the 
above methodology. The first example uses a wide range of product types to establish a 
baseline figure for the UK for the purposes of this exercise. The baseline is then applied 
to calculate CEIR for the included products. The second example demonstrates that the 
methodology can discriminate between the emissions intensity of similar products, in 
this case milk with differing fat contents.   
 
 
 
r>μ+σ 
μ-σ<r<μ-σ/2 
Extremely high 
High 
Low 
  
 
μ+σ/2<r<μ+σ 
Medium μ-σ/2<r<μ+σ/2 
Extremely low 0<r<μ-σ 
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3.3.1 Example one: carbon labelling of different product categories 
For the purposes of this example we are using the 60 products with carbon emissions 
data derived from an input-output model developed by Small World Consulting Ltd, in 
collaboration with Lancaster University (Berners-Lee, 2010). The emissions data were 
converted to the Carbon Emissions Intensity (CEI) in units of kilograms CO2 per Pound 
Sterling (￡) of output based on the retail price, Table 3.1. The products can be divided 
into four categories in terms of their applications, ranging from heavy industrial 
products, light industrial products, groceries to ‗other commercial products‘.  
 
As the economic output values of these products are based on 2009 retail prices, the 
year 2009 is set as the baseline year. Thus, the National Carbon Emissions Intensity 
(NCEI) for the UK can be calculated as follows:  
                  
)2009(
)2009(
)2009(
GDP
GHG
NCEI                           (3-6) 
 
where GHG(2009) is the direct national greenhouse gas emissions of UK at 2009, 
estimated to be 566,300 million kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent (DECC, 2011); 
GDP(2009)  is the national gross domestic product of UK at 2009, given as 2,173,154 
million US dollars by the World Bank (2010). As the yearly average currency exchange 
rate from US dollars to Pounds Sterling is about 0.63 (HM Revenue & Customs, 2011), 
the GDP value at year 2009 can be transformed into ￡1,369,087.02 million. Thus, the 
UK baseline value NCEI(2009)  can be calculated as 0.41 kilograms of carbon 
emissions per ￡.  
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Table 3.1 Carbon footprint intensity of different products  
(Reproduced from ‗How bad are bananas: the carbon footprint of everything) 
Products 
Carbon footprint intensity 
(Kilograms per ￡ of output value) 
Coal 3.56 
Oil and gas 0.78 
Metal ores 0.99 
Stone, clay and minerals 1.06 
Processed meat 1.03 
Fish 0.85 
Processed fish and fruit 0.75 
Processed oils and fats 0.75 
Dairy products 1.22 
Bread and biscuits 0.63 
Sugar 1.04 
Confectionery 0.35 
Alcoholic beverages 0.26 
Soft drinks and mineral water 0.51 
Tobacco products 0.13 
Textile fibers 0.62 
Made-up textiles 0.26 
Carpets and rugs 0.21 
Other textiles 0.58 
Knitted products 0.71 
Clothing 0.23 
Leather products 0.51 
Footwear 0.23 
Wood and wood products 0.76 
Paper and paperboard products 0.71 
Petroleum products and coke 0.64 
Industrial dyes 1.42 
Inorganic chemicals 1.20 
Organic chemicals 1.49 
Fertilisers 3.05 
 
 
Table 3.1 (Continued) Carbon footprint intensity of different products  
(Reproduced from ‗How bad are bananas: the carbon footprint of everything) 
Products 
Carbon footprint intensity 
(Kilograms per ￡ of output value) 
Synthetic resins 1.24 
Pesticides 1.03 
Paints, varnishes, printing ink etc 0.56 
Pharmaceuticals 0.27 
Soap and toilet preparation 0.26 
Man-made fibres 2.07 
Rubber products 0.89 
Plastic products 0.89 
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Glass and glass products 0.94 
Ceramic products 0.46 
Clay products 0.94 
Cement, lime and plaster 4.04 
Concrete 1.31 
Iron and steel 2.63 
Non-ferrous metals 1.80 
Metal castings 2.86 
Metal boilers 0.71 
Cutlery tools 0.46 
Transmitters for TV and radio 0.44 
Receivers for TV and radio 0.23 
Motor vehicles 0.72 
Furniture 0.52 
Jewellery 0.40 
Sports products and toys 0.18 
Insulated wire and cable 1.07 
Domestic appliances 0.44 
Agricultural machinery 0.69 
Machine tools 0.59 
Office machinery and computers 0.36 
Electric motors, generators 0.64 
 
Using Equation (3-3), the CEIR of the 60 selected products can now be calculated, as 
shown in Table 3.2, with   computed as 2.28, and  as 1.97, based on Equations (3-4) 
and (3-5). In this example, therefore, the ‗extremely low‘ region lies between 0 and 
0.31, ‗low‘ between 0.31 and 1.29, ‗medium‘ between 1.29 and 3.27, ‗high‘ between 
3.27 and 4.25, ‗extremely high‘ above 4.25 (See Fig.3.5).  
 
Table 3.2 Carbon footprint intensity ratio of different products 
Products 
Carbon footprint 
intensity ratio 
Carbon footprint 
level 
Coal 8.68 Extremely high 
Oil and gas 1.90 Medium 
Metal ores 2.41 Medium 
Stone, clay and minerals 2.59 Medium 
Processed meat 2.51 Medium 
Fish 2.07 Medium 
Processed fish and fruit 1.83 Medium 
Processed oils and fats 1.83 Medium 
Dairy products 2.98 Medium 
Bread and biscuits 1.54 Medium 
Sugar 2.54 Medium 
80 
 
Confectionery 0.85 Low 
Alcoholic beverages 0.63 Low 
Soft drinks and mineral water 1.24 Low 
Tobacco products 0.32 Low 
Textile fibers 1.51 Medium 
Made-up textiles 0.63 Low 
Carpets and rugs 0.51 Low 
Other textiles 1.41 Medium 
Knitted products 1.73 Medium 
Clothing 0.56 Low 
Leather products 1.24 Low 
Footwear 0.56 Low 
Wood and wood products 1.85 Medium 
Paper and paperboard 
products 
1.73 Medium 
Petroleum products and coke 1.56 Medium 
Industrial dyes 3.46 High 
Inorganic chemicals 2.92 Medium 
Organic chemicals 3.63 High 
Fertilisers 7.44 Extremely high 
 
 
Table 3.2 (Continued) Carbon footprint intensity ratio of different products 
Products 
Carbon footprint 
intensity ratio 
Carbon footprint 
level 
Synthetic resins 3.02 Medium 
Pesticides 2.51 Medium 
Paints, varnishes, printing ink etc 1.37 Medium 
Pharmaceuticals 0.66 Low 
Soap and toilet preparation 0.63 Low 
Man-made fibres 5.05 Extremely high 
Rubber products 2.17 Medium 
Plastic products 2.17 Medium 
Glass and glass products 2.29 Medium 
Ceramic products 1.12 Medium 
Clay products 2.29 Medium 
Cement, lime and plaster 9.85 Extremely high 
Concrete 3.20 Medium 
Iron and steel 6.41 Extremely high 
Non-ferrous metals 4.39 Extremely high 
Metal castings 6.98 Extremely high 
Metal boilers 1.73 Medium 
Cutlery tools 1.12 Low 
Transmitters for TV and radio 1.07 Low 
Receivers for TV and radio 0.56 Low 
Motor vehicles 1.75 Medium 
Furniture 1.27 Low 
Jewellery 0.98 Low 
Sports products and toys 0.44 Low 
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Insulated wire and cable 2.61 Medium 
Domestic appliances 1.07 Low 
Agricultural machinery 1.68 Medium 
Machine tools 1.43 Medium 
Office machinery and computers 0.88 Low 
Electric motors, generators 1.56 Medium 
 
 
 
Fig.3.5. Level of CEIR determination based on 60 product categories (Example one) 
 
It is apparent that the CEIR of the selected products is related to the energy embodied in 
them. Fig.3.6 shows the carbon emissions intensity ratio of 15 heavy industrial 
products, in which coal, oil and gas, metal ores, coke etc are contained. The heavy 
industrial products (including metal ores and fossil fuels) have CEIR values in the 
medium to extremely high ranges. 
 
In contrast to the heavy industrial products, the light industrial products are more 
consumer oriented, instead of via the intermediates used by other industries or 
manufacturers (Owusu, 2011), in Fig.3.7. However, groceries and some household 
products have been excluded from the light industrial category in this example, but 
listed some representative products, such as textiles, fibres etc. Man-made fibre shows 
r>4.25 
0.31<r<1.29 
Extremely high 
High 
Low 
  
 
3.27<r<4.25 
Medium 1.29<r<3.27 
Extremely low 0<r<0.31 
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the highest carbon emissions intensity ratio, whilst other products appear to be at the 
medium or even at the low values.  
 
The ‗grocery‘ category covers not only food and beverages, but also some house-hold 
products, such as furniture, domestic appliances, cutlery etc. Fig.3.8 shows their 
different CEIRs, most fall into the low range. Compared with heavy industrial products, 
light industrial, and food products typically have medium to low CEIR values.  
 
Besides, there are five products categorized into ‗other undefined commercial‘ products 
in this case example, including pesticides, paints, fertilizers, industrial dyes and sport 
products and toys. Their carbon emissions intensity ratios are shown in Fig.3.9. 
Fertilisers also exhibit an extremely high CEIR value.  
 
Thus, the calculated CEIRs provide a convenient, dimensionless, value by which to 
compare the emissions intensity of widely different products. Furthermore, these initial 
values, based on 2009 price figures, would provide an invaluable means of comparing 
emissions intensity of given products over time. The question remains as to whether the 
indicator is sufficiently sensitive to enable the separation of similar products on the 
basis of their emissions intensity, which is a closer simulation of the choices faced by 
consumers.  
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Fig.3.6. Level of CEIR determination based on heavy industrial products (Example one)  
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Fig.3.7. Level of CEIR determination based on light industrial products (Example one) 
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Fig.3.8. Level of CEIR determination based on groceries (Example one) 
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Fig.3.9. Level of CEIR for a selection of products from ‗other undefined commercial 
products‘ category (Example one) 
 
3.3.2 Example two: carbon labelling of similar products 
Example two focuses on a range of similar products, e.g. milk, with different fat 
contents: whole milk (less than 4% fat), semi-skimmed (less than 2% fat) and skimmed 
milk (less than 0.1% fat). According to an investigation carried out by a leading 
supermarket in the UK, the present retail price of the above three milk products is the 
same, 0.49 pounds sterling per pint. Their corresponding carbon footprints, shown in the 
carbon label, are 0.9 kg CO2/pint, 0.8 kg CO2/pint, 0.7 kg CO2/pint, respectively, Table 
3.3. Using the baseline value for NCEI(2009)  of 0.41 kilograms per pound sterling 
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(See example one), the CEI, and its corresponding ratio, can be calculated for the three 
milk products from the equations (3-1) and (3-3), Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.3 Carbon emissions and retail price of three investigated milk products 
Milk products 
Carbon emissions 
per pint (Kg) 
Retail price  
(one pint milk) 
(Pound sterling) 
Whole milk (<4% fat) 0.9  0.49  
Semi-skimmed milk  
(<2% fat) 
0.8  0.49 
Skimmed milk  
(<0.1% fat) 
0.7  0.49  
 
Table 3.4 Carbon emissions intensity and its ratio of three investigated milk products 
Milk products 
Carbon emissions 
intensity  
(Kg per Pound) 
Carbon emissions 
intensity ratio 
Whole milk (<4% fat) 1.84 4.49 
Semi-skimmed milk 
(<2% fat) 
1.63 3.98 
Skimmed milk 
 (<0.1% fat) 
1.43 3.49 
 
Since milk is a dairy product, one of the 60 selected products presented in the example 
one, it can be deemed to be included in the normal distribution of carbon labelled 
products divided into the various regions. Hence, the levels of carbon emissions 
intensity ratio, defined in Fig.3.5 are still relevant to the three milk products. Milk is a 
high carbon product (Berners-Lee, 2010): both semi-skimmed and skimmed milk show 
high CEIRs, whilst whole milk‘s CEIR is extremely high (See Fig.3.10).  
 
The CEIR, therefore, is capable of distinguishing between similar products, even, as in 
this case, variants of the same product. Notably, dairy products overall had a medium 
CEIR (See Table 3.2). The reason can be explained as the difference between the 
individual and entire samples, i.e. dairy products include varieties, such as milk, milk 
powder, butter, cheese, cream, yogurt etc. On the one hand, the carbon emissions 
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intensity ratio for certain variety can be low, medium or high, e.g. the milk investigated 
in this example shows at the high or extremely high level. On the other hand, the CEIR 
for the entirety as dairy products still remains at a comparatively stable level, i.e. 
medium. An emissions-conscious consumer, therefore, would be able to use the 
information provided by CEIR labelling to adjust their consumption habits in such a 
way as to obtain the nutritional benefits of dairy products whilst reducing their personal 
carbon footprint.  
 
 
 
Fig.3.10. Level of CEIR determination based on similar milk products (Example two) 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
No carbon emissions indicator can be more accurate or precise than the inputs from 
which it is derived. In this instance the inputs can be divided between those relating to 
the measurement of carbon emissions, and those relating to the financial data. The most 
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critical input for any carbon emissions indicator is the LCA emissions data. As 
discussed, the complexities of LCA and difficulties in obtaining the required data limit 
the precision of calculated values. In addition, there may be biases in the types of 
products for which values have been calculated, which would influence the CEI. 
Additionally, the national emissions data used to calculate the baseline value are likely 
to vary significantly in methodology of collection and presentation between different 
countries, which will hinder international comparison of CEIR.   
 
For financially based emissions intensities, a significant problem is posed by 
fluctuations in retail prices. The proposed methodology corrects for this, but there are 
uncertainties in the process, with a number of different methods available for providing 
a constant value to fluctuating prices. The methodology needs to be tested for sensitivity 
to calculations of inflation and the assumptions made on short term price fluctuations. 
(e.g., is average recommended retail price for the year used, or are sale prices taken into 
consideration or price discrepancies between different outlets).  
 
One potential innovation to LCA would be to combine the existing life cycle assessment 
approach with other methods, such as Organisation Product based Life Cycle 
Assessment (OP-LCA), Input–Output Analysis based Life Cycle Assessment 
(IO-LCA). This would allow better comparability by using the financial accounts as a 
unique functional unit and including all relevant products and processes (Berners-Lee, 
2010; Carballo-Penela and Doménech, 2010). In this case, the first step of the proposed 
methodology (division by inflation corrected retail price) for carbon labelling could be 
omitted. However, the financial values used in any hybrid LCA approach would need to 
be corrected for variations over time. 
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3.5 Summary 
This Chapter presents an improved carbon labelling scheme to help consumers not only 
to better understand the concept of carbon footprint, but also to appreciate the 
significance of a product‘s carbon footprint in a more visual way. This approach starts 
by normalizing carbon emissions data on a common scale of ‗Carbon Emissions 
Intensity‘, and a new indicator ‗Carbon Emissions Intensity Ratio‘ is generated based 
upon its ratio to the annual national greenhouse gas emission per gross domestic 
product. Five ranges (extremely low, low, medium, high and extremely high) are used 
to represent the level of carbon emission intensity ratio by a simple diagram with colour 
gradation. Two case examples are presented, in which the Carbon Emissions Intensity 
Ratio of various selected products, both distinct and related, are calculated and 
compared. 
 
As it is evident that consumers drive the open market, and their preference may be 
influenced by the carbon footprint label of products, to demand better, safer and 
sustainable products for consumption, as well as to promote cleaner production, which 
should be also attached more importance by manufacturers and government. Although 
the public demand is the principal driver for industrial innovation and adjustment, there 
might be different interests and dilemmas within the stakeholders, i.e. manufacturers 
and government.  
 
Thus, the following chapters first introduce the basis of game theory, and then illustrate 
its application to cleaner production, supply chain respectively to identify the 
appropriate strategy for manufacturers and government whilst optimising sustainability 
or the three dimensions (economic, social and environment).  
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Chapter 4: Game Theory Basis for Decision-Making 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, the fundamentals of game theory are introduced, which will also be 
used for further analysis within different game scenarios. It is considered that game 
theory for decision-making can be similar to the mathematical modelling process (Shier 
and Wallenius, 2000), as a game problem is ultimately resolved by a model. Therefore, 
the mathematical modelling process can be deemed as a general framework for game 
theory application, but one which needs to be adjusted according to the specific game 
circumstance.  
 
The specific process of game theory for decision making is described in Figure 4.1, 
based upon the above prototype. Within the loop cycle of the decision-making process, 
there are four key stages which are: (a) game situation analysis, (b) game modelling, (c) 
game result interpretation, and (d) decision-making for players in turn. Game situation 
is usually derived from a realistic issue, where conflicts or different interests are 
involved (Geckil and Anderson, 2010). In this premise, essential factors that formulate a 
game, as ―players‖, ―payoffs‖ and ―strategies‖ should be analyzed. The decision-maker 
with different interests can be seen as a ‗player‘ in a game. A payoff is what a player 
may possibly gain in the game situation, depending upon the strategic actions of all the 
players. Strategy can be set as the rule of a game, to describe how a player could play 
(Romp, 1997). Moreover, such questions as ―how many players in the game‖, ―how 
many strategies for each player‖, ―what is the possible strategic action for each player‖, 
―what is the possible payoff for each player‖ etc, should be considered at this stage. 
Based upon the game situation analysis, the practical problem can be quantified or 
semi-quantified in the corresponding models in terms of different game forms, e.g. 
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normal or extensive form, or various game scenarios, e.g. static, dynamic, evolutionary 
game theory. The solution of a game is to determine what strategic action each player 
will select, and the result can be interpreted as an equilibrium (agreement) by 
considering the interaction between the players to maximize the individual or group 
interests (Romp, 1997). The agreement could be a long term or short term equilibrium 
to aid decision-making for the players involved. Once the equilibrium has been broken, 
a new game situation will be generated to find out the alternative strategic action for 
each player.  
 
 
 
Fig.4.1. Decision making process by using game theory  
 
4.2 Prisoner’s dilemma 
In this Section, a well-known game example called ―The Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ (Davis, 
1983; Luce and Raiffa, 1989; Straffin, 1993) is introduced more specifically to present 
the above decision making process. The significance of Prisoner‘s Dilemma is that 
considerable social phenomena or issues which are found in our life can be abstracted 
Game Situation 
Analysis 
Game 
Modelling 
Decision making 
for game players 
Game Result 
Interpretation 
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and explained as the prisoner‘s choices in a way (Straffin, 1993). Moreover, this game 
situation can be seen as a prototype to develop the game scenarios in this study, to 
discuss the potential strategic selection between manufacturers and government in the 
Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
For instance, the environmentally friendly products are advocated as an assumption in 
our study, which may lead to further competition within those manufacturers that 
produce the same type of products. It is assumed that two manufacturers will not only 
engage in a cost reduction war, but will also become involved in a product quality 
improvement, e.g. reducing the inherent risk and carbon footprint associated with 
products. If both industries cut the economic cost of production, and lay stress on 
environmental protection such as reducing the risk to public health, and carbon footprint 
of the products, they may have the opportunity to explore a new market share. 
Otherwise, if both industries do not put emphasis on the environmental consideration, 
but just maximize their own economic interests, their long term sales profit may 
decrease gradually. If one industry adopts new and clean technology for cleaner 
production to save the cost and energy of manufacturing on the one hand, provides 
environmental friendly product on the other hand, and another industry still insists on 
their inherent action for production without taking any environmental considerations 
into account, the former industry apparently may have advantages to attract more 
customers to buy their products, thus increasing profits and seeking additional financial 
support as subsidy from government. However, the latter one may have less economic 
risk resulting from technical innovation.  
 
Now return to the ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖, which is a classical game in the field of game 
theory. It is originally generated by Albert W. Thucker (Romp, 1997), and has been 
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gradually developed by many game researchers. There are two players in the game, who 
are detained in separate rooms as being the two suspect criminals in a particular case. 
The policeman is very experienced, but without adequate evidence to sentence them in 
the trial process. Therefore, he tries to give each player two alternative choices, to 
confess what they have done, or not to confess. Therefore, the dilemma faced by the two 
prisoners is to choose whether to confess or not. The potential combinations of the 
choices that they would make are presented as follows. 
 
If both of them choose not to confess, due to the absence of direct evidence of their 
guilt, other accusations as misdemeanours are adjudicated so that they could be imposed 
in a lighter punishment, i.e. both of them are sentenced to one year in jail. If they both 
choose to confess to the policemen, they will be found guilty but will be sentenced to 
less severe punishment. Thus both of them will be sentenced to six years in jail. If one 
of them determines to confess and another one rejects to confess, the confessor will 
receive a reduced penalty as a reward, whilst his partner will be punished heavily. It is 
assumed the confessor can be exempt from jail, but his partner who denied confessing, 
will be sentenced for ten years. Here, the penalties can be arbitrary, and only seen to be 
illustrative in this example. According to the above set of potential strategic actions, this 
problem can be described in a matrix below, shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Payoffs matrix of the ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Not Confess Confess 
Not Confess (-1, -1) (-10, 0) 
Confess (0, -10) (-6, -6) 
 
95 
 
The ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖ belongs to the ―strategic form game‖. If a game is defined as 
the strategic form game, the game should contain the following three important factors, 
which are ―the list of players‖, ―the set of strategies available to each player‖, ―the 
payoffs associated with any strategy combination (one strategy per player)‖ , 
respectively (Dutta, 1999). Payoffs in game theory can be described as the real numbers 
―positive or negative‖ given for different situations. And moreover, these numbers are 
generally derived by the outcomes in the game theory. In some cases, the payoff is 
using a logic unit instead of the monetary value. For instance, if the outcome can be 
interpreted as win, lose and draw, accordingly there are values ―1‖, ―-1‖, ―0‖ to stand 
for these three situations separately (Rapoport, 1999; Thomas, 2003). Within the 
―strategic form game‖, the simplest form is the ―two person game‖, which describes that 
two players are in the game situation and each of them has two available strategies for 
further selection. Moreover, the two person game can be divided into two categories, 
within which one is called ―two-person zero-sum game‖ and another one is called ―two- 
person non zero-sum game‖ (Rapoport, 1999).  
 
A ―two-person zero-sum‖ game is a game that the player‘s payoffs add up to be zero no 
matter what strategy they would use (Kelly, 2003; Thomas, 2003). In such a game 
situation, the competition is very strict, that one player will win and the other will lose. 
The ―two-person zero-sum‖ game is applicable for daily life, but in some real 
circumstance, the payoffs cannot equal to zero as the game is unfair to some extent. 
However, it is found that the sum could be a constant as the result of the extreme 
competitive game. In order for simplicity, the term ―zero-sum‖ can be interpreted as 
―constant sum‖ in a way which means ―players have diametrically opposed the 
interests‖ (Davis, 1983).  
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The ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ is a typical ―two person non-zero-sum game‖ by the reason 
that the total payoff is twelve years if both players decide to confess and two year if 
they do not confess. Thus, the payoffs of the players cannot be summed as zero in this 
game and thus the term ―non-zero-sum‖ is used. In contrast with the two person 
zero-sum game, it is a non-strictly competitive game in which the players are not 
―completely antagonistic to one another‖ (Luce and Raiffa, 1989; Thomas, 2003). In the 
non zero-sum game, the outcome could be beneficial and acceptable to all the players 
involved, as no one will win everything but everyone will get something instead. To 
some extent, this can be understood as a ―win-win‖ situation which is different from the 
zero-sum game as strict ―win-lose‖ situation. Many conflicts related to economic, 
political and military interests can be transformed into a non zero-sum game situation. 
For example, the game scenarios of medical products development could be based on 
the non zero-sum game with various degrees of cooperation and competition (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1989; Whitmore, 2003). The basic form of non zero-sum game can be also 
applied in this study, in order to build different game scenarios in the context of cleaner 
production and green supply chain network, which is discussed in the Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
4.3 Nash equilibrium 
The solution of ―two person non zero-sum game‖, e.g. ―Prisoners‘ Dilemma‖, is 
determined by finding out the possible ―Nash Equilibrium‖. Assume that a game makes 
the unique predication from the possible strategic actions that each player may choose. 
Moreover, the predicted strategy should be a best response compared with the strategies 
chosen by all the other players. Therefore, such prediction is called as ―Nash 
Equilibrium‖, by which the mathematical definition is expressed as followed (Gibbons, 
1992).  
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Generally speaking, there are two stages to find out Nash equilibrium for any game. 
First of all, the optimum strategic action for each player should be determined in turn. 
This is done for every combination of strategies by the other players. Consequently, a 
pair of Nash Equilibria can be identified since all the players choose their optimal 
strategies simultaneously. This method is only used to solve the game with pure 
strategies. A pure strategy can be defined as ―a restricted mixed strategy with a 
probability of one given to the chosen strategy, while zero to the others‖ (Romp, 1997). 
Accordingly, pure strategy equilibrium is a specific strategy that each player chooses.  
 
However, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is that at least one player involved in the game 
randomizes over some or all of the pure strategies. This means a probabilistic 
distribution should be placed by the strategies selection. Therefore, it is supposed that 
pure strategy equilibrium should be a special case of mixed-strategy equilibrium. In 
order to present how to find out the Nash Equilibrium for the above game example 
―Prisoners‘ dilemma‖, it is considered using the method of ―Elimination of dominated 
strategies‖ (Romp, 1997; Gintis, 2009) and ―Swastika‖ method (Thomas, 2003), 
respectively. Moreover, either of these two methods can be applied further to solve the 
game models detailed in Chapter 5 and 6.  
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4.3.1 Elimination of dominated strategy 
‗Dominant strategy‘ is defined as the optimal strategy for a player, no matter what the 
other player chooses (Geckil and Anderson, 2010). However, a strategy is deemed as 
dominated, if other strategies always bring about the improved payoffs no matter what 
the players in the game choose (Romp, 1997). The ―Prisoners‘ Dilemma‖ is solved by 
the elimination of the dominated strategy, to find out the maxmin-maxmin strategic 
pair. In applying this method, each player should be examined in turn and all those 
strategies that are strictly dominated should be eliminated. This process may rule out all 
but one strategy left for each player. Therefore, this method provides a unique solution 
for the game. Table 4.2 shows the different payoffs between two prisoners while taking 
the different strategic actions, ―Confess‖ or ―not confess‖.  
 
Table 4.2 Prisoners‘ dilemma in normal form 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Confess Not confess 
Confess -6, -6  0, -10 
Not confess -10, 0 -1, -1 
 
At first, identify the optimum strategy for Prisoner 1, dependent upon what the prisoner 
2 may choose. Suppose Prisoner 1 predicts that Prisoner 2 may choose ―Confess‖, the 
best strategy for Prisoner 1 is also to ―confess‖ derived from the matrix 
6
10
 
  
, since -6 
is better than -10. As the payoffs are used to represent the duration of imprisonment, the 
numerical values should be as least as possible. Thus, it is shown in Table 4.3 by 
underlining and overstriking the first payoff element ―-6‖ when the Prisoner 2 chooses 
―confess‖.  
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Table 4.3 Prisoner 1‘s optimal choice while Prisoner 2 selecting ―confess‖ 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Confess Not confess 
Confess -6, -6   0, -10 
Not confess -10, 0  -1, -1 
 
If the Prisoner 1 predicts that Prisoner 2 may choose the action ―Not confess‖, the best 
strategy for Prisoner 1 is also to ―confess‖ derived from the matrix 





1
0
, as 0 is better 
than -1. In this case, Prisoner 1 could be exempt from jail as all the punishment will be 
undertaken by Prisoner 2. Thus, it is considered to underline and overstrike ―0‖ in Table 
4.4.  
 
Table 4.4 Prisoner 1‘s optimal choice while Prisoner 2 selecting ―Not confess‖ 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Confess Not confess 
Confess -6, -6   0, -10 
Not confess -10, 0 -1, -1 
 
Similarly, determine the optimal strategy for Prisoner 2, by forecasting the possible 
action choice of Prisoner 1 (taking the array into account). Suppose that Prisoner 1 may 
select ―confess‖, and the best strategy for Prisoner 2 is also to ―confess‖ derived from 
the matrix  6, 10  , as -6 is also better than -10. Thus, it is considered to underline 
and overstrike ―-6‖ in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5 Prisoner 2‘s optimal choice while Prisoner1 selecting ―confess‖ 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Confess Not confess 
Confess -6, -6   0, -10 
Not confess -10, 0  -1, -1 
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When Prisoner 1 may select ―not confess‖, Prisoner 2 would better to choose ―confess‖. 
From the matrix  1,0  , he could be exempted from the jail. Accordingly, the selected 
payoff element is shown in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 Prisoner2‘s optimal choice while Prisoner1 selecting ―Not confess‖ 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Confess Not confess 
Confess -6, -6   0, -10 
Not confess -10, 0  -1, -1 
 
In summary, all the selected optimal payoffs are shown in Table 4.7, with being 
underlined and over-striked. If the payoffs in the same box are underlined and 
over-striked, it is deem that the corresponding strategic pair is the dominant strategy in 
the game.  
 
Table 4.7 Prisoner2‘s optimal choice while Prisoner1 selecting ―Not confess‖ 
Prisoner 1 
Prisoner 2 
 Confess Not confess 
Confess -6, -6 0, -10 
Not confess -10, 0 -1, -1 
 
In the prisoners' dilemma, it is clear that there is only one box where both payoffs have 
been underlined and over-striked, which corresponds to both prisoners confessing. Thus, 
the Nash equilibrium is unique in this game.  
 
However, this result seems to be a not ‗satisfactory‘ solution as it leads the payoffs pair 
(-6, -6), which is worse than (-1, -1), if both players choose ―confess‖. This is because 
the individualism could be superior to the group rationality in the context of 
Non-cooperative game theory. It assumes that the individual action is determined to 
only act in self-interest (Romp, 1997; Thomas, 2003). In contrast, the players could 
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enter into a binding and enforceable agreement in the field of the cooperative game, so 
that the two prisoners are better to choose ―not confess‖. As individuals are assumed to 
work together in a voluntary instead of a compulsory way, the non-cooperative game 
theory research is more prevalent in the economic activities (Romp, 1997). Thus, the 
following studies on application of game theory to cleaner production and supply chain 
are all based upon this premise, and affiliated with the non-cooperative game.  
 
4.3.2 Swastika method 
The Swastika method is a graphical approach for determining all the Nash equilibrium 
pairs for a ―Two Person Non-cooperative‖ game. The name of this method is deriving 
from the final diagram which looks like a ―Swastika‖ (Thomas, 2003).  
 
Nash Theorem (1950): In the n-player normal-form game },...;,...{ 11 nn uuSSG  , if n  
is finite and iS is finite for every i  then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium, and 
possibly involving mixed strategies.  
 
In the premise of ―Nash Theorem‖, any two-person game (zero-sum or non zero-sum) 
with a finite number of pure strategies has at least one equilibrium pair. Suppose a pair 
of strategies Xx * , Yy * is an equilibrium pair for a non zero-sum game, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions should be satisfied for any YyXx  , : 
                       ),(),(
*
1
**
1 yxeyxe                            (4-1) 
                      ),(),( *2
**
2 yxeyxe                             (4-2) 
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The ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ game still uses ―Nash Theorem‖ to find out all the 
equilibrium pairs. In order for computation, the normal form of ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ 
(See Table 4.2) can be expressed in a matrix form below.  
 
 
 
In this example, suppose the mix-strategies for prisoner Ⅰ and Ⅱ are )1,( xx  , and 
)1,( yy  , respectively. According to the inequality (4-1), for a particular y  which is 
part of an equilibrium pair, x  can be found to maximize ),(1 yxe . Thus, the x  must 
be its partner in it. If 1x  which means no matter what y  is, prisoner 1 should 
choose ―confess‖ as the pure strategy. Thus, the expected payoffs of prisoner 1 should 
be less than or equal to the payoffs once ―confess‖ has been selected. The expression 
can be obtained as follows:  
 
                           ),1(),( 11 yeyxe                          (4-3) 
where ),(1 yxe  can be expressed as followed:  
 
  )1()3(3)1)(1(1)1(10)1(06),(1  xxyyxyxyxxyyxe   (4-4) 
 
Let 1x , and substitute the numerical value into equation (4-4) and the inequality 
(4-3), thus the indeterminate form expressions can be transformed as follows:  
 
Ⅰ1 
 
Ⅰ2 
 
Ⅱ1 
 
Ⅱ2 
 
( 6, 6) (0, 10)
( 10,0) ( 1, 1)
   
 
 
    
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                    yxxy 6)1()3(3                           (4-5) 
 
Through further mathematical simplification as the merger of similar items for the 
above expressions, the final expressions can be obtained as below:  
 
0)
3
1
)(1(3  yx                           (4-6) 
 
Followed by the constraint conditions of x  and y , the following linear simultaneous 
inequalities (4-7) can be solved if and only if 1x .  
 
                














10
10
0)
3
1
)(1(3
y
x
yx
                                (4-7) 
Similarly, any fixed x , y  could be found to maximise ),(2 yxe . If x  is part of an 
equilibrium pair, y  should be its partner. If 1y  which means no matter what x is, 
prisoner 2 would choose ―confess‖ as the pure strategy. Thus, the expected payoff of 
prisoner 2 should be less than or equal to the payoff once ―confess‖ being selected. 
Thus, the expression should satisfy the following:  
                   )1,(),( 22 xeyxe                                 (4-8) 
 
 
where 2 ( , )e x y  can be expressed as followed:  
)1()3(3)1)(1(1)1(0)1(106),(2  yyxyxyxyxxyyxe    (4-9) 
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Let 1y  and substitute the value into equation (4-9) and the inequality (4-8), thus the 
indeterminate form expressions can be derived as follows:  
               xyyx 6)1()3(3                              (4-10) 
 
The simplified expressions can be obtained as followed, by means of the merger of 
similar items from the above inequality (4-10).  
                0)
3
1
)(1(3  xy                                 (4-11) 
 
Combining the constraint conditions of x  and y with the inequality (4-11), the 
following linear simultaneous inequalities (4-12) can be solved if and only if 1y .  
 
               














10
10
0)
3
1
)(1(3
y
x
xy
                                (4-12) 
 
Thus, )1,1(),( yx  should be the unique Nash equilibrium solved by the inequalities 
(4-7) and (4-12), where the corresponding payoffs are )6,6(   that means each 
prisoner should be sentenced to 6 years in jail. The equilibrium pair is shown in Fig.4.2. 
Moreover, the Nash equilibrium reflects the probability that both players determine to 
confess is one, whilst the probability of not confessing is zero.  
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Fig.4.2. Swastika method for equilibrium pair 
 
As the ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ is a pure-strategic game, it shows strictly dominant 
strategy. Both of the two methods show that the optimum strategy is both to confess in 
the context of ―Non-cooperative Game‖. However, the ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖ is used to 
express the simplest situation of a game, the real game between manufacturers and 
government is more complex, which is presented in the following Chapter 5 and 6.   
 
4.4 Summary 
This Chapter provides the fundamentals of game theory, which are used for further 
game theoretical analysis and simulation. The starting point is to introduce the general 
process of decision-making by using game theory, which can be divided into four stages 
with a circular routine, as game situation analysis, game modelling, game result 
interpretation and decision-making for game players. Moreover, a classical game that 
the ―Prisoners‘ dilemma‖ is introduced as an example to illustrate how to use game 
theory for decision making. In particular, any game to be built further in this study may 
consider the ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ as an analogy. The game problem can be generally 
solved by means of the ―Nash Equilibrium‖ calculation, to find out the predicted 
strategic action for all the players involved. Thus, two approaches as ―elimination of 
0 
1 
1 
(1, 1) 
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dominated strategy‖ and ―Swastika method‖ are presented to find out the potential Nash 
equilibrium by using the ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ example. Furthermore, these approaches 
will be employed to solve the game developed in this research. Subsequently, Chapter 5 
describes a game in the field of cleaner production, and discusses the possible strategic 
options of the involved players: government and manufacturers, by showing how game 
theory could be applied to better understand their dilemmas. 
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Chapter 5: Game Theory Application to Cleaner Production 
5.1 Introduction 
In the context of sustainable development, all materials can be deemed as ‗hazardous‘ in 
certain situations because of their inherent risk, such as the various stages of the product 
lifecycle, i.e. production, delivery, use and final disposal. From the standpoint of 
‗Hierarchy of Waste Management‘, cleaner production is suggested as an effective way 
to prevent environmental contamination and thus to reduce the environmental risk and 
carbon footprint especially in the final disposal. Cleaner production has been defined as 
―the continuous application of an integrated, preventive strategy to processes, products 
and services to increase efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the environment‖ 
(UNEP, 2006). This can be applied to any point in a product‘s life cycle in order to 
mitigate the adverse impact on the environment and human health by decreasing the 
amount or toxicity of raw materials used in the manufacture or packaging of a product; 
redesigning products in order to increase their lifecycle, reusability and reparability; 
reforming the quality of products by which the residual toxicity and waste once 
products entering the post-consuming stage should have been minimized; changing the 
patterns of raw materials demand and consumption that reduce the amount and toxicity 
of waste generated, etc. (Tchobanoglous, 2002, Allen and Rosselot; 2004).  
 
Whilst such strategies can bring economic as well as environmental benefits, for 
example via energy savings or reductions in the amount of raw materials purchases, or 
reduction in the costs of waste disposal by reducing the amount and/or toxicity of waste 
for disposal (Smith, Hargroves and Desa, 2010), there is little dispute that the state has a 
role in setting a policy context conducive to cleaner production. For instance, the 
Chinese government has a stated policy of promoting cleaner production as a route to 
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sustainable development, in which subsidies including tax breaks, equipment upgrading 
etc., are offered to enterprises for the implementation of cleaner production (China 
NDRC, 2008, Dong et al., 2010). As Smith, Hargroves and Desa (2010) also emphasise, 
a range of policy interventions is needed to promote sustainable production.  
 
However, the policies will have to confront uncertainties during the implementation of 
cleaner production, due to the conflict of interests between the relevant stakeholders, 
especially between the government and manufacturers (Dong et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
whilst environmental policies are essential to achieve sustainable development, they 
may not be sufficient. Even in the context of the EU, which has put environmental 
regulations firmly on the policy agenda since the 1970s, many manufacturers still 
primarily focus on the profit which is the original bottom line for business (Henriques, 
2004), while not taking the full lifecycle of products into account, and even do not 
regard waste materials management as a key business area. In addition, studies have 
shown that smaller organizations pay less attention to ―waste prevention‖ or ―cleaner 
production‖ than larger ones (European Environment Agency, 2003).  
 
In this Chapter, how game theory offers an approach to model the behaviour of 
companies under different policy scenarios is illustrated. A simple ‗cleaner production‘ 
game is presented in which Government and Manufacturers are the principle ‗actors‘. 
The starting point of this approach is to analyze the possible game situation, including 
the dilemmas and actions available to government and manufacturers, respectively, and 
then provide a ―Two-Person Non-cooperative‖ game model based upon the analysis of 
the problem situation behind the cleaner production game. Moreover, the ‗Gambit‘ 
software tool is used to simulate the created game model followed by a number of set 
scenarios, in which government and manufacturers‘ actions are determined mainly by 
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governmental policy of economic sanction, cost of technological innovation and 
expected sales profit, whilst maintaining governmental subsidy (tax break) constant. 
Scenario analysis generated by the established game model can provide a guide to 
policy makers.  
 
5.2 Game situation analysis 
In order to evaluate the ‗problem situation‘, a conceptual model by means of 
‗CATWOE‘ analysis is developed in this section, to understand the principal drivers, 
actors, etc. and influences upon the ultimate environmental impact involved in a ‗game‘. 
The ‗CATWOE‘ analysis is derived from the soft systems methodology (SSM) which is 
assembled by the sequential process, root definition (RD) and conceptual model (CM) 
(see Fig.5.1). The root definition defines aim of system, i.e., what the system is, whilst 
the conceptual model presents what the system should do, e.g., the activities which 
should be done in accordance with the purpose (Wilson, 2001). Moreover, the 
‗CATWOE‘ analysis selects the words from the RD and should be a test of the structure, 
providing a useful mnemonic which can be used to stimulate thinking about problems 
and possible solutions (Checkland, 1990; Wilson, 1990). 
 
 
Fig.5.1. Process of the Soft System Methodology  
(Adopted from: Checkland and Scholes, 1990) 
 
Root definition Conceptual model 
‗CATWOE‘ 
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There are six important elements of ‗CATWOE‘, which can be specified as followed 
(Checkland, 1990; Wilson, 1990):  
 
C -‗Customers‘: the client, beneficiary or victims, i.e., who are the beneficiaries of the 
transformation process and how does the issue affect them. 
 
A-‗Actors‘: the agents who would carry out or cause to be carried out the transformation 
process, i.e., who is involved in the situation, who will be involved in implementing 
solutions. 
 
T- ‗Transformation Process‘: the conversion of input to output, i.e., what processes or 
systems are affected by the issue.  
 
W- ‗World View‘: the outlook or taken for granted framework which makes the 
transformation process meaningful, i.e., what is the big picture and what are the wider 
impacts of the issue.  
 
O- ‗Owner‘: ownership of a system, control, concern or sponsorship, i.e., who owns the 
process or situation being investigated and what role will they play in the solution.  
 
E- ‗Environmental Constraints‘: environmental impositions, elements outside the 
system, interactions with wider system, i.e., what are the constraints and limitations that 
will impact the solution and its success.  
 
In this research, the root definition is deemed as ―manufacturers, supervised by 
government, to provide environmentally friendly products for publics, by reducing the 
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environmental risk and carbon footprint, as well as enhancing the economic 
performance‖. Here, the representative implication for ‗CATWOE‘ can be found as 
followed:  
 
C- Publics (Societal members) 
A- Manufacturers 
T- Provide ‗environmentally friendly products‘ 
W- Reduce the environmental risk and carbon footprint, as well as enhancing the 
economic performance, followed by ‗Triple Bottom Line‘ (TBL) 
O- Manufacturers and Government 
E- Not specified (including additional capital paid for upgrading the existing equipment, 
technology etc) 
 
Thus, a conceptual model is built to discuss the potential game situation followed by the 
above root definition (See Fig.5.2), which could be the premises to analyze the possible 
actions between government and manufacturers in the context of ‗cleaner production‘ or 
the supply chain network (will be detailed in the Chapter 6). This game problem 
primarily results from the product development responding to the public‘s pull and the 
resulting consumption. Moreover, it is important to note that commercial products are 
sometimes manufactured using materials that are potentially ‗hazardous‘, from which 
public health can be affected because of the inherent risk, and in some cases the health 
effects can be substantial. For instance, many materials have potential for toxicity, 
especially cancerogenesis or lead to long term chronic health effects, such as 
formaldehyde which is a common substance used in some furnishings. Accordingly, 
members of the public can be at a finite risk from everyday consumer products. 
However, the public are prepared to accept this risk on account of the useful value of 
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the products, the balance between risk and reward being a key element of subjective 
risk. In this context, it is important to note that a decision making process for production 
which does not take subjective risk into account may result in an inappropriate solution 
that will not meet with public acceptance (McGuire, Neighbour and Price, 2010). 
Therefore, the ‗better and safer‘ alternatives to consumer products are demanded by the 
public. Meanwhile, the manufacturers find huge commercial opportunities or 
advantages through the improvement of their environmental performance. With ‗green 
consumerism‘ gradually emerging into the mainstream market, the governmental 
incentives and the consumer behaviours could be more rational. Thus, an unprecedented 
business opportunity would have been created for both ―environmentally sound 
products‖ and services. In this case, public demand is deemed to be the ‗principal driver‘ 
in the cleaner production ‗game‘ situation. In the following sections, to illustrate the 
approach being taken, different stakeholders, i.e. Government and Manufacturers, with 
a large area of common interest are analysed to present their opportunities and 
dilemmas.  
 
5.2.1 Governmental action and dilemma 
The Government role, is seen as promoting environmental protection to create a 
genuinely sustainable society, whilst safeguarding economic development overall, 
which can be integrated into the concept of the ―Triple Bottom Line‖ (DEFRA, 2009). 
TBL provides an interpretation of the concept of ‗sustainability‘ that, focuses not only 
on economic value, but also on environmental and social impacts that organisations 
have it in their power to influence (Elkington, 1997).  
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Fig.5.2. Conceptual model of the game situation 
 
114 
 
With regard to the ‗cleaner production‘, government aims to ―encourage and drive 
innovation, research and design, in order for sustainability improvements throughout 
the lifecycle of all kinds of products” (DEFRA, 2008). To be more specific, the main 
actions that government can undertake to intervene in the process of ‗cleaner production‘ 
are to prohibit the sale of those least sustainable products in the market; drive the 
existing market towards more sustainable products through regulation; encourage the 
development of ‗better‘ and sustainable products through regulation, knowledge 
transfer, improved design and subsidy.  
 
Fig.5.3 shows the above main actions in a product distribution curve. With the 
development of intervention, the whole product and market would become more 
sustainable over time. Furthermore, these actions mainly are enforced by using policy 
regulation, investing in environmental education for the public, funding for research and 
development for new technologies, research and the exploitation of knowledge, working 
with business on innovation in the environmental industries sector etc, to prevent or 
minimize environmental impact and public subjective risk, thus to achieve cleaner 
production by providing ―environmentally friendly products‖. Moreover, game theory 
allows this model to be tested more thoroughly as well as provide an approach to 
determine the most dominant strategy in the market taking account of the triple bottom 
line.  
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Fig.5.3. Possible Government interventions to increase sustainability 
 (Adopted from: DEFRA, 2008) 
 
However, there are also some dilemmas that affect government actions during the 
process of ‗cleaner production‘. Primarily, the potential conflict between economic 
performance and environmental impact should be taken into account at an early stage, 
as far as the difficulties of policy implementation are concerned. Other uncertain aspects 
include the dynamic behaviour of the system, e.g. the unintended consequences of the 
regulation involved, environmental impact, social responsibility, company behaviour, 
etc. It should be noticed that although relevant fixed legislation are being formulated to 
drive industry towards sustainability, these inflexible regulations will only intensify in 
number and scope, if manufacturers do not respond (Kane, 2010). Given the 
complexity, there are also ―incentives or sanctions‖: how should Government establish 
the reasonable incentive and restraint mechanism? For example, revenues from the 
landfill tax can be used to fund programmes to support business in improving resource 
efficiency (DEFRA, 2006).  
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5.2.2 Manufacturers’ action and dilemma 
For the manufacturers, there are three levels to run a business from bottom to top, which 
can be described as basic market demand (bottom line), a sustainable source of raw 
materials and energy for production, and gradually achieving ‗green‘ societal value for 
environmental protection (Kane, 2010). The manufacturer‘s role is to promote their 
individual firm‘s economic stability whilst acting in accordance with policy and norms 
of behaviour. With the implementation of clean production technology, manufacturers 
should recognize that they need to take more corporate social responsibilities (CSR) for 
the public rather than just their own profitability. For instance, some blue chip 
organizations are using the Triple Bottom Line to manage their production processes. 
Moreover, corporate governance, risk management and control, business accounting and 
reporting can be enhanced by CSR implementation to varying degrees (Monagban, 
2004).  
 
However, manufacturers are also faced to the dilemma that challenges and opportunities 
coexisting with the risk and success, thus not easily to change their business strategies. 
Any change to strategy provides an additional risk, but this may be offset by punitive 
measures where manufacturers could be punished for environmentally unfriendly 
production, for instance, higher carbon footprint for the products etc. The question 
becomes should manufacturers pre-empt regulatory action and seek to gain a 
competitive advantage or key selling point by considering the TBL. The traditional 
basis on which companies operate is governed by the profit motive, hence there has 
been a tendency to neglect their higher moral responsibility to provide ‗environmentally 
sound‘ and ‗socially responsible‘ products having due regard to the Triple Bottom Line 
(TBL).  
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5.3 Game model for cleaner production 
At its simplest, a ―Two-Person Non-cooperative‖ game model for cleaner production is 
built with two players: Government (G) and Manufacturers (M), respectively. This 
model starts from the consideration of ‗fiscal measures‘ by Government and 
‗cost-benefit analysis‘ by manufacturers in the process of cleaner production. Suppose 
each of them has two available strategies. For government, the strategies are: {R, NR} 
which indicate whether government should regulate (R) manufacturing process and 
market competition in order to promote cleaner production or not regulate (NR), while 
keeping the current relationship between supply and market demand. Correspondently, 
there are two strategies for manufacturers, which are {CH, NCH}. Action CH means 
that manufacturers decide to change (CH) their existing process technology or 
equipment aiming at better product quality and market expansion, whist NCH means no 
change to existing business practices. Table 5.1 shows the expected payoffs for the two 
players with different actions.  
 
Table 5.1 Payoffs matrix between Government (G) and Manufacturers (M) 
M 
G 
CH NCH 
R E-TB,  TB-C+S P-I,  -P 
NR E,  -C+S -I,  0 
 
In the payoffs matrix, ‗TB‘ corresponds to the governmental subsidy in a form of ‗tax 
break‘ in order to help manufacturers implement cleaner production; ‗P‘ denotes 
economic penalties if manufacturers still insist on environmentally unfriendly 
production, and ‗C‘ represents the cost of technological innovation of manufacturers for 
cleaner production. ‗E‘ denotes the economic benefit that government would gain in 
terms of revenue when manufacturers improve production technology, whilst 
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minimizing environmental impact, such as reducing environmental risk and carbon 
footprint etc. ‗S‘ indicates the additional sales that manufacturers may expect from 
adopting cleaner production instead of the existing method of production. ‗I‘ denotes 
the possible loss resulting from environmental impact (such as pollution events).  
 
It is considered that the dilemma between Government and Manufacturers is an 
―imperfect information game‖. A game with imperfect information is defined as “one in 
which neither player knows the actions of the other player before playing his or her own 
strategy” (Fink, 1998). In this game, manufacturers cannot predict the actions taken by 
government at an earlier stage of the game. However they may pay more attention to the 
potential economic benefits while choosing to change or not to change. Meanwhile, 
government initially cannot determine whether to regulate the market or not, as the 
actions from manufacturers could be cooperative or non-cooperative. Therefore, a game 
with imperfect information adds to the complexity and uncertainty of the game.  
 
5.4 Game theoretical analysis  
According to the above payoffs matrix (See Table 5.1), game theoretical analysis is 
introduced in this section to predict the possible actions of government and 
manufacturers, respectively, which will be a basis for further simulation in different 
game scenarios.  
 
5.4.1 Strategic action of manufacturers 
The functions of the expected payoffs of manufacturers can be easily derived by 
assuming that government takes the action of ―Regulation‖. When the strategy ‗CH‘ 
(Change) or ‗NC‘ (Non-change) has been selected, the functions of expected payoffs 
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can be expressed as CHV  and NCV , separately. The expressions of expected payoffs 
can be seen as following: 
 ( - ) Pr { }CH BV T C S ob G R     (5-1) 
 }{Pr RGobPVNC   (5-2) 
where Pr { }ob G R  is the probability that government takes the action of ‗Regulation‘ 
(R).  
 
In order to aid manufacturers change the current mode of production, followed by 
implementation of cleaner production as the dominant strategy, the relationship between 
Equations (5-1) and (5-2) should be satisfied as NCCH VV  . Thus, 0 NCCH VV  and 
the following inequality can be derived. 
                       0}{Pr)(  RGobPSCTB               (5-3) 
 
No matter what of }{Pr RGob   value is selected (from 0 to 1), deemed as no matter 
how efficient government regulation is (to what extent that government will take 
regulation into account), we still seek 0)(  PSCTB . This inequality can be 
transformed into the following inequality:  
                       BTSPC                               (5-4) 
 
Thus, if the difference between addition cost (C) that manufacturers will pay for 
technical innovation and essential economic fine (P) is lower than the sum of additional 
sales (S) of ―environmentally friendly products‖ and Tax Break (TB) that government 
provides in order to promote ―cleaner production‖, manufacturers will prefer ―Change‖ 
(CH) rather than ―Non-change‖ (NCH). 
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Assuming that government will choose the action of ―Non-regulation‖ (NR), the 
expected payoff 
'
CHV  can be obtained as followed, if manufacturers determine to 
change their existing production mode.   
                  
}{Pr)(
'
NRGobSCVCH                      (5-5) 
 
where Pr { }ob G NR  is the probability that government takes the action of 
‗Non-Regulation‘ (NR).  
 
Only if the Equation (5-5) be greater than 0, will manufacturers follow the 
implementation of cleaner production (CH). Moreover, CS   can be derived from 
Equation (5-5), which indicates that the additional sale for ‗environmentally friendly 
products‘ could cover the additional cost for technical innovation.  
 
The inequality (5-4) can be transformed into inequality (5-6) as followed: 
                 SCTP B                                     (5-6) 
 
Since CS  , SC   should be lower than 0,  BTP  should be definitely greater than 
the difference between C  and S . From inequality (5-6), it is identified that no matter 
what government will choose, the action of ‗change‘ (CH) is the strictly dominated 
strategy for manufacturers.  
 
5.4.2 Strategic action of government 
The functions of the expected payoff for governmental regulation ―UR‖ and 
non-regulation ―UNR‖ can be expressed in Equations (5-7) and (5-8), respectively.  
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 ){Pr)(){Pr)( NCMobIPCHMobTEU BR   (5-7) 
 }{Pr){Pr NCMobICHMobEU NR   (5-8) 
 
where Pr { )ob M CH  is the probability that manufacturers takes the action of 
‗Change‘ (CH), whilst Pr { )ob M NC  is the probability that manufacturers takes the 
action of ‗Non-change‘ (NC).  
 
In the above equations, }{Pr1){Pr NCMobCHMob   implies the sum of 
probability is equal to one that manufactures choose either the actions ‗Change‘ or 
‗Non-change‘. Moreover, the difference can be derived by subtracting the Equations 
(5-7) and (5-8), shown as followed:  
                    )(}{Pr BNRR TPCHMobPUU            (5-9) 
 
If Manufacturers definitely choose to change their existing mode of production,
1){Pr  CHMob , BNRR TUU  . Thus, the best choice for government is not to 
offer any subsidy for manufacturers. In this case, if manufacturers choose to ‗Change‘ 
(CH), they will gain CS  . Otherwise, they will gain 0 followed by the action 
‗Non-change‘ (NCH).  
 
5.5 Simulation of game situations 
According to the above theoretical analysis, three possible game scenarios are presented 
in sequence to select different pairs of strategies. These game scenarios are generated by 
inserting different numerical values in terms of a logic unit. In this section, a simulation 
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software tool ‗Gambit‘ (McKelvey, McLennan and Turocy, 2007) is used to express the 
dilemma and possible game actions between government and manufacturers. Gambit is 
an effective tool to construct and analyze certain extensive and strategic games, while 
with the latest and ultimate version 0.2007.12.04 released on 4
th
 December 2007 
(McKelvey, McLennan and Turocy, 2007). Currently, specific software or tools for 
Game theory solution are rarely reported in the literature. There are several advantages 
of Gambit which are presented below to demonstrate why it is selected for the 
simulation:  
 
1. Gambit is an open source free software for game theory simulation, through which 
users are allowed and encouraged to apply the functions provided for their own 
requirements.  
 
2. Gambit supports multiple platforms, including Windows XP, Linux, MacOS X etc, 
with C++ source code for representing games.  
 
3. Gambit can distinguish the documented file formats, which make them be able to 
interact with other external platforms, as implementing new computing methods for 
game analysis. 
 
 
4. All the game programs are encapsulated in an integrated and user friendly interface, 
in which the functions can be invoked easily by users to simulate the game and 
analyze the results.  
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5. From the standpoint of programming for game analysis and simulation, Gambit 
could save the cost and time for users making the same programming to solve 
similar game problems.  
 
However, there are still some limitations in this intelligent software.  
 
1. If a game should be the infinite game, in which players would choose continuous 
and different types of strategies, Gambit cannot simulate a solution out as its 
mathematical structure for finite games, and moreover the computer cannot run 
infinitely.  
 
2. Cooperative game theory is still a hot issue being discussed in the academic field of 
game theory, especially some problems within do not suffer from computational 
complexity but could be resulted from game rules which are not very clear, for instance 
the player‘s actions maybe interacted with each other. Thus, Gambit can only support 
non-cooperative game theory.  
 
3. Gambit cannot deal with periodic games or evolutionary games, instead of one-off 
games, as the Nash equilibrium can be difficult to compute with the varying strategies.  
 
In summary, all the built strategic game models could be solved using the Gambit 
software package and it will be embedded into a larger, more developed decision 
support tool called ‗Environmental Risk management System for Hazardous Waste 
Materials‘ in this study.  
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5.5.1 Game scenario one 
Game scenario one illustrates the preliminary stage of the game situation, which reflects 
the difficulty in developing a cleaner production program. For government, the 
supervision and regulation of cleaner production is still insufficient with ambiguous 
policies of sanctions and incentives. Furthermore, any new change may also give rise to 
an economic risk for the manufacturer. For instance, if the additional sales of 
environmentally friendly products can not initially cover the total economic cost, 
manufacturers will be reluctant to implement cleaner production. Thus, once
BS C T P    , manufacturers will prefer paying the penalties for environmentally 
unfriendly production. Selected model parameters for game simulation are presented in 
Table 5.2. Here, in order for wider application, all the parameters are expressed in terms 
of a logic unit. For example, costs may be indicated as 1 unit to represent the real 
monetary value. The tax break can be provided in terms of ‗Capital allowance‘, 
currently around 20% in UK for plant and machinery (UK HM Revenue & Customs, 
2008), and it is assumed in this model 22 percent of the technological innovation cost 
can be saved by upgrading the existing machinery, equipment or tools to promote 
cleaner production. The factor on revenue and additional sales can be random variables, 
10 to 10000 times more than the cost in order for sensitivity analysis. In this scenario, 
we assume that additional sales can cover 50% of the cost at most (0.1 to 0.5). 
Moreover, the fine factor related to economic sanctions needs to be set at a very low 
level (0 to 0.2), which is estimated by the equation BS C T P    , as well as the value 
range of additional sales factor (S). Otherwise, if the penalty for manufacturers is set at 
a higher level, manufacturers would mostly opt for a production change for their 
strategic action. Thus, the dominant strategy pair will be (R, NCH). 
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Table 5.2 Model parameters of game scenario one 
Parameters Conversion factors Note 
Cost (C) 1 unit  
Rand is a function 
which the random 
number from 0 to 1 will 
be selected. 
 Revenue factor is 
between 10 to 10000 
Sales factor is between 
0.1 to 0.5 
Fine factor is between 0 
to 0.2 
Environmental loss 
factor is 10000 
Tax Break (TB) Cost×22% 
Economic Benefit (E) 
Cost×Rand×Revenue 
factor  
Additional Sales (S) 
Cost×Rand×Sales 
factor 
Economic Sanction 
(P) 
Cost×Rand×Fine factor 
Environmental Loss 
(I) 
Cost×Rand×Loss factor 
 
Once the model parameters have been determined by Table 5.2, the Nash Equilibrium is 
stable and will not vary no matter how many times the game model is run. Thus, a 
random group of numerical value has been selected to represent the game situation by 
means of the ‗Gambit‘ tool (see Fig.5.4a). In the Gambit tool, the dominated strategies 
can be eliminated iteratively by the dominance panel. The strictly dominated action is 
opposite to dominant strategy, which is defined as ―always worse than another, 
regardless of beliefs at the information set‖ (Mckelvey et al., 2010). In this scenario, 
CH is the strictly weak strategy for manufacturers which should be eliminated first (see 
Fig.5.4b). When manufacturers determine not to change their current production mode, 
non-regulation becomes the dominated strategy accordingly. Fig.5.4c shows the second 
round of dominated strategy elimination, in which ‗NR‘ has been crossed out. The pair 
of dominant strategy comes out since all the dominated strategies have been eliminated. 
In scenario one, the result in Fig.5.4d suggests that government should regulate the 
manufacturing process by selecting ‗R‘, while the manufacturers‘ position remains 
unchanged (‗NCH‘) due to the insufficient economic sanctions.  
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The remaining strategy pair (R-NCH) represents the unique and stable Nash 
Equilibrium for this game solution. Moreover, this is a pure strategy game, which is a 
game with probability of one given to the selected strategy and zero to others (Romp, 
1997). For instance, Fig.5.5 shows the computation result of Nash Equilibrium, from 
which the probability equals to one when government chooses ‗R‘ and manufacturers 
choose ‗CH‘.  
 
The traditional method of computing the Nash Equilibrium is strongly deterministic. 
However, the ‗Gambit‘ tool provides a novel approach called ‗Quantal Response 
Equilibrium‘ (QRE) to search the subset of Nash equilibria. This approach uses 
imperfect or noisy expectations logic instead of the perfectly rational expectations logic, 
when searching for the Nash Equilibrium (McKelvey and PalFrey, 1995). Fig.5.6 
demonstrates how the ‗QRE‘ approach is used to search Nash Equilibrium. The QRE 
model is a function of a probability distribution and the error of choice selection, 
Lambda (λ) in the figure is related to the level of error in expectation. For 0  , the 
actions are composed of errors, and for   , there is no error. If both players, 
government and manufacturers, evaluate their expected payoffs in an unbiased way, the 
probabilities of each strategy being selected should be the same at the beginning of the 
game, that is why all the graphs in Fig.5.6 start at 0.5. As Lambda tends to infinity (∞), 
the Nash Equilibrium converges to a unique value. For example in this game scenario, 
the pair of Nash Equilibrium is ‗R-NCH‘, as well as the probability of selecting both 
strategic actions, equals to one (See Fig.5.6a and Fig.5.6d). 
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Fig.5.4. Gambit simulation for game scenario one 
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Fig.5.5. Computation result of Nash Equilibrium in game scenario one 
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Fig.5.6. Quantal response equilibrium approach for game scenario one 
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5.5.2 Game scenario two 
Without sufficient governmental regulation for industrial production, society could be 
exposed to serious environmental impact. If government imposes heavier economic 
penalties (P) for environmentally unfriendly actions, manufacturers are again obliged to 
compare the payoff in implementing cleaner production (CH) with that of keeping 
existing methods (NCH), in order to identify the most beneficial strategy. Game 
scenario two suggests that if BS C T P    , there is no dominant strategy in the 
game. Thus, a mixed-strategy game scenario is generated to find out the corresponding 
Nash Equilibrium. A mixed-strategy equilibrium, in contrast to pure strategy 
equilibrium (each player can only select one specific strategy in a game), is defined as 
―at least one player involved in the game will place a probability distribution for the 
alternative strategies‖ (Romp, 1997). Table 5.3 reflects the parameters selected for 
game scenario two, especially assuming that the economic penalty (P) for 
environmentally unfriendly actions is set to severe, i.e. weighted as 10000 times more 
than cost.  
 
Table 5.3 Model parameters of game scenario two 
Parameters Conversion factors Note 
Cost (C) 1 unit  
Rand is a function 
which the random 
number from 0 to 1 will 
be selected. 
 Revenue factor is 
between 10 to 10000 
Sales factor is between 
0.1 to 1 
Fine factor is 10000 
Environmental loss 
factor is 10000 
Tax Break (TB) Cost×22% 
Economic Benefit (E) 
Cost×Rand×Revenue 
factor  
Additional Sales (S) 
Cost×Rand×Sales 
factor 
Economic Sanction 
(P) 
Cost×Rand×Fine 
factor 
Environmental Loss 
(I) 
Cost×Rand×Loss 
factor 
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Fig.5.7 reflects the variation of Nash Equilibria as calculated by the ‗Gambit‘ tool, with 
the sales factor being varied from 0.1 to 1. It can be found that the probability that 
government chooses ‗Non-regulation‘ (NR) while Manufacturers choose ‗Change‘ (CH) 
is nearly 1, about 99%. This pair of strategic selection (NR-CH) approximates closely to 
the dominant strategy selected in game scenario three, which will be demonstrated in 
the following section. Moreover, this selection is strongly determined by governmental 
sanction. Manufacturers will consider changing their current industrial process by 
upgrading the existing equipment or technology for cleaner production, only if the 
economic penalty is set high enough (as 10000 shown in Table 5.3).  
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Fig.5.7. Nash equlibria of game scenario two 
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5.5.3 Game scenario three 
With ―green consumerism‖ gaining increasing influence on the market, so will cleaner 
production mature correspondingly, and thus manufacturers will gradually seek to 
benefit from business opportunities connected with sales of ‗environmentally friendly 
products‘. Once the additional sales completely cover the total cost ( S C ), 
government will no longer need to take actions to regulate the process, with 
manufacturers opting to develop cleaner production voluntarily. This game scenario 
suggests the dominant strategy is that government chooses ‗NR‘, and manufacturers 
choose ‗CH‘, which is the optimal result among the three game situations. Table 5.4 
summarizes the conversion factors to determine the model parameters. As long as 
‗additional sales‘ (S) is above cost (C), ‗NR-CH‘ (Non-regulation for Government, 
Change for Manufacturers) is the unique Nash Equilibrium of this game scenario no 
matter how the factors change. Fig.5.8 shows the possible maximum and minimum 
payoffs of strategies of ‗R-CH‘ and ‗NR-CH‘ with both revenue and sales factors being 
varied from 10 to 10000.  
 
Table 5.4 Model parameters of game scenario three 
Parameters Conversion factors Note 
Cost (C) 1 unit  
Rand is a function 
which the random 
number from 0 to 1 will 
be selected. 
 Revenue factor is 
between 10 to 10000 
Sales factor is between 
10 to 10000 
Fine factor is 10000 
Environmental loss 
factor is 10000 
Tax Break (TB) Cost×22% 
Economic Benefit (E) 
Cost×Rand×Revenue 
factor  
Additional Sales (S) 
Cost×(1+Rand×Sales 
factor) 
Economic Sanction 
(P) 
Cost×Rand×Fine 
factor 
Environmental Loss 
(I) 
Cost×Rand×Loss 
factor 
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Fig.5.8. Maximum and minimum payoffs with different factors 
 
Since S C , the Nash Equilibrium will not be changed in this scenario. Fig.5.9 shows 
a random group of numerical values being selected to simulate the game situation by 
Gambit tool (assuming 10 for both revenue and sales factors in this example). Like the 
analysis of game scenario one, the dominated strategy and its corresponding payoff 
should be eliminated. Thus, Fig.5.9b shows no matter whether government choose 
regulation or non-regulation, ‗NCH‘ is the weak strategy for manufacturers which 
should be eliminated first. When the action of ‗NCH‘ has been eliminated in the first 
round, ‗R‘ is the dominated strategy for government in the second turn whilst ‗CH‘ is 
selected by manufacturers (see Fig.5.9c). Once all the dominated strategies have been 
eliminated, Fig.5.9d suggests that the dominant strategy is that ‗NR‘ selected by 
government and ‗CH‘ by manufacturers. This result also suggests a pure strategy pair 
with the probability of one being calculated for both strategy ‗NR‘ and ‗CH‘, 
respectively (see Fig.5.10).  
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Fig.5.9. Gambit simulation for game scenario three 
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Fig.5.10. Computation result of Nash Equilibrium in game scenario three 
 
As an analogy to the first game scenario, ‗QRE‘ approach can be also applied to this 
scenario in order to search for the unique Nash equilibrium. Fig.5.10 reflects that the 
strategic action pair ‗NR-CH‘ is the unique and stable solution of Nash Equilibrium 
found by the ‗Gambit‘ tool. In contrast, the ‗QRE‘ curves shown in Fig.5.11, which 
present the steady trend of rising or declining probability, have fluctuated at first and 
then stabilized. For example, when government chooses the action of ‗R‘, the 
probability firstly ascends from 0.5 to above 0.6 and then regresses, finally falling down 
to 0 (See Fig.5.11a). This phenomenon results from the principle of maximum benefits 
followed by different actions of Government, ‗R‘ and ‗NR‘ respectively. From the 
payoff matrix in the game scenario three, it can be seen from Fig.5.9 that government 
can gain the maximum benefit while choosing ‗R‘ to the extent of 3321.95 logic unit. 
That is why the probability of ‗R‘ has shown an upward tendency from 0.5 to 0.6 in 
Fig.5.11a. However, when taking the possible actions of manufacturers into account, 
e.g. ‗CH‘ being selected, the individual rational behaviour reminds government to 
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re-consider the payoffs. By contrast, government can gain more benefit as 0.25 logic 
unit followed by selecting ‗NR‘. Thus, the probability to choose ‗R‘ has fallen back to 
0.5, and then gradually reduced to 0.  
 
5.5.4 Analysis of game interaction 
According to the above game simulation, it can be concluded that the strategic actions 
that government and manufacturers will take mainly resulted from the following factors, 
economic penalty (P), technological innovation cost (C) and additional sales (S). 
Fig.5.12 illustrates the interaction between influencing factors and the strategic actions.  
 
It is clear that the economic penalty (P) set by governmental policy needs to be high 
enough to compel manufacturers to change their current production mode actively, thus 
to implement cleaner production as well as provide ‗environmentally friendly‘ products. 
The technological innovation cost (C) should be in accordance with the basic standards 
or principles of cleaner production, to ensure that new products are associated with 
reduced environmental risk and carbon footprint, and are sustainable. For food and 
those materials with which people will have direct contact, the criteria of production 
should be much stricter. The potential economic benefit on the part of manufacturers is 
determined by the additional sales profit (S), which will also give rise to increasing 
governmental revenue. Moreover, the profit accruing from additional sales is strongly 
determined by consumer behaviour, and attitudes to ‗environmentally sound products‘, 
public acceptance, automatically determining the actions of manufacturers, i.e., whether 
to ‗Change‘ or ‗Not change‘.  
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Fig.5.11. Quantal response equilibrium approach for game scenario three 
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Fig.5.12. Influencing factors and strategic action 
 
5.6 Summary 
This Chapter shows how game theory could be applied to better understand the 
dilemmas of government and manufacturers in the context of a ‗game‘ to achieve more 
environmentally friendly products. The starting point of this novel approach is to 
analyze the dilemmas and possible actions available to government and manufacturers 
by means of the ‗CATWOE‘ approach, respectively. In order to demonstrate the 
problem situation of cleaner production more intuitively, the ‗Gambit‘ tool is used to 
simulate the created game model conceived as a ―two person non-cooperative‖ game.  
 
With the improvement of cleaner production, different game scenarios have been 
generated to reflect the variation trend of strategic actions. The simulation result 
confirms that government seeks to regulate (R) the process in the initial stage of cleaner 
production, while manufacturers do not change (NCH) the existing production mode 
Additional Sales of 
New Products (S) 
Basic Standards of 
Cleaner Production 
Governmental Policy 
Action Choice of 
Manufacturers 
 Action Choice of 
Government 
Economic Penalty 
(P) 
Technological 
Innovation Cost (C) 
Economic Benefit 
Tax break  
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(‗R-NCH‘) due to any potential economic risk. As long as the penalties are set high 
enough, manufacturers should opt to change their production technology to be more 
‗green‘, and government will gradually adjust the regulatory policy. Once the 
‗environmentally sound products‘ have become the mainstream of market, the dominant 
strategy ultimately becomes non-regulation for government and change for 
manufacturers (‗NR-CH‘), because manufacturers are then willing to promote cleaner 
production to gain increased profits, additional sales covering the total of technological 
innovation, equipment upgrading etc.  
 
The application of game theory is shown to provide a useful insight to inform strategic 
decision making in both government and manufacturers. Chapter 6 mainly focuses on 
the game theory application in the context of supply chain network, to analyze the 
strategies selected by the manufacturers of the ‗hazardous‘ materials, by reducing the 
environmental risk and the associated carbon emissions, in order to provide better and 
safer products.  
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Chapter 6: Game Theory Application to Supply Chain
3
 
6.1 Introduction 
Supply chain management (SCM) has been brought into academic research since the 
early 1980s, covering a range of control and planning applications relating to material 
selection, production, transportation, distribution etc., as well as the potential 
collaboration among manufacturers, retailers and customers (Oliver and Webber, 1982; 
Hines, 2004; Blanchard, 2007; Harrison and Hoek, 2008). With global business 
developing rapidly, the increasing demand for the consumption of commercial products 
has greatly accelerated the depletion of resources and contributed environmental 
pollution. Green supply chain management (GSCM) has emerged as a response to the 
challenge of how to improve long term economic profits and environmental 
performance (Sheu, Chou and Hu, 2005). GSCM can be defined as a series of 
regulations and interventions in the supply chain achieved by attempting to minimize 
the environmental impact from the suppliers to the end users (Basu and Wright, 2008). 
It is also claimed to be a ―win-win‖ strategy, through which economic benefits can be 
increased by reducing environmental impact (Zhu and Cote, 2004; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 
2008).  
 
In this context, GSCM has a substantial influence on the manufacturers within supply 
chain network, e.g. increasing both opportunities and challenges in green product 
development, promoting innovative product design etc ( Wang and Gupta, 2011). As a 
consequence, manufacturers will be encouraged, not only to consider the economic 
                                                 
3 This chapter has been accepted by the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. See 
details in: Zhao, R., Neighbour, G., Han, J.J., McGuire, M., Deutz, P., 2012. Game Theory Approach 
to Strategy Selection for Environmental Risk and Carbon Footprint Reduction in the Green Supply 
Chain. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. In press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.004 
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benefits, but also to provide ‗environmentally sound‘ products having due regard to the 
Triple Bottom Line (TBL). With integrating clean technologies into supply chain 
processes, one of the major environmental concerns is the detoxification of industrial 
pollutants (Wang, 2009), since many common industrial materials used in manufactured 
products can be considered harmful or ‗hazardous‘ to the environment to a greater or 
lesser extent. In addition to the immediate risk posed by ‗hazardous‘ materials in use, it 
is also important in the socio-political context to discriminate within the supply chain 
the ―carbon footprint‖ which may be an increasingly used indicator of the public‘s 
acceptance of the product, even though the environmental risk and the carbon footprint 
in the final disposal stage are often very high compared to other stages (Zhu and Sarkis, 
2006). That is, the legacy of the product may further cause damage to the environment 
once the product has been declared ‗waste‘. However, as the general framework of 
supply chain management is not usually considered (as opposed to the risk assessment 
of particular operations), manufacturers usually focus on the economic risk and benefits, 
as well as the efficiency of the supply chain. The treatment and disposal of hazardous 
materials is usually given little deliberation especially in the post-consuming stage 
(Deutz, Neighbour and McGuire, 2010).  
 
This Chapter proposes a game theory approach that models the likely behaviour of 
manufacturers in response to drivers to reduce environmental risk and carbon emissions 
in the context of the green supply chain. Game theory application is described in more 
detail below, but in short, allows the identification of alternative ‗business‘ strategies. 
However, here the emphasis is on reducing environmental risk without affecting the 
commercial sustainability, irrespective of any governmental or inter-governmental 
objectives, e.g. international treaty. Although the green supply chain management 
concept has laid stress on increasing economic returns by reducing the environmental 
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risk and impacts (Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2008), the extent to which the environmental risk 
and carbon footprint reduction should be reasonable in the management process has not 
been generally discussed. In summary, this chapter here proposes a novel approach 
based on game theory to help manufacturers reduce the environmental risk of a supply 
chain containing ‗hazardous‘ materials and the carbon footprint in the context of ‗green‘ 
supply chain management. Moreover, this study provides an initial insight into how 
they may respond to game scenarios with and without governmental regulations. 
 
6.2 Formulation of the game 
Whilst it is evident that ultimately consumers drive the open market, i.e. an attractive 
and competitive product meeting a public need, it must also be recognized that 
Government, for good reason, often restricts the market by legislation or regulation, and 
that such action sometimes leads to unintended consequences. In this chapter, game 
theory will be used to investigate possible governmental intentions and their possible 
consequences.  
 
The game situation can be defined by three important boundaries in the supply chain, 
Government︱Manufacturer, and Manufacturer︱Retailer, Retailer︱Consumer, as 
show in Fig.6.1. It seems logical to apply game theory first to the dynamic boundary of 
Government︱Manufacturer, which establishes the necessary regulation for industrial 
production at an early stage. Whilst an observer might conclude there is but one game, 
we suggest there that there are, in reality, several, related, but largely independent 
games. Thus, this chapter presents the game theory approach for strategy selection for 
the reduction of environmental risk and carbon footprint by manufacturers, initially 
without government supervision, and subsequently, with government supervision. 
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Fig.6.1. Boundaries of possible game scenarios 
 
6.2.1 Application of tolerability of risk 
As discussed in the thesis introduction, the environmental risk needs to be controlled 
and managed at an early stage during the production. Furthermore, in order to 
understand what the level of risk ought to be, as well as to estimate whether more 
should be done to reduce risk, it is necessary to set out certain risk criteria to determine 
acceptability levels ((Bouder, Slavin and Löfstedt, 2007). Thus, the principle of 
―tolerability of risk‖ provides a framework by which judgments can be made as to 
whether society should accept the risk (HSE, 1988). Importantly, this framework 
provides a benchmark for a tolerable risk, see Fig.6.2, which cannot be deemed as 
broadly acceptable without implementing any risk control measures, and also fills the 
gap between what is absolutely safe and absolutely unsafe, i.e. intolerable (Clay and 
Bassett, 1999). Between the intolerable region and the broadly acceptable region, it is a 
requirement to demonstrate the risk is ‗as low as reasonably practicable‘ (ALARP), i.e. 
risk mitigation is in place. Within the ALARP region, whether to reduce the level of risk 
further or accept the existing level of risk can be judged on the grounds of the risk levels 
and the costs associated with controlling the risk (Fuller and Vassie, 2004). The 
principle is well established in some heavy industries, such as nuclear, chemical, etc. 
HSE has also proposed notional boundaries for each region (See Fig.6.2) in terms of the 
risk of death or serious injury to a member of the public. A risk of 1 in 10
4
 per annum to 
any member of the public is the maximum that should be tolerated from any large 
Government Manufacturer Retailer Consumer 
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industrial plant in any industry. The level of broadly acceptable risk is suggested as 1 in 
10
6
 per annum (HSE, 1988).  
 
It is proposed in this study that the boundary between intolerable and tolerable regions 
should be represented by the 2020 carbon emission target, and that between the 
tolerable and the broadly acceptable region by the reduction target at the year 2050 (See 
Fig.6.2). According to the UK Climate Change Act 2008, the total carbon emission is 
expected to be reduced to, at least, 26% below the 1990 baseline by the year 2020 and 
80% by 2050, respectively. The 1990 baseline represents the aggregate amount of net 
UK emissions of the determined greenhouse gases for that year, e.g. CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs and SF6 etc. (OPSI, 2008). Total aggregate anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases, excluding emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry, is 
approximately 774Mt for the UK in 1990 (United Nations, 2009). Thus, the carbon 
footprint at the year of 2020 and 2050 can be calculated from the 1990 baseline as 
approximately 572 Mt and 154 Mt, respectively. Moreover, it is proposed in this study 
that these emissions can be seen as the total emissions contributed by the national 
supply chain network.  
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Fig.6.2. Intolerable, tolerable and acceptable regions of risk and carbon footprint 
 
6.2.2 Game theoretical analysis 
6.2.2.1 Notations 
PF  payoff of the conventional supply chain; 
'PF  
payoff of the supply chain in the context of Green Supply chain 
management; 
icf (i=1,2,3) 
carbon footprint of the supply chain at different level ; 
1cf  represents the carbon footprint at the acceptable level 
2cf  represents the carbon footprint at the tolerable level 
3cf  represents the carbon footprint at the intolerable level 
iR (i=1,2,3) 
inherent risk of the supply chain contained ‗hazardous materials‘ at 
different level; 
 Intolerable region 
 Tolerable region 
 Acceptable region 
1 in 10
4
 per annum 
1 in 10
6
 per annum 
2020 baseline: 572Mt 
2050 baseline: 154 Mt 
Risk Carbon 
footprint 
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1R represents the risk at the acceptable level 
2R represents the risk at the tolerable level 
3R represents the risk at the intolerable level 
Ct  carbon tax; 
Cr  cost per unit of risk; 
 
6.2.2.2 Payoff function 
It is proposed that the manufacturer of ‗hazardous‘ materials within the supply chain is 
assigned a carbon footprint cf and inherent risk R , as well as a value of PF  reflecting 
the payoff of the conventional supply chain without taking the carbon footprint and risk 
into account. The payoff function 'PF  in the context of a green supply chain is 
expressed as follows:  
 
 ' - ( ) - ( )PF PF R Cr cf Ct     (6-1) 
 
In Equation (6-1), the inherent risk of the supply chain containing ‗hazardous materials‘ 
can be measured by multiplying the consequence ( )N i  by the corresponding 
probability Pr ( )ob i  in a particular hazard scenario. The consequence of the hazard in 
this study is taken as the number of fatalities resulting from environmental accidents or 
other adverse events attributed to the supply chain, e.g. as might occur in the different 
scenarios (i), i.e. process of production, transportation and final disposal.  
                        )()(Pr iNiobRi                            (6-2) 
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The common approach to measure the carbon footprint is to apply green house gases 
emission factor multiplied by activity data (DEFRA, 2009). Activity data for a supply 
chain network mainly reflects the energy consumption in the process of production and 
transportation, the amount of waste production etc.  
  Carbon Footprint (cf)= Estimated Activity Data Emission Factor              (6-3) 
 
The cost per unit public risk reduction ( Cr ) can be derived from the compensation for 
fatalities. For example, in the UK 1,000,000 GB pounds (2001 prices) is presented as a 
value of preventing a fatality (VPF) related to a reduction in risk of one in a hundred 
thousand (HSE, 2001). Moreover, as there is no specific standard for the cost of carbon 
emissions, Ct can be employed instead of energy tax in the different scenarios.  
 
If manufacturers do not consider the risk and carbon footprint reduction on the supply 
chain, the payoff of the total supply chain will not be changed, i.e. 'PF  is equal to PF . 
However, if manufacturers decide to reduce the risk and carbon footprint within the 
supply chain, extra costs for supplier selection, technology improvement, equipment 
upgrading etc. may be incurred. On the other hand, the quality and safety of the 
products can be improved, which may result in additional sales profits. This will be 
discussed in the following section dealing with the assumptions made for the game 
theoretical analysis.  
 
6.2.2.3 Assumption for game theoretical analysis 
When the current carbon footprint level of the supply chain cf is within the tolerable 
carbon footprint area (see Fig.6.3), which is higher than the upper limit 
1f  of the 
acceptable carbon footprint area, but lower than the upper limit 
2f  of the tolerable 
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carbon footprint area, the manufacturer has two potential strategic choices: either to 
reduce or to maintain the carbon footprint. Once carbon footprint cf is in the intolerable 
region as above the 
2f  criterion, manufacturers on the supply chain ought to reduce the 
carbon footprint to the tolerable area at least, if not to the acceptable area. In this 
approach, assume that the acceptable level should be the ‗optimal region‘ in terms of 
green supply chain management to minimize the risk and carbon footprint. In addition, 
the current risk on the supply chain, 
1r  and 2r , should correspond to an equivalent 
carbon footprint, 
1f  and 2f , according to the threshold values illustrated in Fig.6.3. For 
the purpose of analysis, regions 1, 2, 3 are defined as acceptable, tolerable and 
intolerable regions, respectively. 
 
 
Fig.6.3. Criteria of risk and carbon footprint 
 
It is assumed that additional economic benefits can be generated due to the risk and 
carbon footprint reduction, and will thus be welcomed by the consumers as 
‗environmentally friendly‘. In Fig.6.4a, let 1RP , 2RP , 3RP  denote the yield gaps as a result 
of the environmental risk decreasing from the tolerable region to the acceptable region, 
f2 Criterion 
f1 Criterion 
 Intolerable area 
Region 3 
 Tolerable area 
Region 2 
 Broadly acceptable area 
Region 1 
  
  
 
r2 Criterion 
r1 Criterion 
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from the intolerable region to the acceptable region and from the intolerable region to 
the tolerable region, respectively. Similarly, in Fig.6.4b, let 1cfP , 2cfP  and 3cfP  denote 
the yield gap as a result of the carbon footprint decreasing from the tolerable region to 
the acceptable region, from the intolerable region to the acceptable region and from the 
intolerable region to the tolerable region, respectively.  
 
As shown in Fig.6.4c, let the additional cost of reducing risk from the tolerable level to 
the acceptable level be 1RC , from the intolerable level to the acceptable level be 2RC , 
and from the intolerable level to the tolerable level be 3RC . Similarly, in Fig.6.4d, let 
the additional cost on reducing the carbon footprint from the tolerable to the acceptable 
level be 1CfC , from the intolerable to the acceptable level be 2CfC  , and from the 
intolerable the tolerable level be 3CfC . 
  
6.2.3 Game scenario one— manufacturers’ action 
In this scenario, it is assumed that the strategic actions adopted by the manufacturers 
within the supply chain are the same and simultaneous. According to the above basic 
payoff function and assumptions, the payoff matrix of manufacturers at different risk or 
carbon footprint level is given in Table 6.1. Moreover, Table 6.1 can be broken into 
several sub-tables for the following analysis of manufacturers‘ strategic actions on 
improving the current carbon footprint and risk level, but without governmental 
supervision.  
 
 
 
151 
 
When carbon footprint and risk is at the acceptable level, the manufacturers in the 
supply chain will not pay more attention to further carbon footprint or risk reduction, as 
denoted by ―(
1 1PF R Cr cf Ct  , 1 1PF R Cr cf Ct  )‖ in Table 6.1.  
 
When both carbon footprint and risk are at the tolerable level (See the payoff matrix in 
Table 6.2), and if the expected profits 1RP and 1cfP  from the sale of ‗environmentally 
sound‘ products totally cover the technological innovation cost 1RC , 1cfC arising from 
risk and carbon footprint reduction, the following inequalities apply:   
 1 1 1 0R RC P rCr     (6-4) 
 1 1 1 0cf cfC P f Ct     (6-5) 
 
The dominant strategy is that manufacturers will attempt to reduce both the carbon 
footprint and risk to the ‗acceptable level‘, as the payoff at acceptable level is higher 
than that at the tolerable level. Otherwise, manufacturers are reluctant to improve and 
the situation will remain at the ‗tolerable level‘. 
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Fig.6.4. Additional profit and cost in different risk or carbon footprint region 
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Table 6.1 Payoffs of carbon footprint and risk reduction in different regions 
Risk 
Carbon 
emissions 
Acceptable (r1) 
Tolerable (r2)  ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) 
Intolerable 
Maintain Reduce to acceptable level Reduce to acceptable level Reduce to tolerable level Acceptable 
(f1) 
(PF- R1Cr-cf1Ct,  
PF- R1Cr-cf1Ct) 
Tolerable 
(f2) 
Maintain 
(PF- R2Cr-cf2Ct,  
PF- R2Cr-cf2Ct) 
(PF-( R2-r1)Cr-cf2Ct,  
PF-( R2-r1)Cr -cf2Ct-ΔCR1+PR1) 
(PF-cf2Ct-(R3-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr- cf2Ct+PR2-ΔCR2) 
(PF-cf2Ct-(R3-r2)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr- cf2Ct+PR3-ΔCR3) 
Reduce to 
acceptable level 
(PF-R2Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1, 
PF-R2Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct) 
(PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1,  
PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCR1+PR1) 
(PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCR2+PR2) 
(PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCR3+PR3) 
Intolerable 
Reduce to 
acceptable level 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-R2Cr,  
PF-R2Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct) 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-(R2-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct+PR1-ΔCR1) 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-(R3-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct+PR2-ΔCR2) 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-(R3-r2)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct+PR3-ΔCR3) 
Reduce to tolerable 
level 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-R2Cr,  
PF-R2Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct) 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-(R2-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct+PR1-ΔCR1) 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-(R3-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct+PR2-ΔCR2) 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-(R3-r2)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct+PR3-ΔCR3) 
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When the carbon footprint is at the tolerable level, whilst the risk remains intolerable 
(See Table 6.3), and if the following two inequalities are both satisfied:  
 1 1 1 0cf cfC P f Ct      (6-6) 
 1 2 2 3 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) 0R R R Rr r Cr P P C C        (6-7) 
manufacturers will reduce both the carbon footprint and risk to the acceptable level. On 
the other hand, if the expected profit cannot cover the technological cost of reducing the 
carbon footprint of products, 1 1 1( ) 0cf cfP C f Ct   , manufacturers will maintain the 
carbon footprint at the tolerable level, but decrease the risk from the intolerable to the 
tolerable level, because the expected payoff of risk reduction at the tolerable level is 
higher than at the acceptable level.   
 
Similarly, when the carbon footprint is at the intolerable level, whilst risk tolerable (See 
Table 6.4), the dominant strategy for manufacturers is to reduce both the carbon 
footprint and risk to the acceptable level, as long as the following two inequalities are 
both satisfied:   
 1 2 2 3 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) 0cf cf cf cff f Ct P P C C        (6-8) 
 1 1 1 0R RC P rCr     (6-9) 
 
Otherwise, manufacturers will maintain the risk at the tolerable level, but decrease the 
carbon footprint from the intolerable to the tolerable level.  
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When both carbon footprint and risk are at the intolerable level (See the payoff matrix 
in Table 6.5), and if both inequalities (6-10) and (6-11) are satisfied, reduction of both 
carbon footprint and risk to the acceptable level is the dominant strategy for 
manufacturers, because the economic benefits are greater by taking acceptable action 
than by taking tolerable action.  
            0)()()( 323221  cfcfcfcf CCPPCtff                (6-10) 
            0)()()( 323221  RRRR CCPPCrrr                 (6-11) 
 
According to the above analysis, whether manufacturers are willing to reduce the risk 
and carbon footprint voluntarily is mainly determined by ‗cost-benefit‘ analysis. If the 
additional sales profit can cover the technological innovation cost, both risk and carbon 
footprint will be decreased. Otherwise, manufacturers will keep either the risk or carbon 
footprint at the original level. In the next section, governmental punitive policy and 
incentives are involved in the game scenario analysis.  
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Table 6.2 Payoffs of carbon footprint and risk at tolerable region 
 Tolerable (r2)  ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) 
Maintain Reduce to acceptable level 
Tolerable (f2)  
Maintain 
(PF- R2Cr-cf2Ct, 
PF- R2Cr-cf2Ct) 
(PF-( R2-r1)Cr-cf2Ct, 
PF-( R2-r1)Cr -cf2Ct-ΔCR1+PR1) 
Reduce to acceptable level 
(PF-R2Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1, 
PF-R2Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct) 
(PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1, 
PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCR1+PR1) 
 
 
Table 6.3 Payoffs of carbon footprint at the tolerable region and risk at the intolerable region 
 
Intolerable 
Reduce to acceptable level Reduce to tolerable level 
Tolerable (f2)  
Maintain 
(PF-cf2Ct-(R3-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr- cf2Ct+PR2-ΔCR2) 
(PF-cf2Ct-(R3-r2)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr- cf2Ct+PR3-ΔCR3) 
Reduce to acceptable level 
(PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCR2+PR2) 
(PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCcf1+Pcf1,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf2-f1)Ct-ΔCR3+PR3) 
 
Carbon footprint 
Risk 
Carbon footprint 
Risk 
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Table 6.4 Payoffs of carbon footprint at the intolerable region and risk at the tolerable region 
 Tolerable (r2)  ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) 
Maintain Reduce to acceptable level 
Intolerable 
Reduce to acceptable level 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-R2Cr,  
PF-R2Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct) 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-(R2-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct+PR1-ΔCR1) 
Reduce to tolerable level 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-R2Cr,  
PF-R2Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct) 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-(R2-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R2-r1)Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct+PR1-ΔCR1) 
 
 
Table 6.5 Payoffs of carbon footprint and risk at the intolerable region 
 
Intolerable 
Reduce to acceptable level Reduce to tolerable level 
Intolerable 
Reduce to acceptable level 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-(R3-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct+PR2-ΔCR2) 
(PF-ΔCcf2+Pcf2-(cf3-f1)Ct-(R3-r2)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf3-f1)Ct+PR3-ΔCR3) 
Reduce to tolerable level 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-(R3-r1)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r1)Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct+PR2-ΔCR2) 
(PF-ΔCcf3+Pcf3-(cf3-f2)Ct-(R3-r2)Cr,  
PF-(R3-r2)Cr-(cf3-f2)Ct+PR3-ΔCR3) 
 
Carbon footprint 
Risk 
Carbon footprint 
Risk 
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6.2.4 Game scenario two— governmental sanction 
In this game scenario, there are two players who separately represent the government 
and the manufacturers of potentially ‗hazardous materials‘. The overall objective of 
reducing risk and carbon footprint, while still ensuring the economic interest of the 
supply chain, remains the focal point of the game. In order to simplify the mathematical 
model, manufacturers will choose the same strategy under the specific government 
policy, i.e. implement production at least within the tolerable region. Let E and U 
denote the economic benefit that government would gain in terms of revenue when 
manufacturers produce at the tolerable and intolerable levels, respectively. Cs indicates 
the cost of governmental supervision. The game between government and 
manufacturers, when the risk or carbon footprint is at an intolerable level, is shown in 
Table 6.6. Government makes the decisions between P and NP, which indicates 
‗Penalty‘ and ‗No-penalty‘ strategy, respectively. Meanwhile, manufacturers make their 
own decisions on whether to reduce the risk and carbon footprint to the tolerable level 
(RT) or to maintain (M) the current carbon footprint and risk level.  
 
This game model contains a three stage game (see Fig.6.5). In the first stage, when there 
is no penalty from the government (NP), the cost of governmental supervision is higher 
than the penalties ( sC P ). Additionally, the technological cost ( 3 3 3R cfC C C    ) is 
quite high for manufacturers to bear by reducing both risk and carbon footprint 
( 2 2 3 3r Cr f Ct P C    ). Thus, to keep the production mode at the current level (M) is the 
dominant strategy for the manufacturers.  
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Table 6.6 Strategic game between government and manufacturers in the intolerable region 
Order of payoffs:  
Government, Manufacturers 
Manufacturers 
RT M 
Government 
P (E-CS, PF+(Pcf3-ΔCcf3)+ (PR3-ΔCR3)- (cf3-f2)Ct-(R3-r2)Cr) (U-CS+P, PF-R3Cr-cf3Ct-P) 
NP (E, PF+(Pcf3-ΔCcf3)+ (PR3-ΔCR3)- (cf3-f2)Ct-(R3-r2)Cr) (U, PF-R3Cr-cf3Ct) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
 
 
Fig.6.5. Three stages in the punitive game between government and manufacturers 
 
In the second stage, when government decides to penalise (P) the environmentally 
unfriendly action of manufacturers, and if the economic sanctions are increasing 
gradually above the supervision cost, as sC P , manufacturers will prefer paying the 
economic penalties to maintain the current production mode (M) rather than reducing 
both the risk and carbon footprint level, since, if the punishment is not severe, the 
inequality ( 2 2 3 3r Cr f Ct P P C     ) applies. Thus, the pair of dominant strategy has been 
transformed into ‗P-M‘.  
 
 
 
Government 
Manufacturers 
Government 
Manufacturers 
Government 
Manufacturers 
NP 
M 
P 
M 
NP 
RT 
No governmental punishment 
Increasing penalties, not severe 
Penalties are set in the high level 
3 3 2 2P C P r Cr f Ct      
3 3 2 2P C P r Cr f Ct    
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Assuming in the third stage that the governmental penalties are set high enough in terms 
of the punitive policy, manufacturers will opt to change their existing production mode 
(RT). The penalties should satisfy the following inequality: 
        
CtfCrrPPCCP cfRcfR 223333 )()(                     (6-12) 
 
Moreover, if the technological cost can be totally covered by the additional sales of 
‗environmentally friendly product‘, then 2 2 3 3
0r Cr f Ct P C    , and government will 
no longer need to take actions to regulate the process (P), manufacturers opting to 
reduce the risk and carbon footprint to the tolerable level (RT). Thus, the ‗win-win‘ 
strategy can be ‗NP-RT‘.  
 
6.2.5 Game scenario three— governmental incentive 
In order to promote the supply chain to be much ‗cleaner‘ and ‗greener‘, government 
should also hold some incentive policies to help the manufacturers upgrade their current 
production method. Adopting the premise that production is prohibited if either risk or 
carbon footprint is at the intolerable level, this study only discusses how to incentivize 
the manufacturers to improve the carbon footprint and risk from tolerable to acceptable 
level.  
 
Let I denote the governmental incentive value in terms of subsidies i.e., through tax 
breaks, and V indicate the additional governmental revenue gained by manufacturers 
producing at the acceptable level, since manufacturers provide environmentally friendly 
products for the market. The game between government and manufacturers is a 
two-stage game, Table 6.7, as depicted in Fig.6.6. Suppose that government initially 
chooses the strategy I (Incentive) or NI (No Incentive). In response to these options, the 
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manufacturers, in their turn, then have to decide whether to reduce their carbon footprint 
and risk to the acceptable level (RA) or to maintain at the current level (M).  
 
 
Fig.6.6. Two stages in the incentive game between government and manufacturers 
 
From Table 6.7, to give any subsidy to impel manufacturers to reduce the risk and 
carbon footprint should be the dominated strategy for government. Thus, government 
prefers choosing ‗NI‘ rather than ‗I‘. In the first stage, when government chooses the 
strategy ‗NI‘, and if 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0R cf R cfrCr f Ct P P C C       , where the technological 
innovation cost ( 1 1 1R cfC C C    ) cannot totally be covered by the additional sales 
profits ( 1 1 1R cfP P P  ) and the cost saving resulting from risk and carbon footprint 
reduction to the acceptable level ( 1 1sC rCr f Ct  ), manufacturers will choose to maintain 
production in the tolerable region. However, when government chooses to incentivize 
(‗I‘) the manufacturers to reduce to acceptable level (‗RA‘), and the incentive subsidy 
satisfies the following inequality: 
               
CtfCrrPPCCI cfRcfR 111111 )()(               (6-13) 
 
Government 
Manufacturers 
Manufacturers M 
RA 
Government NI 
NI 
1 1 1 1 0rCr f Ct P C     
1 1 1 1 0rCr f Ct P C   
 
High incentive subsidy by government (I) 
1 1 1 1I C P rCr f Ct    
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manufacturers will tend to reduce risk and carbon footprint from the tolerable level to 
the acceptable level. Otherwise, if the incentive subsidy is not high enough, 
manufacturers will choose to maintain current practices. 
 
The second stage suggests that, if 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0R cf R cfrCr f Ct P P C C       , where the 
technological innovation cost can be totally covered, the manufacturers are willing to 
decrease the risk and carbon footprint to the acceptable level, so that the governmental 
incentive is not necessary at this stage. Thus, the strategic action pair has been 
transformed into (‗NI-RA‘), which is the ‗win-win‘ strategy for both parties.  
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Table 6.7 Strategic game between government and manufacturers in the tolerable region 
Order of payoffs:  
Government, Manufacturers 
Manufacturers 
RA M 
Government 
I (V-I, PF+(Pcf1-ΔCcf1)+ (PR1-ΔCR1)- (cf2-f1)Ct-(R2-r1)Cr+I) (-I, PF-R2Cr-cf2Ct) 
NI (V, PF+(Pcf1-ΔCcf1)+ (PR1-ΔCR1)- (cf2-f1)Ct-(R2-r1)Cr) (0, PF-R2Cr-cf2Ct) 
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6.2.6 Case example 
In order to show how game theory informs the national manufacturers and government 
to reduce risk and carbon footprint, a case example is presented in this section. Here, the 
data are mainly sourced from the annual reports of Tesco Group (2007-2011) and the 
corporate responsibility report (2010). To demonstrate the manufacturers‘ action 
without governmental supervision, we assume that the risk is initially at the tolerable 
level within the current supply chain, whilst the carbon footprint remains intolerable. 
Table 6.8 shows the game model parameters selected for the case example. Thus, the 
payoffs matrix shown in Table 6.4 can be quantified. Moreover, a game theory tool 
based upon Visual Basic programming is designed to solve the two persons pure and 
mix-strategy game, where the quantified payoffs matrix can be seen in Fig.6.7. The 
solution suggests a dominant strategy in this game, that the carbon footprint should be 
reduced to the acceptable level, whilst the risk still remains at the tolerable level. The 
dominant strategy is greatly affected by the purchase preference of customers who 
select environmentally friendly products. If the customers prefer environmentally 
friendly products more than existing products, the demands of the green products should 
be increased such that the carbon footprint is reduced, and thus to improve the carbon 
footprint level. For instance, Tesco group has surveyed that 59% of UK customers 
bought at least one carbon labelled product (Tesco, 2011). However, the current cost 
paid for risk reduction is considered about three times larger than the benefit (HSE, 
2001), which highlights the difficulty of reducing the environmental risk at the same 
time.  
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Table 6.8 Model parameters of the case examples 
Parameters Numerical value Source 
PF 
60931 million GB 
Pounds 
Tesco Group revenue at 2010 (exc.VAT) 
cf3 
5.44 million 
tonnes 
The carbon footprint measured by the Tesco Group at 2011. 
f1 0 tonne Tesco has claimed to be a ‗zero-carbon‘ business by 2050. 
f2 
3.81 million 
tonnes 
As the carbon emissions of the products in the Tesco supply 
chain is claimed to be reduced by 30% at 2020, f2 can be 
derived by the current carbon footprint (5.44 million tonnes) 
to multiply 70% 
Cr 106 GB pounds 
A value of preventing a fatality (VPF) related to a reduction 
in risk of one in a hundred thousand 
Ct ￡12/tonne CO2 
The Carbon Trust (2010) suggests that the carbon price is 
fixed as￡12/tonne  
R2 10
-5 Assume the risk is at the tolerable level 
r1 10
-6 The risk criterion between tolerable and acceptable region 
ΔCcf3 
22.08 million GB 
pounds 
Tesco has launched the green clubcard program, worth over 
￡10 million to incentivize green behaviour of the consumers 
each year, which subordinates to the indicator ‗group cost of 
sales‘. Thus, the average growth rate of cost of sales is 
roughly calculated as 9.2%. The cost for carbon footprint 
reduction to year 2020 can be measured as 
910 (1 9.2%) 22.08   million GB pounds, whilst selecting 
year 2011 as the baseline.  
ΔCcf2 
309.52 million GB 
pounds 
The cost of 2011 is still used as the baseline, the cost for 
carbon footprint reduction to the year 2050 can be measured 
as 
3910 (1 9.2%) 309.52   million GB pounds 
Pcf3 
185.36 million GB 
pounds 
Tesco has carbon labeled 1100 products since 2008, which 
account for 1.3 billion of sales each year. As the group 
operating profit margin is 6.3% at 2011, it is suggested that 
the ‗green‘ products profit is 1300 6.3% 81.9  million 
pounds in 2011. In addition, we have calculated the average 
growth rate of the sales profit as 9.5%. Thus, sales profit at 
year 2020 can be measured as 
981.9 (1 9.5%) 185.36    
million GB pounds, whilst selecting year 2011 as the 
baseline. 
Pcf2 
2821.20 million 
GB pounds 
Sales profit at year 2020 can be measured as 
3981.9 (1 9.5%) 2821.20    million GB pounds.  
ΔCR1 
6411.32 million 
GB pounds 
The risk is managed as a key issue in the Tesco group, it is 
suggested that the annual administrative expense to be fully 
used for risk control. HSE (2001) suggests the cost discount 
rate is suggested by 3.5% for risk reduction. Thus, the cost 
for risk reducing from the tolerable to the acceptable level 
can be measured as 
391676 (1 3.5%) 6411.32    million 
pounds, whilst selecting year 2011 as the baseline. 
PR1 
2137.11 million 
GB pounds 
HSE suggests the cost is three times larger than the benefits, 
when applying risk to workers. Thus, the benefit for risk 
reducing from the tolerable to the acceptable level can be 
measured as 6411.32 / 3 2137.11  million pounds.  
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Fig.6.7. Solution of case example in the designed game theory tool 
 
6.3 Strategic options 
Based upon the above game theoretical analysis, the potential actions of manufacturers 
within the different scenarios are summarized as followed. When there is no supervision 
from the government, the dominant strategy of the manufacturers will mainly depend on 
the difference between the payoff of the re-designed supply chain and the payoff when 
carbon footprint and risk are reduced to the specified level, e.g., tolerable level, 
acceptable level. If the profit is shown to be more than the cost following a reduction of 
the carbon footprint or risk through the whole supply chain, the strategy that 
manufacturers are expected to adopt is to implement improvements to production 
methods. Otherwise, the strategy is to keep the original risk and carbon footprint level. 
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The preferential purchase of environmentally friendly products by customers will 
greatly influence the dominant strategies of manufacturers when there is no supervision 
from the government. However, when the government increases the penalties on the 
environmental unfriendly actions of manufacturers, the strategic choices of the 
manufacturers will be decided by the level of such penalties. If the punishment is slight, 
and it is not large enough to induce the manufacturers to change the current risk and 
carbon footprint level, the dominant strategy is to retain the current level. If the sanction 
is large enough, improving the risk and carbon footprint to the tolerable level at least 
should be the dominant strategy for manufacturers. In conclusion, when the government 
instigates a sanctions policy for the environmentally unfriendly actions of the 
manufacturers, the result will tend towards the risk and carbon footprint level situated 
within the tolerable band at best.  
 
If the government aims to further improve the risk and carbon footprint to the broadly 
acceptable level, then an incentive policy will be required, such as a subsidy from 
government which may promote the risk and carbon footprint reduction.  
 
6.4 Summary 
This Chapter provides a novel approach in the context of green supply chain 
management, using game theory to analyze the strategies selected by the manufacturers 
of ‗hazardous‘ materials, to reduce environmental risk and the associated carbon 
footprint. Through the application of the ‗tolerability of risk‘ concept, different 
judgments about the extent of environmental risk and carbon footprint reduction have 
been determined. Currently, scant attention is given to ‗holistic‘ supervision of the 
supply chain of hazardous materials by governments, and thus the starting hypothesis 
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here is that the default strategy that manufacturers will adopt is to improve their carbon 
footprint and level of environmental risk, according to a perceived consumer preference 
for environmental friendly products, with the aim of increasing revenue. Moreover, it is 
assumed that, once necessary governmental policy has been established in the supply 
chain management of hazardous materials, the strategic choices of the manufacturers 
should be influenced by government penalties or incentives. Here, the application of 
game theory provides a useful insight. Chapter 7 uses the principle of dynamic 
optimisation technique to discuss the maximum extent of the environmental risk and 
associated carbon footprint reduction, as well as to minimize the total economic cost on 
the supply chain, based upon the above game theoretical analysis.   
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Chapter 7: An Optimisation Model for Supply Chain 
7.1 Introduction 
The increasing demand for consumption has greatly accelerated the depletion of 
resources and therefore leads to environmental problems. The supply chain is no 
exception. Confronted with balancing profits and the environmental performance, the 
new consideration arouses management for supply chain which may be known as 
―Green Supply Chain Management‖ (GrSCM) (Sheu, Chou and Hu, 2005). Green 
supply chain management can be defined as a series of regulations and policies for 
supply chain management in the context of sustainable development, with particular 
attention to minimizing the environmental impact from the suppliers to the end users 
(Basu and Wright, 2008). In contrast to conventional supply chain management, the 
strategy that is adopted by green supply chain management is a ―win-win‖ strategy in 
effect. Through its application, not only the business profits can be increased, but also 
environmental benefits can be generated (Zhu and Cote, 2004). Furthermore, green 
supply chain management mainly focuses on waste reduction within the industrial 
system, while lessening the material consumption, saving energy, preventing hazardous 
materials stream into the environment (Ho, 2009). This chapter considers how to 
re-design the conventional supply chain network of ‗hazardous‘ materials in a more 
sustainable way and thus building a dynamic optimisation model, not only to minimize 
the total economic cost, but also the inherent risk and carbon footprint throughout the 
process of supply chain. In particular, followed by extending the responsibility of supply 
chain, the inherent risk and carbon footprint in various scenarios, such as production, 
transportation and final disposal, are taken into account for the model construction.  
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7.2 Basis of dynamic optimisation  
Dynamic optimisation can be understood as ‗dynamic programming‘, from which a 
sequential or multistage decision progress can be solved by transforming it into a single 
stage optimisation problem (Bellman, 1957). Fig.7.1 shows a typical process of 
dynamic optimisation, composed of a series of sub-optimisation problems, which 
interact with each other, i.e. the output of one stage could be the input to the next 
(Willis and Finney, 2003).  
 
 
Fig.7.1. Typical process of dynamic optimisation  
(adopted from: Willis and Finney, 2003) 
 
From Fig.7.1, nX  is the decision variable, whilst nS  is the input variable at stage n , 
and the corresponding output variable 1nS  can be expressed as followed:  
                        ),(1 nnn XSTS                             (7-1) 
where T  indicates a transformation process of the state variable. Meanwhile, there is a 
return function nR  of the input and output state variables, shown in Equation (7-2).  
                       ),,( 1 nnnnn XSSRR                           (7-2) 
 
 
Stage n Stage n-1 Stage 1 
Sn-2 
…… 
S1 Sn 
Xn 
Sn-1 
Rn 
Xn-1 
Rn-1 
X1 
R1 
S0 
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Thus, the dynamic optimisation is to maximise the n  stage return function. Assuming 
( )n nf S  is the optimal return function with given the system in state nS ,  and a system 
objective g , which can be expressed as followed:  
 )],(),(),,([max)( 111111
,,1
XSRXSRXSRgSf nnnnnn
XX
nn
n


                  (7-3) 
subject to the Equation (7-1) as the constraint condition.  
 
The above Equation (7-3) can be decomposed by n  sub-optimisation problems, by 
means of calculating the optimal return function at each stage. In this premise, the total 
return from stage 1 to n  can be separated as followed:  
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1[ ( , ), , ( , )] [ ( , ), ( ( , ) , ( , ))]n n n n n n n n ng R S X R S X g R S X g R S X R S X       (7-4) 
 
where 1g  and 2g  are the real-valued functions. Based upon the Equations (7-3) and 
(7-4), the optimal return function can be transformed as followed (Nemhauser, 1966):  
   
1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
, ,
( ) max [ ( , ), max ( ( , ) ( , ))]
n n
n n n n n n n n
X X X X
f S g R S X g R S X R S X            (7-5) 
 
As the returns are addictive, Equation (7-5) can be transformed again, shown below:  
                  1 1( ) max[ ( , ) ( )]
n
n n n n n n n
X
f S R S X f S                    (7-6) 
 
Thus, Equation (7-6) can be seen as the general mathematical expression of dynamic 
programming, which seeks to optimize the remaining decisions in terms of the state 
resulting from the first decisions.  
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The following section will invoke the basis of the dynamic optimization technique to 
build a specific model applicable to supply chain networks to reduce the inherent risk, 
carbon footprint and the associated additional cost.  
 
7.3 Optimisation model 
The starting point of dynamic optimisation is to find out the possible stages of 
optimisation. In this study, there are two stages of optimisation, shown in Fig.7.2. In the 
first stage, the optimisation model is built to maximize the reduction extent of inherent 
risk and carbon footprint on the whole supply chain. Once the maximum reduction extent 
has been determined, an optimization model to minimize the total economic cost is 
established in the second stage. Moreover, a full lifecycle perspective has been 
incorporated into the supply chain model, including production, transportation and 
disposal.  
 
 
Fig.7.2. Flow-process of dynamic optimisation model 
 
Maximizing public risk reduction 
Maximizing carbon footprint reduction 
Production Transportation Disposal 
Minimizing total economic cost 
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7.3.1 Maximizing the environmental risk reduction 
The risk to the environment resulting from the complete supply chain involving 
‗hazardous‘ materials, is deemed as the risk which will result in casualties to people, and 
thus give rise to fatalities in the context of the product life-cycle. There are three 
important scenarios incorporated into the supply chain inherent risk calculation, which 
are production, delivery, waste disposal, respectively. Accordingly, the risk decrement of 
these three scenarios can be denoted as PR , tR  and dR . Therefore, the annual 
reduction of the inherent risk on the supply chain network can be expressed as following:  
                            p t d
R R R R    
                 (7-7) 
 
As discussed in the Chapter 6, the inherent risk can be measured by multiplying the 
consequence N  by the corresponding probability Prob in a particular hazard scenario 
(Faisal and Mahmoud, 2003).  
                                   NobRisk  Pr                  (7-8) 
 
The consequence of a hazard scenario in this study, is taken as the number of fatalities 
resulting from environmental accidents or other adverse events attributed to the supply 
chain, e.g. as might occur in the different scenarios, process of production, 
transportation and final disposal. Assuming that inherent risk has not previously been 
considered by the conventional supply chain network, consequently its reduction can be 
derived as followed:  
             
0 Pr Pr Prp p t t d dR R ob N ob N ob N                         (7-9) 
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where Pr pob , Pr tob and Pr dob  indicate the annual probability of the hazard events in 
the process of production, transportation, disposal respectively, with the corresponding 
annual fatalities pN , tN and dN  caused by these hazard scenarios.  
 
According to the framework of ―Tolerability of risk‖ (See the section 6.2.1), the annual 
probability of the hazard can be determined, and thus the number of fatalities at different 
hazard scenarios are converted into decision variables. Thus, the optimization model to 
maximize public risk reduction is built as following:  
 
                 

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dtp
d
t
p
ddbtpp
.
PrPrPrmax
        (7-10)
 
where a, b, c and d are the constant representing the annual fatalities in terms of the 
criteria suggested by the principle of ‗tolerability of risk‘.  
 
7.3.2 Maximizing the carbon footprint reduction 
Carbon footprint is regarded as a new indicator, which has been widely adopted as ―the 
total set of greenhouse gas emissions caused directly and indirectly by a person, 
organization, event or product‖ (Carbon Trust, 2009). In the supply chain network, 
carbon footprints are produced in every stage, from product manufacturing, delivery and 
to the final disposal.  
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Let CF  denote the total annual reduction of the carbon emissions in the whole supply 
chain network. Specifically, PCF , tCF  and dCF  indicate the carbon footprint 
reduction at the production, transportation and disposal stages, respectively.  
          p t d
CF CF CF CF    
                      (7-11) 
 
As noted in the Chapter 6, the common approach to estimate the carbon footprint is to 
apply green house gases emission factor multiplying activity data (DEFRA, 2009). 
Activity data for a supply chain network mainly reflects the activities in the process of 
production, transportation, waste disposal, which may generate greenhouse gases 
emissions.  
 Carbon Footprint (cf)= Estimated Activity Data Emission Factor              (7-12) 
 
Assuming that carbon footprint still has not been considered by the conventional supply 
chain network, the reduction of carbon footprint can be derived as followed: 
          pi pi tj tj dk dk
i j k
CF A G B G C G                        (7-13) 
 
where 
piA  
denotes the i
th
 activity contributed to annual carbon emissions in the process 
of production, e.g. various energy consumption (burning oil, coal, compressed natural 
gas etc). Similarly, tjB  
indicates the annual transportation distances according to j
th
  
vehicle, and dkC is the annual volume of k
th
 waste material generation, e.g. paper, plastic, 
glass etc. piG , tjG and dkG  
indicate the corresponding greenhouse emission factor at 
the predetermined scenarios, production, transportation and disposal, separately. In order 
to calculate the carbon footprint conveniently, as well as simplify the computation 
complexity, this approach has been embodied into a decision support tool based upon 
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Visual Basic Programming, shown in Fig.7.3, by taking the carbon footprint calculation 
in the process of production as an example. Moreover, the details of carbon footprint 
calculation in the scenarios of production, transportation and disposal can be found in 
the Appendix A-User manual for decision support tool.  
 
 
Fig.7.3. Screenshot of the carbon footprint calculation in the industrial process 
 
As the greenhouse emission factors
piG , tjG and dkG can be assumed to be constant, the 
optimization model to maximize total carbon footprint reduction is built as follows:  
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(7-14)
 
 
In the above optimization model, the constrained conditions are derived from the strategy 
for carbon footprint reduction of the specific organisation, i.e. each manufacturer on the 
supply chain network should predetermine annual energy consumption for their 
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production ( e being represented as a constant), annual delivery distances ( f being 
represented as a constant), as well as annual waste generation ( h being represented as a 
constant).  
 
7.3.3 Minimizing the additional cost  
As the environmental policy for the conventional supply chain network usually focuses 
on the production process as well as the delivery of the product to the market and the 
consumer, the management measures still have not laid sufficient stress on reducing the 
consumption of ‗hazardous‘ materials. Especially the treatment and disposal of 
hazardous materials is usually given little deliberation in the post-consuming stage, even 
though the amount of waste materials has increased over the past few decades (Zhu and 
Cote, 2004). In this study, the total additional cost, in the context of green supply chain 
network, should be minimized by not only the cost for production, delivery and waste 
materials disposal, but also the cost for reducing the inherent risk and carbon footprint. 
Thus, the total annual additional economic cost additonC  can be expressed as follows: 
                      addition p t d R CFC C C C C C                 (7-15) 
 
where pC , tC and dC denote the annual increased cost for production, 
transportation and waste materials disposal respectively. These additional costs 
generated by various stages of the supply chain, can reflect the efforts paid to risk and 
carbon footprint reduction by organizations, for instance including such measures as 
equipment replacement, technical renovation for raw materials selection, packaging etc., 
in the process of production, vehicles inspection and repairing in terms of transportation, 
promoting the waste materials recycle and reuse etc. On the contrary, 
RC and CFC  
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denote annual saved cost since the risk and carbon footprint will have been reduced, 
which can be expressed in the following equations.  
                      
( )RC R Cost R                              (7-16) 
                      
( )CFC CF Cost CF                          (7-17) 
 
where ( )Cost R indicates as the cost that per unit of risk reduction. Similarly, ( )Cost CF
indicates the cost that per unit of carbon footprint reduction. In this study, carbon tax is 
suggested measuring the cost of carbon footprint reduction. Thus, the objective function 
of additional cost, as equation (7-15) can be transformed as followed: 
( ) ( )addition p t dC C C C R Cost R CF Cost CF          
 (7-18) 
 
Let 
pC , tC , dC  be the constant as the related data which can be derived from the 
annual financial report of the specific organizations. The maximum extent of risk and 
carbon footprint reduction, 
RC  and CFC can be derived from the expressions (7-10) 
and (7-14). Therefore, the optimization model for minimizing the total economic cost is 
only determined by the decision variables ( )Cost R and ( )Cost CF , which is built as 
following:  
 
min ( ) ( )
( )
( )
.
( )
( )
addition p t d
p t d
p t d
C C C C R Cost R CF Cost CF
Cost R m
Cost CF n
s t
R Cost R C C C
CF Cost CF C C C
          

 
       

                        (7-19) 
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7.4 An illustrative example 
In this Section, an example is given to illustrate how the above dynamic optimization 
model works. However, this is just an example to demonstrate the merit of the approach. 
It should be acknowledged that the real situation could be much more complex.  
 
UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) suggest the probability of any large-scale 
industrial hazard e.g. explosion, poisonous gas leakage etc., are nearly the same in a 
certain time period, which is 1 in 10
4 
as the maximum frequency within tolerable risk 
region to any public member (HSE, 1988). Moreover, assume that every organization in 
the supply chain should control the number of fatalities below 50 during the process of 
production, transportation and disposal, based on the HSE guidance (HSE, 2005). Thus, 
the optimization result can be derived by means of LINGO programming (LINDO 
Systems), shown in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1 Maximum reduction of public risk 
Parameters Constraint conditions 
Maximum 
objective value 
4Pr 10pob
  
4Pr 10tob
  
4Pr 10dob
  
20pN   
20tN   
20dN   
50p t dN N N    
0.005R   
 
With regard to the optimization of the carbon footprint reduction, the supply chain of 
croissants is selected in the illustrative example (Carbon Trust, 2008). Table 7.2 reflects 
the corresponding greenhouse emission factors, constraint conditions and the maximum 
objective value. Here, the calculated maximum objective value in Table 7.2 indicates 
the carbon footprint per tonne of croissants. Assume that ten thousand tonne of 
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croissants have been produced in this example. Thus, the total annual maximum carbon 
footprints are measured as 16900 tonnes. Once the maximum reduction of public risk 
and carbon footprint has been determined, the optimum result to minimize additional 
cost can be solved by the expression (7-19). 
 
Table 7.2 Maximum reduction of carbon footprint 
Parameters Constraint conditions 
Maximum 
objective value 
0.5 /electricityG kg kwh  
0.2 /gasG kg kwh  
1 /deliveryG kg km  
2 /waste transportG kg km   
800 /wasteG kg tonne  
300electricityA kwh  
1000gasA kwh  
640deliveryB km  
150waste transportC km   
0.5wasteC tonnes  
1690CF kg   
 
The detailed preferences are shown in Table 7.3, from which it is supposed the 
croissants factory spends a million pounds annually for business development. The Cost 
of per unit risk reduction ( )Cost R is derived from the monetary value for per fatalities in 
terms of the UK regulation (HSE, 2003). Moreover, as there is no specific standard for 
the cost of carbon emissions in UK, cost of per unit carbon footprint reduction 
( )Cost CF is suggested by EU Committee as carbon tax (€4 to €30 per tonne) and has 
been converted into British Pounds by yearly average official exchanging rate (Kanter, 
2010).  
 
Table 7.3 Minimum total economic cost 
Parameters Constraint conditions Minimum 
objective 
value 
610p t dC C C     
 
( ) 1,336,800 Cost R   
3 ( ) 25Cost CF   
570,816additionC   
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7.5 Summary 
This Chapter provides insight to formulate a dynamic optimization approach to increase 
performance along the three dimensions of the Triple Bottom Line (Economic, Social 
and Environment), whilst minimizing public risk, carbon footprint and economic cost in 
the context of green supply chain management. There are two stages of the built 
optimisation model. Maximizing the reduction extent of inherent risk and carbon 
footprint on the whole supply chain should be considered at the first stage. 
Consequentially, minimizing the total economic cost is implemented at the second stage, 
based upon the maximum reduction extent of risk and carbon footprint. A case example 
is provided, by using the croissants factory to illustrate how the dynamic optimisation 
model works.  
 
As ‗hazardous‘ materials are defined in the Introduction of this study, which may cause 
a risk or damage to the environment especially once the ‗hazardous‘ materials have 
been converted to the hazardous waste materials. Thus, careful materials selection is 
becoming an increasingly important aspect of product design to promote cleaner 
production and improve the quality of products for public consumption. Subsequently, 
Chapter 8 describes an environmental evaluation approach to aid decision-making on 
materials selection in the context of cleaner production. 
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Chapter 8: An Environmental Evaluation Approach for 
Materials Selection
4
 
8.1 Introduction 
Materials selection can be done in different ways, but the principles are quite similar. 
Generally, selection of materials for products is either ‗design oriented‘, driven by 
functional demands, requiring substantial consideration of mechanical, physical and 
chemical properties (Edwards, 1994; Ashby, 2005; Kalpakjian and Schmid, 2006) 
‗product oriented‘ by market or public demand (Ljungberg and Edwards, 2003), or ‗cost 
oriented‘ aiming at manufacturing cost reduction (Farag and Magd, 1992). In recent 
years, the concept of ‗green‘ and ‗low-carbon‘ technology has been gradually entering 
into product lifecycle management, both as a measure against ‗climate change‘ and for 
sustainability. Simultaneously, the concept of ―environmental conscious design‖ has 
gradually emerged in manufacturing, in particular focusing on ―design for environment‖ 
(Zhang, Kuo, Lu and Huang, 1997; Fiksel, 2009). From the perspective of the 
‗Hierarchy of Waste‘, the most preferable strategy for encompassing sustainable 
development is to prevent or eliminate waste (DEFRA, 2007). The mitigation of the 
adverse impact of products on the environment and human health can be achieved in 
part by the careful selection of raw materials, thus improving product lifecycle 
(including reusability and recyclability), reforming the quality of products and 
minimizing the amount and toxicity of waste generated during manufacturing processes 
etc. (Tchobanoglous and Kreith, 2002; Williams, 2005). In this context, environmental 
consideration is an increasingly important component in materials selection, in order to 
                                                 
4 This chapter has been published by the Journal ―Materials & Design‖. See details in: Zhao, R., 
Neighbour, G., Deutz, P., McGuire, M., 2012. Materials Selection for Cleaner Production: An 
Environmental Evaluation Approach. Materials & Design 37, 429-434. 
184 
 
adapt product design to promote cleaner production, provide sustainable products for 
public consumption and achieve long term commercial success.  
 
This Chapter presents a convenient approach, using a ‗binary-dominance matrix‘ 
integrated with grey relational analysis, for application by engineers to aid 
decision-making on materials selection, whilst taking environmental factors into 
account. Grey relational analysis is a quantitative method used to aid decision making, 
by examining how closely the value of each attribute approaches to value of the ideal 
parameter (Liu and Lin, 2006). This integrated methodology is described in detail in the 
following Section 8.2. A computational tool, based on a spreadsheet calculation, has 
also been devised to help engineers and designers better understand and employ this 
approach. Moreover, this work mainly focuses on selection between similar materials 
(including type and composition) to further improve the environmental performance of 
the product. A study to select a range of poly(vinyl chloride) (PVC) materials for 
handbag manufacturing is used as a case example. 
 
8.2 Methodology 
8.2.1 Evaluation indicator selection 
The evaluation approach starts from the selection of necessary indicators for cleaner 
production. The use of environmental and economic evaluation indicators is an efficient 
way to help improve and monitor the processes of product design. Following the basic 
principles and guidelines of ‗design for environment‘ (Tscoulfas and Pappis, 2008, 
Fiksel, 2009, Allione, 2011), this study has identified a number of typical indicators 
which best represent environmental impact, e.g. on human health risk / toxicity, 
economics and resource efficiency, as a basis for materials selection. These indicators 
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listed in Table 8.1 are generic in the context of ‗sustainable development‘, but, in order 
to distinguish their importance, weighting value need to be assigned to them. This is 
discussed below.  
 
Table 8.1 Selection of environmental criteria 
Indicators  
Energy consumption  
Human health risk / toxicity  
Materials recyclability  
Materials reusability  
Use of recycled materials  
Manufacture defects  
Defects recyclability  
By-products  
By-products recyclability  
Waste production  
Manufacture cost  
Sales profit  
 
8.2.2 Determination of weighting factors 
As the selected evaluation criteria are not equally important relative to each other and 
highly dependent on the product, it is necessary to introduce some form of weighting as 
part of the evaluation process. Generally, there are two common approaches for 
determining the extent of weighting required: objective and subjective. The former is 
mainly based upon the data of the attributes, e.g. the entropy approach, while the latter 
is based on the decision maker‘s preferences, e.g. the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
(Shanian and Savadogo, 2006; Rao and Davim, 2008; Rao and Patel, 2010). The 
‗Binary-dominance matrix‘ method is a simplified way of applying the subjective 
weighting approach, and has been employed in this study, in order to reduce the 
computational time and complexity (Hurst, 1999).  
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In this approach, all the criteria are listed on both vertical and horizontal axes of a 
matrix, and then the numerical value 1 or 0 is input into each box generated by the 
intersection of the axes according to their relative importance. Each individual criterion 
is evaluated separately against every other criterion. If a pair of indicators is judged as 
equal in importance, a value of 0.5 is assigned to each. Once all the indicators have been 
scored by 0, 1 or 0.5, each row of the matrix should be increased by 1 to ensure the 
arithmetic validity. Thus, the weight value can be derived as the result of the aggregated 
score of each indicator divided by the total score of all the indicators, as shown in the 
Equation (8-1).  
 
                        





n
i
i
i
x
x
W
1
1)(
1
                                (8-1) 
where W is the weighting, ix is the score of the individual criterion.  
 
The weight value can be determined from different case studies. However, as a 
simplified approach, the criteria in Table 8.1 will be examined by comparing search 
results from an online science database, which reflects the current academic research 
interests or attentions paid to environmental or sustainable studies. Scirus.com, is a 
comprehensive academic search engine, including over 440 million scientific items, is 
used to search the above indicators in this study. Apart from the published scientific 
papers, other web sources, including the patents, scientists‘ homepages, courseware, 
current research progress etc can also be found in the ‗Scirus‘ database (SCIRUS, 2011). 
According to the retrieval rating of each indicator in terms of the number of ‗hit‘, the 
relative importance is ranked from 1 to 12, shown in Fig.8.1. Thus, the weight value can 
be calculated by Equation (8-1), based upon the importance ranking list. Table 8.2 
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shows the ‗binary-Dominance Matrix‘ by using the Scirus example to determine the 
weight value.  
 
8.2.3 Grey relation analysis 
The grey decision approach derives from grey systems theory, which was proposed by 
Professor Julong Deng in 1982 and now has been developed to study those uncertain 
systems with poor or partially known information (Deng, 2000). The general decision 
models with grey elements or integrated with grey system models can be solved by 
means of grey analysis (Liu and Lin, 2006). In this study, grey relational analysis is the 
preferred method for selecting the environmentally friendly materials for further 
industrial application. The evaluation result can be interpreted as the ‗degree of grey 
incidence‘, which is used to express the rates of change of the mathematical 
progressions relative to a baseline or an ideal progression (Liu and Lin, 2006). The 
greater the number of attributes that satisfy this condition, the greater the degree of grey 
incidence is (Zhai, Khoo & Zhong, 2008).  
 
The basic model for grey decision-making can be described as the product of the 
weighting value and the result of grey relational analysis (Du, Pang & Wu, 2008), as 
follows:  
                           R W E                                    (8-2) 
 
where 1 2[ , , , ]
T
mR r r r  is the result vector of m  evaluation objects, and 1
( )
n
k
W W k


is the weight value for each evaluation indicator. E  is the matrix composed of all the 
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evaluation indicators, in which ( )i k is the grey relational coefficient between the k
th
 
indicator and the optimal indicator:  
 
                   
1 1 1
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  
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  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          (8-3) 
 
Assume that the ideal index of evaluation indicators is * * * *
1 2[ , , , ]n    , in which 
*
k is the optimal value for the k
th
 evaluation indicator. The ideal values are set 
depending upon how the indicators are viewed by manufacturer, e.g. some criteria need 
to be maxmised, i.e. materials recyclability, reusability, sales profit etc, and some 
should be minimised, i.e. energy consumption, health risk, manufacture cost etc. 
However, it is important to realize that the ideal value for each criterion shown in Table 
8.1 should be set at an appropriate level, according to the technical and economic 
feasibilities within a specific manufacturer. Once 
*  has been determined, a new grey 
relational matrix   can be constructed, where ik  is the original numerical value of 
the k
th
 indicator:  
 
                 
* * *
1 2
1 1 1
1 2
1 2
n
n
m m m
n
  
  
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 
 
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                                   (8-4) 
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Fig.8.1. Relative importance of selected indicators as determined from a database search (updated by 14.10.2011) 
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Table 8.2 Binary dominance matrix complied using data from the Scirus database (Scenario one) 
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Score Weighting 
1.Energy 
consumption 
× 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 0.141 
2.Human health 
risk 
1 × 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 0.154 
3.Materials 
recyclability 
0 0 × 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.038 
4.Materials 
Reusability 
0 0 1 × 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.051 
5.Use of recycled 
materials 
0 0 1 1 × 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 6 0.077 
6.Manufacture 
defects 
0 0 1 1 0 × 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0.064 
7.Defects 
recyclability 
0 0 0 0 0 0 × 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.013 
8.By-products 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 × 1 0 0 0 7 0.090 
9.By-products 
recyclability 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 × 0 0 0 2 0.026 
10.Waste 
production 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 × 1 1 10 0.128 
11.Manufacture 
cost 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 × 0 8 0.103 
12.Sales profit 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 × 9 0.115 
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As the data collected for the selected evaluation criteria usually have different units, for 
instance energy consumption may be measured in kWh (Kilowatt hour), BTU (British 
Thermal Unit), J(Joule) etc, it is necessary to normalize these data, thus rendering them 
dimensionless for further evaluation. Further assume that the numerical value range of 
the k
th
 criterion is 1 2[ , ]k k  , in which 1k  
is minimum among all the evaluation 
objects and 2k  
is maximum, a dimensionless matrix   can be derived from   by 
means of the relation 1
2 1
i
i k k
k
k k
 

 



 ( (0,1)ik  ), as shown in expression (8-5). In this 
research, all the evaluation indicators have been normalized in terms of percentage.  
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 
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                                     (8-5) 
 
In the matrix , 
* * * *
1 2{ } [ , , ]n     is set as the non-dimensional expected optimal 
sequence compared with the sequence of 1 2{ } [ , , ]
i i i
n    . Thus, the grey relational 
coefficient can be calculated as follows:  
            
* *
* *
min min max max
( )
max max
i i
k k k k
i k i k
i i i
k k k k
i k
k
    

    
  

  
                   (8-6) 
 
where   is known as the distinguishing coefficient and (0,1)  . Conventionally, and 
empirically,   is set as 0.5 (Liu and lin, 2006), and this value is adopted in this study.  
 
From the Equations (8-2) and (8-6), the grey decision-making model can be transformed 
as follows:  
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1
( ) ( )
n
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k
R W k k

                                 (8-7) 
 
As iR  increases, { }
i  approaches more closely to the expecting optimal evaluation 
index 
*{ } . When 
iR  reaches the maximum value within the set of R , this is an 
indication that the i
th
 evaluation object is better than others. The evaluation result can be 
interpreted as the ‗degree of grey incidence‘, which is used to express the rates of 
change of the mathematical progressions relative to a baseline or an ideal progression 
(Liu and Yi, 2006). In this study, the degree of grey incidence ‗Ri‘ reflects how the data 
column of each evaluation object approximates to the set of ideal value index. The 
greater ‗Ri‘ is, the closer the evaluated object approaches the ideal value set. Thus, 
different evaluated objects can be ranked in a sequence from the highest to the lowest 
grade. In addition, the evaluation object corresponding to the maximum grey correlative 
degree is deemed as the optimal object, and vice versa.  
 
8.3 Case example 
A leading handbag manufacturer in Guangdong Province, China, has kindly consented 
to their data being used for this case study. The material commonly used for handbags is 
PVC, and five grades with different compositions are investigated. The designations A, 
B, C, D and E are used to distinguish the five materials, shown in Fig.8.2. The purpose 
is to evaluate these five materials by means of the grey decision-making approach, and 
so determine which material is the most ‗environmentally friendly‘.  
 
193 
 
There are two evaluation scenarios: One is based upon the weight value determined by 
the keyword search from the ‗Scirus‘ academic database, as shown in Fig.8.1. The other 
will apply the weighting value assigned by the product manager of the cited handbag 
manufacturer. Thus, the generated evaluation results will not only be compared with 
each other, but also analyzed in comparison with the current selection of materials used 
by the company.  
 
Table 8.3 shows how to measure the selected criteria by using the five different grades 
of PVC materials. According to the measurements, the data collected from the handbag 
manufacturer have been processed dimensionlessly by percentage, as shown in Table 
8.4. Moreover, some of the ideal values are set by the production strategies by the cited 
manufacturer. For example, the manufacturer expects to reduce the electricity consumed 
by the PVC material processing to 70%, as well as to reduce the manufacturing defects 
to 2% (See Fig.8.3a and Fig.8.3f). Similarly, the manufacturing cost should be 
minimized to 30%, whilst raising sales profit to 45% (See Fig.8.3k and Fig.8.3l). In 
addition, as previously mentioned some values, e.g. the human health risk, by-products, 
waste production, should be controlled as low as reasonable, ideally down to 0.0001%, 
0.011% and 2%, respectively (See Fig.8.3b, Fig.8.3h and Fig.8.3j). On the other hand, 
others such as materials recyclability and reusability, need to be as high as possible, e.g. 
98% and 0.23% (See Fig.8.3c and Fig.8.3d). Similarly, 93%, 95% and 0.20% are the 
representative ideal value selected from the criteria such as use of recycled materials, 
defects and by-products recyclability (See Fig.8.3e, Fig.8.3g and Fig.8.3i).  
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Table 8.3 Definition of measurements for environmental criteria 
Indicators Measurements 
Energy 
 consumption % 
( )c
c
t
E i
E
E
  where ( )cE i  is the energy consumed by using the i
th
 material for industrial manufacture, 
tE is the total energy consumed by the production, i=A, B, C, D, E. The energy used for PVC materials 
manufacturing is specified as electricity. For every 100 kWh electricity, 1 tonne material A will use 97 kWh 
for industrial processing, B 93.6 kWh, C 89.5 kWh, D 83.0 kWh and E 80.0 kWh. 
Human  
health risk % 
( )h
h
t
R i
R
R
  where ( )hR i  is the health risk resulted from using the ith PVC material for industrial 
manufacture, tR is the total health risk caused by using all kinds of the PVC materials for handbags 
production, i=A, B, C, D, E. ( ) ( ) ( )h e eR i P i C i  where ( )eP i  is the probability of sudden environmental 
accidents during selection of the i
th
 material for production, ( )eC i is the consequence of the failure scenario 
in terms of the number of fatalities. 
Materials 
recyclability % 
( )
( )
rec
ec
t
Q i
R
Q i
  where ( )recQ i  is the quantity of recycled materials while using the i
th 
PVC material for 
industrial processing, ( )tQ i is the total quantity of the i
th
 PVC material consuming, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
Materials 
 Reusability % 
( )
( )
us
us
t
Q i
R
Q i
  where ( )usQ i  is the quantity of reused materials while using the i
th
 PVC material for 
industrial processing, ( )tQ i is the total quantity of the i
th
 PVC material consuming, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
Use of recycled 
 materials % 
( )
( )
ur
ur
rec
Q i
R
Q i
  where ( )urQ i is the usable quantity of the recycled materials, ( )recQ i  is the quantity of 
recycled material while using the i
th
 PVC material for industrial processing, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
Manufacture 
 defects % 
( )
( )
d
d
M
Q i
M
Q i
  where ( )dQ i is the quantity of the manufacture defects, ( )MQ i  is the quantity of 
products (handbags) while using the i
th
 material for industrial manufacturing, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
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Table 8.3 (Continued) Definition of measurements for environmental criteria 
Indicators Measurements 
Defects 
 recyclability % 
( )
( )
rd
rec
d
Q i
D
Q i
  where ( )rdQ i is the quantity of the recycled manufacture defects, ( )dQ i  is the quantity of the 
manufacture defects while using the i
th
 material for industrial manufacturing, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
By-products % 
( )
( )
bp
p
M
Q i
B
Q i
  where ( )bpQ i is the quantity of the manufactured by-products, ( )MQ i  is the quantity of products 
(handbags) while using the i
th
 material for industrial manufacturing, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
By-products 
 recyclability % 
( )
( )
brec
rec
bp
Q i
B
Q i

 where ( )brecQ i is the quantity of the recycled by-products, ( )bpQ i  is the quantity of the 
by-products while using the i
th
 material for industrial manufacturing, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
Waste production % 
( )
( )
wp
p
t
Q i
W
Q i
  where ( )wpQ i  is the quantity of waste while using the i
th
 material for industrial processing, 
( )tQ i is the total quantity of the i
th
 material consuming, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
Manufacture cost % 
( )M
M
t
C i
C
C
  where ( )MC i  is the cost by using the i
th 
material for industrial production, tC is the total cost 
paid by using all kinds of the PVC materials for handbags production, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
Sales profit % 
( )p
p
t
S i
S
S
  where ( )pS i  is the expected sales profit by using the i
th
 material for industrial production, tS is 
the total expected sales profit gained by using all kinds of PVC materials for handbags production, i=A, B, C, D, E. 
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Table 8.4 Data for different indicators provided by a handbag manufacturer 
Indicators% 
Material 
A 
Material 
B 
Material 
C 
Material 
D 
Material 
E 
Ideal 
value 
Energy 
consumption 
97.00 93.60 89.50 83.00 80.00 70.00 
Human health 
risk 
0.0015 0.0013 0.0005 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 
Materials 
recyclability 
94.70 95.30 94.00 96.30 98.00 98.00 
Materials 
Reusability 
0.13 0.16 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.23 
Use of 
recycled 
materials 
90.80 91.00 91.90 92.70 92.00 93.00 
Manufacture 
defects 
8.10 7.30 5.80 6.00 5.00 2.00 
Defects 
recyclability 
90.00 93.00 93.60 89.00 94.00 95.00 
By-products 0.020 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 
By-products 
recyclability 
0.12 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.20 0.20 
Waste 
production 
4.90 4.50 3.60 2.90 2.50 2.00 
Manufacturing 
cost 
42.00 38.00 32.00 34.00 28.00 30.00 
Sales profit 40.00 39.80 38.60 35.70 31.00 45.00 
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Fig.8.2. Five PVC materials with different compositions 
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Fig.8.3. Comparison of five PVC materials within different criteria in the case example 
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8.3.1 Evaluation scenario one 
Scenario one will use the set of weight values determined by the ‗Scirus‘ search 
example for the evaluation. In order to help the engineer or designer employ the grey 
analysis more conveniently, as well as simplify the computation complexity, this 
approach has been embodied into a decision support tool based on a spreadsheet 
calculation (Microsoft Excel 2007). The decision support tool has been divided into two 
modules, representing the input parameters and the output of the analysis results. 
Fig.8.4 depicts a screen shot of the input module, starting with the weighting value 
determination by marking 1 or 0 in the designed ‗binary-dominance matrix‘ table (See 
Fig.8.4a first step), followed by entering the numerical value for each indicator derived 
from the case example (See Fig.8.4b second step). When all the information has been 
submitted, the evaluation result of scenario one can be calculated by means of the 
spreadsheet, as shown in Table 8.5.  
 
Table 8.5 Grey evaluation result of scenario one 
Grey 
incidence 
(Ri) 
Material A Material B Material C Material D Material E 
RA 0.7615     
RB  0.7835    
RC   0.8227   
RD    0.8270  
RE     0.8456 
 
As can be seen from the Table 8.5, RE>RD>RC>RB>RA, material E is the optimum 
material from an ‗environmentally friendly‘ point of view, material A being the worst 
choice in this scenario.  
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Fig.8.4. Screen shot of the decision support tool in the evaluation scenario one 
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8.3.2 Evaluation scenario two 
In this scenario, the product manager in the cited handbag manufacturer was requested 
to rank the importance of each criterion, which can lead to a more realistic evaluation. 
In the ‗Scirus‘ example shown in the scenario one, each indicator was scored using 
value 1 or 0. In scenario two, the product manager has classified the evaluation criteria 
as seven levels in terms of their relative importance (See Fig.8.5), and since some 
indicators are incorporated into the same level, these are scored 0.5 for each. Table 8.6 
shows the ‗binary dominance matrix‘ in terms of the importance hierarchies, defined in 
Fig.8.5. The evaluation results are shown in Table 8.7. This confirms that, whilst the 
sequence has changed (RE>RC>RD>RB>RA), material E is still the most 
‗environmentally friendly‘ material among the five PVC materials, with material A the 
least.  
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Fig.8.5. Levels of evaluation criteria ranked by the cited handbag manufacturer 
 
Cost 
Human health risk 
Sales Profit 
Waste production Materials recyclability Materials reusability 
Energy consumption 
Manufacture defects By-products 
Defects recyclability By-products recyclability Use of recycled materials 
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Table 8.6 Binary dominance matrix of the case example (scenario two) 
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Score Weighting 
1.Energy 
consumption 
× 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 7 0.089 
2.Human health 
risk 
1 × 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 11 0.139 
3.Materials 
recyclability 
1 0 × 0 1 1 1 1 1  0.5 0 0 8 0.101 
4.Materials 
Reusability 
1 0  0.5 × 1 1 1 1 1  0.5 0 0 8 0.101 
5.Use of recycled 
materials 
0 0 0 1 × 0  0.5 0  0.5 0 0 0 2 0.025 
6.Manufacture 
defects 
0 0 0 1 1 × 1  0.5 1 0 0 0 4.5 0.057 
7.Defects 
recyclability 
0 0 0 0  0.5 0 × 0  0.5 0 0 0 2 0.025 
8.By-products 0 0 0 0 1  0.5 1 × 1 0 0 0 4.5 0.057 
9.By-products 
recyclability 
0 0 0 0  0.5 0  0.5 0 × 0 0 0 2 0.025 
10.Waste 
production 
1 0  0.5  0.5 1 1 1 1 1 × 0 0 8 0.101 
11.Manufacture 
cost 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 × 1 12 0.152 
12.Sales profit 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 × 10 0.127 
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Table 8.7 Grey evaluation result of scenario two 
Grey 
incidence 
(Ri) 
Material A Material B Material C Material D Material E 
RA 0.7684     
RB  0.7960    
RC   0.8365   
RD    0.8301  
RE     0.8608 
 
8.3.3 Results and discussions 
According to the evaluation results of scenarios one and two, the variation of weighting 
value plays an important role in the sensitivity of the grey relational model, other model 
parameters being fixed. Thus, the importance of energy consumption has remarkably 
decreased from 0.141 in Table 8.2 to 0.089 in Table 8.6, use of recycled materials from 
0.077 to 0.025, by-products from 0.090 to 0.057 and waste production from 0.128 to 
0.101. On the other hand, manufacturing cost and sales profit are raised significantly 
from 0.103 to 0.152, from 0.115 to 0.127, respectively, as well as the materials 
recyclability and reusability, from 0.038 and 0.051 to 0.101. The remaining indicators 
are little changed, e.g. human health risk and manufacture defects reducing from 0.154 
to 0.139, from 0.064 to 0.057, separately, defects recyclability increasing from 0.013 to 
0.025. Thus, the evaluation result has slightly altered, from which material C is superior 
to material D in the scenario two. Both scenario one and two suggest that material E is 
most ‗environmental sound‘, while material A ‗environmentally unfriendly‘.  
 
The actual consumption of these five PVC materials used by the cited manufacturer has 
been investigated. Material C has the highest consumption rate for handbag production, 
followed by materials E, D, B, and A, i.e. MC>ME>MD>MB>MA, which reflects that the 
material selection for handbag production is, in reality, strongly influenced by criteria 
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such as ‗market demand‘, ‗materials performance‘, and ‗cost-benefit‘ (Edwards, 1994; 
Ljungberg and Edwards, 2003; Ashby, 2005). In other words, apart from product 
functionality and company profitability, popular fashion is also a fundamental driver in 
product design. In terms of ‗cost-benefit‘, Table 8.4 shows that material A has the 
highest manufacturing cost, whilst it also contributes the highest proportion of profits, 
both about 40%. Comparatively speaking, the processing cost of material C (about 32%) 
is less than material A (about 42%), but it yields higher profit (38.6%). ‗Materials 
performance‘ is mainly related to the properties of materials, which affects the quality 
of products. For the PVC materials used in the present case, the laboratory performance 
tests include a mechanical fatigue test, chemical corrosion test by means of salt spray, 
oven test for thermal expansion and a colour fastness test  (Allen, 2011; SATRA 
Technology, 2011; Winckle, 2011). According to the test results, material C shows the 
best abrasive resistance, decay, heat resistance, and colour fastness. However, material 
A shows poor performances, for example, the surface is easily rubbed off during the 
process of manufacture. 
  
In addition, it can be identified that the sequence of actual materials consumption 
(MC>ME>MD>MB>MA) is quite similar to the result from grey relational analysis 
(RE>RC>RD>RB>RA) in the case example. Material C shows not only the highest 
consumption rate for handbag production, but also the second highest degree of grey 
incidence. Although material E is superior to C in terms of grey evaluation result, the 
actual consumption of material E is less than C. This is because material C is more 
favorable as the main material, while material E is more commonly used as an auxiliary 
material for handbag design. Thus, material C can be determined as the near optimal 
choice. It is suggested, therefore, that the actual consumption of material could be 
integrated into the environmental evaluation to aid decision making on materials 
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selection. In this case study, both materials E and C emerge as ‗environmentally 
friendly‘ for cleaner production, while the use of material A should be reduced or 
eliminated all together from the manufacturing process.  
 
Previous studies have concentrated on the selection of materials with widely differing 
characteristics. The present study confirms that our evaluation methodology is capable 
of discriminating between materials with similar manufacturing and environmental 
characteristics. In addition, our calculation tool can be used for a wide range of 
materials selection scenarios.  
 
8.4 Summary 
This Chapter uses a grey relational analysis approach for application to aid 
decision-making on materials selection for cleaner production for application by 
engineers. The starting point of this study is to determine the environmental evaluation 
criteria and to assign a weighting value in terms of their importance. A case example is 
provided, in which five PVC materials have been subjected to environmental evaluation 
to determine their sustainability for handbag manufacture. In order to assist engineers in 
the application of the grey evaluation process for materials selection, and to simplify the 
computational complexity, a calculation support tool based on a spreadsheet calculation 
has been developed. The associated grey relational result analysis of the case example is 
discussed. Chapter 9 provides the discussions and conclusions for the PhD study, laying 
a foundation for further work.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Further Study 
9.1 Discussion 
This PhD study focuses on the design of an environmental management system for 
hazardous waste materials to minimize environmental impact, i.e. environmental risk 
and carbon emissions, by which new understanding and novel solutions would be 
provided with regard to societal change in the context of "sustainable development". In 
particular, this research is directed towards to persuading consumers to adjust their 
purchasing behaviour to mitigate climate change, thus promoting sustainable production 
whilst maintaining industrial competitiveness, and to demonstrate sustainability for 
environmentally friendly products with due regard to the Triple Bottom Line (TBL).  
 
The study seeks to raise consumers‘ awareness of climate change, and thus to help 
change their lifestyles and purchasing behaviours. In this context, a dimensionless 
system of carbon labelling has been proposed, which could increase the ability of green 
consumers to implement their concerns in the market place. However, it should be 
acknowledged that an indicator never becomes of better quality than the input of which 
it is based (See the detailed discussions in Chapter 3). For instance, the proposed 
indicator ‗Carbon Emissions Intensity Ratio‘ (CEIR) is highly dependent upon the 
variance of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) emissions data. Moreover, the dimensionless 
carbon labelling indicator is seen to be influenced by short term price fluctuations and 
the precision of the calculated baseline, i.e. national carbon emissions per GDP.  
 
An important assumption is that purchasing preference can be influenced by education 
in green and low carbon issues to increase demand for more environmentally friendly 
products, thus in turn to promote sustainable production by manufacturers. However, a 
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greater level of governmental intervention, in the form of manufacturing process 
regulation might be necessary to achieve this. Game theory provides a novel perspective 
that models the likely behaviour of manufacturers and government in response to 
minimizing environmental impact, whilst increasing performance along the three 
dimensions of the Triple Bottom Line (Economic, Society and Environment). However, 
the influence of such factors as living standards, public purchasing behaviour etc., have 
yet to be considered in this study. The interactions between the upstream and 
downstream businesses, as well as between the enterprises and customers have been 
omitted. Furthermore, the manufacturers are considered as one entity, regardless of the 
scale, quantity and quality of productions. Similarly, government is accorded as a 
generic role without distinction of identity, e.g. National government or European 
Union (EU) Committee.  
 
In order to provide better, safer and sustainable products for public consumption and 
achieve long term commercial success, careful materials selection is becoming an 
increasingly important aspect of product design. This PhD study mainly focuses on a 
simple approach for engineering designers to use, by integrating binary-dominance 
matrix with grey relational analysis to aid decision-making on materials selection while 
taking environmental evaluation into account. The majority previous studies have used 
the life cycle assessment (LCA) approach to materials selection when considering 
environmental impact, e.g. Eco-indicator 99, which is still a complex process involving 
a large amount of input data (Yang, 2007; Zhou, Yin and Hu, 2009). Moreover, this 
work mainly especially contributes a selection approach between similar materials 
(including type and composition) to further improve the environmental performance of 
the product. Although the proposed approach shows promise, it is necessary to test the 
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validity and sensitivity of the grey evaluation model further by applying it to a wider 
variety of case studies.  
 
9.2 Conclusions 
The main contribution of this PhD study can be reflected in the several aspects, i.e. the 
identification a new indicator to appreciate the understanding of carbon footprint and 
thus to improve the existing carbon footprint label; the application game theory to aid 
decision support by seeking the optimal or near-optimal strategies for environmental 
risk and carbon footprint reduction to achieve more environmentally friend products; 
the development a novel convenient approach for materials selection to promote cleaner 
production. All the detailed investigations in this study and the recommendations for 
future study are reviewed below.   
 
A review of the literature is necessary to set this research in context, relating to the 
following topics: hazardous materials, hazardous waste, waste management, 
environmental risk, carbon footprint, game theory application, and decision support 
systems. The review supports the research aim and objectives, which is an essential 
point in the development of a novel environmental risk management system for 
hazardous waste materials.  
 
Current carbon labelling scheme is considered not easily to be understood by consumers 
thus leading to further improvement. This study achieves the first research objective by 
identifying a novel dimensionless indicator Carbon Emissions Intensity Ratio (CEIR) to 
present the carbon labelling in a more intuitive way, as well as to help consumers raise 
the awareness of environmental impact, i.e. carbon footprint. The carbon emissions 
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from LCA are normalized as Carbon Emissions Intensity (CEI), whilst the 
dimensionless indicator CEIR is established based upon the CEI‘s ratio to the overall 
national carbon emissions intensity. Carbon emissions intensity ratios of a 
comprehensive range of products are calculated and assigned to different ratio levels, to 
show how to employ this approach. It is apparent that heavy industrial products 
generate the highest carbon emissions intensity ratio, and groceries the lowest. Seven 
products are identified with extremely high emissions intensity ratio, accounting for 
11.7% of the total sixty products.  
 
Game Theory offers an effective approach to formulating a dominant strategy designed 
to increase performance across the three dimensions of the Triple Bottom Line 
(Economic, Society and Environment). This study has applied game theory to better 
understand the dilemmas that can exist between government and manufacturers, as well 
as provide insightful perspectives on the potential problems in the context of cleaner 
production. Three game scenarios have been developed sequentially which reflect the 
possible changes in the actions of government and manufacturers to achieve more 
environmentally friendly products. The established game model mainly depends upon 
the variation of the following three important factors, such as innovation cost (C), 
economic penalty (P) and additional sales of ‗environmentally friendly products‘ (S). 
Through the analysis of several game scenarios, it is concluded that the behaviours of 
the main players, in this case, government and manufacturers, can be seen to be best 
achieved by cooperation driven by a combination of regulation pressure and consumer 
preference. 
 
Game theory approach also informs government and manufacturers‘ decision making 
ability on the appropriate extent of risk and carbon footprint reduction in the green 
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supply chain. Different strategies have been initially identified and compared in order to 
limit the potential environmental impact, by reducing the risk and the carbon emissions, 
whilst maximizing the economical benefits, by inclusion of the principle of the 
‗tolerability of risk‘. Moreover, major factors have been identified by the construction 
of the game model, such as cost and benefit, governmental punitive and incentive policy 
etc, to provide insight into the problem situation.  
 
Environmental consideration is an increasingly important component in materials 
selection, in order to adapt product design to promote cleaner production, provide 
sustainable products for public consumption and achieve long term commercial success.  
This study has introduced a convenient approach by integrating ‗Binary Dominance 
Matrix‘ with grey relational analysis for application by engineering designers to aid 
decision-making on materials selection while taking environmental evaluation into 
account. Five PVC materials, designated as A, B, C, D and E, have been investigated to 
identify which one is the most ‗environmentally friendly‘ for future handbag 
manufacture. The evaluation result has been compared with the actual materials 
consumption in the representative handbag manufacturer in order to select which 
material is the most ‗environmentally friendly‘. It is concluded that both materials E and 
C emerge as ‗environmentally friendly‘ for cleaner production, while the use of material 
A should be reduced or eliminated all together from the manufacturing process. In 
addition, this integrated evaluation approach is flexible which can provide an 
environmental index to judge a range of materials. 
 
It is concluded that this study provides a decision support tool for use by engineering 
designers to minimize the risk, and the carbon footprint, from hazardous materials in 
product design, through the application of ‗game theory‘, ‗grey theory‘ etc, as well as 
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various computational approaches, by helping the designer identify novel solutions or 
mitigation strategies. 
 
9.3 Further study 
The research work offers an approach to maintain competitiveness as well as 
demonstrate sustainability for products, i.e. economic, social and environment 
dimensions. This can be true for all developed economies, as the need to reduce 
environmental impact increases in importance and consumers may become more 
sophisticated in their buying habits. However, there are still some limitations in the 
system study, e.g. carbon labelling scheme, game theoretical analysis and materials 
selection, which lay a foundation for further work, ultimately to provide appropriate 
solutions, mitigation strategies for designers, engineers and policy makers to minimize 
the environmental impact. The recommended future studies are presented in the 
following sections. 
 
9.3.1 Carbon labelling improvement 
The evaluation criteria for carbon footprint intensity in Chapter 3 are based on the 
assumption that all the products analyzed are subject to the assumed normal 
distribution, and this may result in uncertainties of criteria definition. Thus, a wider 
range of products and specific case scenarios need to be examined to confirm the 
validity and sensitivity of this approach. With regard to carbon labelling, whether the 
form of label suggested here, based upon the carbon footprint intensity, is easily 
understood by consumers needs to be established through questionnaires, focus groups 
and interviews.  
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9.3.2 Game theory for decision making 
With regard to the ‗cleaner production‘ game presented in the Chapter 5, there are still 
some limitations involved in the game model and simulation. First of all, the 
manufacturers are considered one entity, regardless of the scale, quantity and quality of 
productions, economic benefit and selected strategies, etc. Secondly, in order to 
simplify the analysis of game simulation, the factor of tax break has been fixed, and 
consequently the selection of strategic choice will be influenced. Moreover, the 
interactions between the different organisations, enterprises and customers have been 
omitted. Further study will focus on the underlying mathematical modelling for the 
game representing the complexity between government, manufacturers and other 
stakeholders, as well as the development of game simulation in different scenarios. 
Moreover, it is expected the game model can be fully quantified for further application 
by means of integration with case studies.  
 
Similarly, when discussing game theory application to the supply chain (in Chapter 6), 
it is expected that the mathematical model can be fully quantified for further application 
by means of integration with more case studies. The priority of reducing environmental 
risk and carbon footprint in different scenarios of the supply chain network will also be 
considered.  
 
The game theoretical approach in this study mainly focuses on the static normal form 
game to provide strategies selected by government and manufacturers. Future study 
could discuss other game forms, such as dynamic, repeating, signal game etc (Rasmusen, 
2007). Moreover, the game relationship can be more interactive, not only restricting it 
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to the non-cooperative game, but also developing it as an evolutionary or cooperative 
game.  
 
9.3.3 Materials selection 
In this study, the evaluation criteria for materials selection are generic in the context of 
‗sustainable development‘. This situation can be improved further to involve other 
typical parameters considered during the process of materials selection, e.g. physical 
and chemical properties of materials, materials performance for the specific process 
industries, thus to make the evaluation results more convincing in various application 
scenarios. Secondly, the ‗Binary Dominance Matrix‘ can be improved by using 
alternative methods of weight determination, e.g. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), 
Entropy method, fuzzy logic etc to compare their accuracy. In addition, the 
computational tool can also be improved by including other important aspects such as 
market demand and materials performance. It is expected that this approach can be 
applied to more case scenarios, to examine the validity and sensitivity of the grey 
evaluation model.  
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Appendix A: User manual for decision support tool  
A.1 System introduction and requirement 
This appendix demonstrates a ‗decision support tool‘ for application by engineering 
designers and policy makers to reduce the environmental risk and the associated carbon 
footprint, as well as to help the designer identify novel solutions, mitigation strategies 
and select appropriate materials for cleaner production. This decision support tool is 
entitled ―Environmental Risk Management System for Hazardous Waste Materials‖, 
developed and encapsulated by the Visual Basic 6.0 programming (See Fig.A.1.1). The 
decision support tool should be operated based upon the ―Windows XP‖ system or even 
a higher system, i.e. ―Windows 7‖. Moreover, the Windows operation system should 
install the ‗Microsoft Excel 2007‘ or even higher ‗Microsoft Excel 2010‘ for further 
application.  
 
 
Fig.A.1.1. Installation of the developed decision support tool 
 
While double clicking on the ‗decision support tool‘.exe, there are five sub modules 
within the tool, ‗carbon footprint of products and carbon footprint intensity‘, ‗Gambit 
simulation‘, ‗environmental impact assessment (Carbon footprint measurement)‘, ‗Two 
player‘s game for decision-making‘ and ‗materials selection for cleaner industrial 
application‘. Each sub-module can be accessed by clicking the corresponding button in 
the interface of the decision support tool (See Fig.A.1.2). The detailed functionality of 
each sub-module is introduced in the following sections. 
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Fig.A.1.2. Interface of the developed decision support tool 
 
A.2 Products’ carbon footprint and intensity 
This module is used to measure the various products‘ carbon footprints and their 
corresponding carbon footprint intensity (CFI), which has been defined in the Chapter 3. 
The products have been categorized into five groups in terms of their applications, e.g. 
heavy industrial products, light industrial products, food and drink and ‗other 
commercial‘ products. The carbon footprint emission factors, derived from an 
input-output model developed by Small World Consulting Ltd, in collaboration with 
Lancaster University (Berners-Lee, 2010), have been converted to carbon footprint 
intensity in units of kilograms per Pound Sterling (￡) of output based on the retail 
prices. 
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The first frame shows the carbon footprint measurement for heavy industrial products, 
in which coal, oil and gas, metal ores, coke etc., is included (See Fig.A.2.1). The 
product type, annual expense, emissions factor and carbon footprint are shown in the 
left side, whilst the carbon footprint intensity of each product is set to display in the 
right side. In addition, there are five buttons in the left corner, as ‗Calculation‘, ‗Show 
carbon footprint intensity‘, ‗Clear‘, ‗Next group of products‘, ‗Return‘, 
respectively.  
 
 
Fig.A.2.1. Carbon footprint measurement for heavy industrial products 
 
Here, ‗1 pound‘ is assumed to be the annual expense for each product as a 
representative example to demonstrate how to operate the functional module. While 
filling out the annual expense for each heavy industrial product in terms of British 
Pounds (￡), the corresponding carbon footprint will be calculated by clicking the 
button ‗Calculation‘ and shown in the output boxes. Once clicking the button ‗Show 
carbon footprint intensity‘, the risk-based diagram for each product will be displayed, 
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e.g. coal, iron and steel, metal casting and cement show high carbon footprint intensity 
(See Fig.A.2.2). If the annual expense of certain product needs to be revised, or if the 
carbon footprint requires calculating again, click the ‗Clear‘ button to eliminate the 
previous input. Click the ‗Return‘ button to escape this functional module, whilst 
switching to the main frame of the decision support tool. 
 
 
Fig.A.2.2. Carbon footprint and its intensity for heavy industrial product 
 
Click the button ‗Next group of products‘, the modular frame will be switched to the 
carbon footprint measurement for light industrial products (See Fig.A.2.3). Similar to 
the above assumption, ‗1 pound‘ is representative to be the annual expense for each 
product. Fig.A.2.4 shows the corresponding carbon footprint in the output box, once 
inputting the annual expense for each heavy industrial product in terms of British 
Pounds (￡). Furthermore, the carbon footprint intensities for all the products are 
displayed in the assigned frame, by clicking ‗Show carbon footprint intensity‘ at the 
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left corner. Click the ‗Return‘ button to return to the interface of carbon footprint 
measurement for heavy industrial products.  
 
 
Fig.A.2.3. Carbon footprint measurement for light industrial products 
 
 
Fig.A.2.4. Carbon footprint and its intensity for light industrial product 
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The next group of products is ‗food and drink‘, including the processed meat, oils, fruit, 
dairy products, soft drinks etc (See Fig.A.2.5). While submitting ‗1‘ as the 
representative annual expense to each input box, the corresponding carbon footprint can 
be calculated by clicking the button ‗Calculation‘. Subsequently, the carbon footprint 
intensity for each product is show in the right side (See Fig.A.2.6).It is clear that the 
carbon footprint intensity of food and drink is lower than industrial products. If the 
annual expense of certain product needs to be revised, or if the carbon footprint requires 
calculating again, click the ‗Clear‘ button to eliminate the previous input.  
 
 
Fig.A.2.5. Carbon footprint measurement for food and drink 
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Fig.A.2.6. Carbon footprint and its intensity of food and drink 
 
There are 18 products in the category of house-ware, such as furniture, domestic 
appliances, cutlery etc, which have been displayed in two forms of the system module. 
While still using ‗1‘ pound as the annual expense for each household product, the 
corresponding carbon footprint can be derived from clicking the button ‗Calculation‘. 
Similarly, once clicking the button ‗Show carbon footprint intensity‘, the risk-based 
carbon labelling diagram for each product will be displayed (See Fig.A.2.7 and 
Fig.A.2.8). It is clear that heavy industrial products generate the highest carbon 
footprint, in which all the products are identified as having at least medium carbon 
footprint intensity, with five precursor materials being extremely high. However, light 
industrial products contribute lower carbon emissions than heavy ones, and the group of 
groceries shows the least carbon footprint intensity compared with heavy and light 
industrial products. If the annual expense of certain product needs to be revised, or if the 
carbon footprint requires calculating again, click the ‗Clear‘ button to eliminate the 
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previous input. Click the ‗Return‘ button to switch to the last group of measured 
products.  
 
 
Fig.A.2.7. Carbon footprint and its intensity of selected household products (Form 1) 
 
 
Fig.A.2.8. Carbon footprint and its intensity of selected household products (Form 2) 
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Once clicking the button ‗Next group of products‘, the form of carbon footprint 
measurement for ‗other commercial products‘ is displayed, including chemicals, 
pesticides, fertilizers etc. While fill ―1‖ in the annual expense box for each product, the 
corresponding carbon footprint in shown in the output box followed by ‗Calculation‘ 
clicking. If ‗Show carbon footprint intensity‘ is triggered, the intensity level for each 
product will be shown in the right side (See Fig.A.2.9). While escaping the functional 
module for products‘ carbon footprint measurement, click the ‗Return to DSS‘ button 
to go back to the main interface of the decision support tool. 
 
 
Fig.A.2.9. Carbon footprint and its intensity of ‗other commercial product‘ 
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A.3 Gambit simulation  
The ‗Gambit‘ simulation tool is developed by Mckelvey et al. (2007, 2010), which is 
used to build and analyze certain extensive and strategic games (See Fig.A.3.1). Chapter 
5 has employed ‗Gambit‘ to simulate the created game model followed by a number of 
set scenarios, in which government and manufacturers‘ actions are discussed. In this 
section, a one-off game ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ will be simulated to demonstrate how to 
use this tool, in terms of the strategic game form.  
 
 
Fig.A.3.1. Screen shot the ‗Gambit‘ tool 
 
At first, select the icon of strategic game panel in the Gambit tool , and assume 
that there are two players who are called ―Rui‖, ―Gary‖ separately, as two prisoners 
involved in this game. Both of them have two strategies ―not confess‖ and ―confess‖ for 
determination, in which red color is represented for Rui‘s strategy and blue for Gary‘s. 
The payoff matrix of the above example ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ presented in Chapter 4, 
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are used in this simple simulation. Fig.A.3.2 shows all the above information, ‗players‘, 
‗payoffs‘ and ‗strategies‘ are input the ‗Gambit‘ tool.  
 
 
Fig.A.3.2. Payoff matrix of the ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ 
 
It is considered that the game is enumerated the result with Rui‘s strategic action at first 
(red colour), then by Gary‘s strategic action (blue colour). Thus, the payoffs matrix can 
be displayed in Fig.A.3.3, by dragging the player icon  from the left of Gary‘s 
name in the list of players and dropping it on the right side of Rui‘s strategy label 
column.  
 
 
Fig A.3.3. ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ with Rui‘s choice first 
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Strategies that are strictly dominated can be eliminated iteratively by the ‗dominance‘ 
panel, which is shown in the ‗Tools‘ dropdown list. Here, the dominated action is 
defined by Gambit tool as the action which shows always worse than another, 
regardless of beliefs at the information set (Mckelvey, et al., 2010). In this game, the 
strategy of ‗not confess‘ is strictly dominated by both players. Therefore, confess as the 
dominated strategy is labelled with ―X‖ cross for both two players Rui and Gary. In 
addition, their corresponding payoffs are also marked with ―X‖ cross. Fig.A.3.4 shows 
that all the dominated strategy for both players is crossed out.  
 
 
Fig.A.3.4. Dominated strategy crossed out 
 
With the dominated strategy being crossed out, Fig.A.3.5 suggests that the optimal 
strategy for both prisoners is to confess by clicking the icon . The reason for this 
situation results from the dominant strategies determination. A dominant strategy is the 
best strategy for a player to adopt in a game no matter what strategies will be chosen by 
the other players (Mankiw, 1998). Since Rui‘s choice should be considered first, to 
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confess is his dominant strategy regardless of whether Gary would confess or not. The 
reason is that if Rui decides to confess, he will spend less time in the prison maybe 
released or sentenced six year. On the contrary, if Rui does not confess, he may be 
suffered harsh sentence as ten years with greater probability by the reason that he is not 
sure whether Gary would cooperate with him as not confess for his initial 
determination. Similarly, Gary faces the same situation like Rui, and he would probably 
choose the same way. Gary may prefer confessing rather than confessing. Consequently, 
to confess is also a dominant strategy for Gary.  
 
 
Fig.A.3.5. Dominant strategy for ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ 
 
Accordingly, the Nash Equilibrium can be computed by clicking the icon , whilst 
a dialog box is coming out (See Fig.A.3.6). In this study, all the Nash Equilibrium 
should be calculated by the Gambit‘s recommended method. While clicking the ―OK‖ 
button, the computation result is shown in Fig.A.3.7. This result also suggests a pure 
strategy, which is a game with probability of one given to the selected strategy and zero 
to others (Romp, 1997), with the probability of one being calculated for strategy 
‗confess‘.  
 
252 
 
 
 
Fig.A.3.6. Nash Equilibrium computation 
 
 
 
Fig.A.3.7. Nash Equilibrium computation result 
 
The ‗Gambit‘ tool also provides a novel approach called ‗Quantal Response 
Equilibrium‘ (QRE) to search the subset of Nash equilibria by means of selection the 
‗QRE‘ from the ‗Tools‘ dropdown list. This approach uses imperfect or noisy 
expectations logic instead of the perfectly rational expectations logic, when searching 
for the Nash Equilibrium (McKelvey and PalFrey, 1995).  
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Fig.A.3.8 shows how the ‗QRE‘ approach is used to search Nash Equilibrium. As the 
QRE model is a function of probability distribution and the error of choice selection, 
Lambda (λ) in the figure is related to the level of error in expectation. For 0  , the 
actions are composed of errors, and for   , there is no error. If both players, 
government and manufacturers, evaluate their expected payoffs in an unbiased way, the 
probabilities of each strategy being selected should be the same at the beginning of the 
game, that is why all the graphs in Fig.A.3.8 start at 0.5. As Lambda tends to infinity 
(∞), the Nash Equilibrium converges to a unique value. For example in this game 
example, the pair of Nash Equilibrium is ‗confess-confess‘.  
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Fig.A.3.8. Quantal response equilibrium approach for ―Prisoner‘s dilemma‖ 
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A.4 Two players’ game for decision making 
This module is designed based upon ‗Two-Person Non-cooperative Game Theory‘, 
which is mainly used in the Chapter 7. Game theory can be understood as an insightful 
tool to understand the possible relationships of cooperation or competition, whilst 
decision makers taking different actions (Rasmusen, 2007). In particular, game theory 
provides the perspective for business managers or those who interact with management 
to find out optimal strategies achieving commercial sustainability, as well as better 
understand the nature of incentives, conflict on decision making and how strategic 
actions affect the short or long term business (Kelly, 2003; Geckil and Anderson, 2010). 
There are three important factors being considered by game theory for decision making, 
as ‗players‘, ‗actions‘, ‗payoffs‘ separately (see Fig.A.4.1).  
 
Fig.A.4.1. Screenshot of the ‗two players game for decision making‘ 
 
256 
 
 
‗Players‘ in a game can be deemed as the individuals who make decisions (Romp, 
1995). At least two players should be involved in the game situation, since that this 
functional module is based upon ‗two players‘ game‘. Furthermore, player can be 
considered as a general entity, i.e. a manufacturer, corporation, nation etc (Straffin, 
1993). In some special cases, player can be also seen as a ‗Pseudo-player‘, such as 
weather, economic situation (depression), etc (Rasmusen, 2007). ‗Action‘ is similar to 
strategy, which presents how a player can move in a game situation. For instance, a 
player‘s actions can depend upon the observation of other players‘ movement in the 
game (Romp, 1995; Rasmusen, 2007). Once the potential actions have been determined 
in the game, different pay-offs will be generated accordingly and represented in the 
form of matrix. The payoffs can be related to the monetary value, i.e. economic profits, 
or the utility that players received in the game (Romp, 1995). In addition, it is assumed 
each player is rational in the game, whose action only cares about self-interest.  
 
As a simple case to demonstrate how to use this functional module, two players have 
been defined as ‗Manufacturer‘ and ‗Customer‘, respectively, and suppose each of them 
has two available actions to lead their further action. For Manufacturer, the possible 
actions are: {SN, SO} which indicate that whether manufacturer will sell the new 
products (SN) or sell the old products (SO). The biggest difference between the new and 
old products is that the new one has taken environmental indicators into account, by 
means of reducing the inherent risk and associated carbon footprint to make products be 
more environmentally friendly. Correspondingly, there are two strategies for customers 
which are {WB, UWB}. Action WB means that customers are willing to buy the 
products no matter whether the products are environmental friendly, as well as NWB 
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indicates the contrary consuming behaviour that customers are unwilling to buy both of 
these two products (See Fig.A.4.2).  
 
Fig.A.4.2. Example game situation between Manufacturer and Customer 
 
Payoffs corresponding to the actions can be input as the real monetary value or any 
logic unit. With the payoffs being adjusted, the game solution can be varied 
accordingly. For example in the above example, the payoffs are determined by the 
potential economic profits, compared with the cost which is quantified by 1 unit. 
Fig.A.4.3 shows the simplest case is that Manufacturer will gain 3 units whilst 
consumers favouring the new environmental friendly products, as well as Customer can 
save 20% in comparison with the Recommended Retail Price (RRP). However, 
Manufacturer will lose 1.5 units if Customers are not interested in the new products and 
thus unwilling to buy. With regard to the old products sell, Manufacturer can gain 2.5 
units once customer has decided to purchase, whist saving 35% for customer. Moreover, 
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only 0.5 units will be lost if customer is unwilling to buy the old products. No matter 
Consumer takes actions on not buying new or old products, no economic saving will be 
generated as the payoff is 0.  
 
Fig.A.4.3. Payoffs for different actions 
 
Once all the payoffs have been determined in the game situation, dominant strategy can 
be found by means of clicking the button of ‗Solution‘. A dominant strategy is defined 
as the optimal strategy for a player no matter what the other player chooses (Geckil and 
Anderson, 2010). The example shows the solution is that both players choose action 1, 
which is the unique dominant strategy of the game. In this case, Manufacturer will 
provide new environmental soundly products for the market, as well as customers are 
willing to buy (see Fig.A.4.4). If other payoffs need to be modified, or if another game 
situation is proposed to resolve, click the ‗Clear‘ button to eliminate the previous input 
and determine new numerical value for ‗Players‘, ‗Actions‘ and ‗Payoffs‘. When 
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escaping this functional module, click the ‗Return‘ button to return the main interface of 
the decision support tool. 
 
 
Fig.A.4.4. Solution of the example game  
 
A.5 Environmental impact assessment 
This functional module is mainly used in both Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 for carbon 
footprint measurement in the supply chain network. There are three stages being 
considered, as production, transportation and waste disposal. The approach for carbon 
footprint measurement is developed by Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA), to apply green house gases emission factor multiplied by activity 
data. Activity data of supply chain network mainly reflect the energy consumption in 
the process of production and transportation, amount of waste production etc. The 
corresponding greenhouse emission factors are derived from the DEFRA GHG 
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Conversion Factors Guidelines (2009). However, this is a simplified approach for 
carbon footprint measurement, which only takes the direct energy consumption into 
account. Once clicking the button ‗Environmental Impact Assessment‘ from the 
interface of the decision support tool, the first stage as ―Direct Energy Consumption in 
the Industrial Processes and Product Use‖ is displayed (see Fig.A.5.1).  
 
Fig.A.5.1. Direct Energy Consumption in the Industrial Processes and Product Use 
 
All the energy consumptions are measured annually by using the unit of ‗tonne‘, and the 
carbon footprint is measured by ‗Kilogram‘. There are two buttons at the left corner, 
‗Calculation‘ and ‗Next stage‘, respectively. When all the information of annual 
energy consumption submitted by means of the ‗Calculation‘ button, the carbon 
footprint of each kind of energy can be produced in the corresponding blank boxes and 
the total carbon footprint will show in the right corner. Once finishing the calculation, 
click ‗Next stage‘ to move to the transportation stage.  
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In order to measure the carbon footprint during the product transportation, four common 
used fuels have been considered, petrol, diesel, liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and 
compressed natural gas (CNG) (See Fig.A.5.2). However, their measure units are 
slightly different, as the former three use ‗litre‘, whilst the latter one uses ‗kilogram‘. 
Once inputting the annual using amounts for each type of fuel, the corresponding 
carbon footprint and the total carbon footprint of the transportation stage can be 
calculated by clicking the button ‗Calculation‘. If the carbon footprint in the process 
industrial production wants to be reviewed, click the button ‗Return to the above stage‘ 
to return. Conversely, click ‗Next stage‘ and move to the waste disposal stage. 
 
Fig.A.5.2. Carbon footprint measurement in the transportation stage 
 
Fig.A.5.3 shows that 16 types of waste materials are considered to measure their carbon 
footprint in the stage of final disposal, such as paper and card, wood, textiles, glass, 
tyres etc. When the information of annual waste production is input, the corresponding 
carbon footprint can be output. Similar to the transportation stage, If the carbon 
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footprint in the process of production and transportation want to be reviewed, click the 
button ‗Return to the above stage‘ to return. Moreover, the summary information for 
the three measured stages has been provided followed by clicking the button ‗See 
summary‘.  
 
 
Fig.A.5.3. Carbon footprint of different waste materials 
 
In the summary section, the carbon footprints calculated for the three stages (Production, 
Transportation and Disposal) are listed sequentially. While clicking the button ‗Total 
carbon footprint‘, the carbon footprint of the whole supply chain network can be 
measured roughly by combining the carbon footprint at each stage together. Click the 
‗Quit‘ button to escape this functional module, and return to the main interface of the 
decision support tool (See Fig.A.5.4). 
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Fig.A.5.4. Summary of total carbon footprint in the supply chain 
 
A.6 Materials selection for cleaner industrial production 
In order to help the engineer or designer employ the grey analysis more conveniently, as 
well as simplify the computation complexity, this approach has been embodied into a 
computational tool based on a spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel 2007). This functional 
module has been divided into two modules, representing the input parameters and the 
output of the analysis results.  
 
As the ‗Scirus‘ case example has been presented in Chapter 8 in terms of the 
screenshots, following illustration is using the weighting value assigned by the product 
manager of the cited handbag manufacturer. Fig.A.6.1 depicts the input module of the 
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developed tool, starting with the weighting value determination by marking 1, 0 or 0.5 
in the designed ‗binary-dominance matrix‘ table. Then, enter the numerical value for 
each indicator derived from the case example, shown in Fig.A.6.2.  
 
When all the information has been submitted, the evaluation result of the case example 
can be calculated by means of the spreadsheet programming, and a sequence of the 
evaluated materials can be ranked from the highest to the lowest grade, shown in 
Fig.A.6.3. Thus, material E is the most ‗environmentally friendly‘ material among the 
five PVC materials, with material A the least.  
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Fig.A.6.1. Weighting value determination for each indicator 
 
 
Fig.A.6.2. Numerical values input for each indicator 
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Fig.A.6.3. Grey evaluation result of the case example 
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